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THE FINDINGS OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 6, 2007

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THE FINDINGS OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez, and Corker.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Jessica L. Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.

Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; David E. Bonine and James Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; Colleen J. Shogan, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski and Nathan Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant

to Senator Chambliss; and David Hanke and Russell J. Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Today we welcome General Jim Jones and the other members of the Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. We thank them for their extremely important work that they have done for our country.

Service to country is nothing new to these commissioners. They have all served with great distinction in military or police capacities in their earlier careers. We very much appreciate the willingness of the members of this Commission to risk life and limb during three separate visits of relatively long duration in a dangerous Iraq to acquire the insights and to make the important findings and recommendations contained in this report.

This Commission was established by congressional legislation which was authored by Senator Warner, who also consulted frequently with the Commission to ensure that no roadblocks were hindering the completion of their important work in time to inform the upcoming critical debates on Iraq policy.

The Commission was tasked to assess the readiness of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq, to deny safe haven to international terrorists, to bring greater security to Iraq's provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, to end sectarian violence, and to achieve national reconciliation. On that last point, I would note that the Commission found that the "Iraqi army and police services have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but, ultimately, the ISFs will reflect the society from which they are drawn. Political reconciliation, the Commission found, is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq."

The Commission also assessed "the single most important event that could immediately and favorably affect Iraq's direction and security is political reconciliation focused on ending sectarian violence and hatred. Sustained progress within the ISFs depends on such a political agreement."

The Commission was further tasked to evaluate the capacity of the ISFs in key functional areas and to what extent continued U.S. support is needed by the ISFs. The Commission's major findings are not surprising to those of us who also visit Iraq frequently. They're consistent with what we found on our last trip there, just last month. The Iraqi army is making progress and is increasingly capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations, either independently or with coalition support. What is needed to achieve more independent operations, the Commission finds, include the "key enablers of combat support, particularly aviation, intelligence, communications, and combat service support, particularly logistics and maintenance functions. For those, the Iraqi army will continue to depend on coalition support."

The Ministry of the Interior and the police, on the other hand, are, in the Commission's words: "dysfunctional, and require a major overhaul." They are the creation and tools of sectarian Iraqi politicians. The question is, of course, how to convince the Iraqi government to take the necessary steps to carry out the overhaul.

The Commission believes, and has found, that "The Iraqi army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from coalition forces, but that the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12 to 18 months." The key word is "independently." However, the Commission also believes that the coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, realigned, and retasked as the Iraqi army is able to take on more responsibility for daily combat operations.

Now, according to the statistics that we have from the administration's quarterly report to Congress, well over half of the Iraqi army and police battalions can operate at least in the lead with coalition support. It's my observation that far fewer than that number are actually now in the lead. That raises the question, which I hope the Commission will address, as to why more Iraqi units should not be given the lead responsibility that they are capable of now, and why the adjustment, realignment, and retasking of coalition forces, which the Commission calls for, should not begin promptly.

One of the most significant Commission statements is the following, that "perceptions and reality are frequently at odds with each other when trying to understand Iraq's problems and progress." Nowhere is this more apparent than in the impressions drawn from seeing our massive logistics footprint, our many installations, and the number of personnel, military and civilian, especially in and around the Baghdad area. "The unintended message," the Commission writes, "that's conveyed is one of permanence, an occupying force, as it were. What is needed is the opposite impression, one that is lighter, less massive, and more expeditionary, significant reductions, consolidations, and realignments would appear to be possible and prudent."

So, the key issue that we're all going to be facing is what reductions in U.S. forces will be the result of the adjustment, realignment, and retasking of coalition forces which the Commission calls for.

During our recent visit, one U.S. soldier, who is on his third deployment to Iraq, told us that the Iraqis will let U.S. soldiers do the job that they're supposed to be doing forever, and that we need to let them do it on their own.

It is, indeed, long overdue that we cut the cords of dependence, push the Iraqis to take more responsibility and ownership by giving them the lead in counterinsurgency operations. I believe that is the thrust of the Commission's recommendations.

Again, I thank the commissioners for their service to our Nation, for appearing at this hearing today.

Senator Warner will have an opening statement. I, again, want to thank him for the leadership which he has taken in putting the language in our law which created this Commission.

At the end of Senator Warner's statement, we'll turn to General Jones, and then we will have a 6-minute round, because votes are going to begin at 11:05. We expect up to five votes, and we're going to have to keep our hearing going during those votes, as best we can. I'll explain how I think we can best do that, after General Jones's statement.

Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and Senator McCain for scheduling this prompt hearing on this very important contribution to the dialogue and the gathering of a factual base for the benefit of the President and for the benefit of Congress, and, most importantly, for the benefit of the American people. Senator McCain will be here momentarily to make an opening statement.

But I want to say, right off, my gratitude to Senator Byrd for joining me in getting this particular piece of legislation, together with the other framework legislation requiring the report in July by the President, the report this month by the President, and to have the appearances of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. So, I thank you, Senator Byrd.

The reason that we came up with this legislation is that the foundation of all U.S. policies with regard to Iraq is predicated on the ability of this sovereign nation to muster the forces to train and inspire those forces to take over the security of this fledgling sovereign nation. I felt that, through the years, this committee, and other committees of Congress, had interrogated the Department of Defense (DOD) and other administration witnesses, time and time again, with regard to the status of the professional ability and the projections of the security force of Iraq. I'm not here to criticize those representations, but I felt it was important to have a totally independent analysis performed by individuals whose experience, collectively and individually, could bring to bear this report.

General Jones, I commend you—John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, General Joulwan, former North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Commander, and Chief Ramsey, whom I've known through the years—for doing this work and leading the other gentlemen, who are behind you here today, in this very important contribution.

On January 10, the President initiated, with a clear speech, the surge concept. When Senator Levin and I were in Iraq 2 weeks ago, we saw clear evidence that that the surge had achieved its goals in some phases, were measurable goals. But, at the same time, the President laid down in the speech, with clarity, that it was incumbent upon the Iraqi government to do the reconciliation, and that, the record shows today, has not come about.

You have drawn attention to the fact that military forces have done their role, but, if reconciliation were to take place, it would bring about a cessation of the hostilities, the mixture of hostilities—perhaps not al Qaeda, but the mixture of hostilities between, particularly, the Sunni and the Shia, that would be equivalent to several brigades of coalition forces performing their military duties. It's that important, reconciliation.

So, I thank you very much for your work. It will be studied carefully by Congress, and, most importantly, the American people, and I hope it will contribute to the President's analysis of where we go in the months to come.

I'd like to yield a minute or 2 of my time to Senator Byrd, if that's alright, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. If there's no objection, we would be happy to do that. I want to add my thanks to Senator Byrd. I failed to mention that the language, which created this Commission, was not just Senator Warner's language, but was the language that Senator Warner and Senator Byrd, together, worked on. We add our thanks to Senator Byrd.

Senator Byrd, could you give a few moments of your thoughts?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Levin.

I thank my good friend and colleague, that venerable John Warner, a great Virginian, for his leadership on this issue. It has been my honor and my privilege to work together with this man—he is a great man—many, many times over the years, always with the goal of doing what is best for the country, first and foremost. It was in that spirit that my friend approached me about establishing an independent commission to assess Iraq's security forces. I was proud to join him as a cosponsor of the amendment to do so.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much.

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman? Could I just make one comment? Not a statement, but—I will not be able to stay here, because I am the ranking member of the Environment and Public Works Committee, and we have a very critical meeting, but I just want to echo the remarks of Senator Warner, and, particularly, General Jones, how much I enjoyed being with you on your last mission there before your retirement. I have to say this, on my 15th trip, last week, to the area of responsibility, I just get so excited about good things that are happening. The surge is having very positive results, and thank you for all your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. General Jones?

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.) CHAIRMAN, INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ; ACCOMPANIED BY COMMISSIONERS GEN JOHN N. ABRAMS, USA (RET.); LT. GEN. MARTIN R. BERNDT, USMC (RET.); GEN. CHARLES G. BOYD, USAF (RET.); SGT. MAJ. DWIGHT J. BROWN, USA (RET.); HON. TERRANCE GAINER; HON. JOHN J. HAMRE; COL. MICHAEL HEIDINGSFIELD, USAF (RET.); ADM GREGORY G. JOHNSON, USN (RET.); GEN GEORGE A. JOULWAN, USA (RET.); LTG JAMES C. KING, USA (RET.); ASST. CHIEF CONSTABLE DUNCAN MCCAUSLAND; LT. GEN. GARY S. MCKISSOCK, USMC (RET.); SGT. MAJ. ALFORD L. MCMICHAEL, USMC (RET.); MAJ. GEN. ARNOLD L. PUNARO, USMC (RET.); AND CHIEF CHARLES H. RAMSEY

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee, it's a great honor to be here today, and we all thank you for the opportunity to address you this morning about the work of our Commission over the past few months, and to have a discussion on our assessment.

On behalf of the Commission, I would also like to thank Senator Warner and Senator Byrd for their vision and their work to bring about the legislation that enabled this Commission to come together. It has been a wonderful experience to work with a great

group of professionals, and we're honored to be here today to share our impressions with you.

Before I begin this morning, I'd like to take a minute to introduce my fellow commissioners to you. To carry out our mandate from Congress, we assembled a very highly-qualified team of 20 prominent senior retired military officers, chiefs of police, and a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, and, most importantly, two sergeants major who formed the balance of our team. This independent team, supported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, brought more than 500 cumulative years of military and defense experience, and 150 years of law enforcement experience in the professional disciplines that it was chartered to examine.

The Commission consists of ten syndicates which examined each element of the ISF and the principal crosscutting support issues. So, it's my pleasure to introduce our Commission to you.

First, let me introduce the members of our Army and Ground Forces Syndicate: General George Joulwan, United States Army (Retired), syndicate chair and, joining me at the witness table; General John Abrams, United States Army (Retired); General Charles Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps (Retired), who is not able to be here today, unfortunately; Lieutenant General John Van Alstyne, United States Army (Retired), also unable to be here today; former Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Alfred McMichael, United States Marine Corps (Retired); and Command Sergeant Major Dwight Brown, United States Army (Retired); Brigadier General Richard Potter, United States Army (Retired), who examined the Iraqi special forces, and is not able to be here today. Our Commission also benefited from the experience of Admiral Gregory Johnson, United States Navy (Retired), who principally addressed the issues surrounding the Iraqi navy; General Chuck Boyd, United States Air Force (Retired), who focused on the Iraqi air force and major strategic issues.

The Commission benefited from over 150 years of law enforcement experience, headed by Chief Charles Ramsey, who joins me at the witness table. Chief Ramsey assembled a distinguished group of police chiefs: The Honorable Terry Gainer, who you also know as your Senate Sergeant-at-Arms; Chief John Timoney, chief of police of the Miami Police Department, who could not be here today; Chief Michael Heidensfield, a former contingent commander for the Police Advisory Mission in Iraq; Assistant Chief Constable Duncan McCausland, who joined our Commission from Belfast, Northern Ireland, to complement this extraordinary team of distinguished law enforcement officials. We also have Lieutenant General Martin Berndt, United States Marine Corps (Retired), who focused on the Iraqi border security and the Ministry of the Interior.

We also had a number of commissioners who examined crosscutting issues relative to the ISFs: The Honorable Dr. John Hamre, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, who joins us at the witness table, focused on resource allocation and budget issues; Lieutenant General James King, United States Army (Retired), who focused on intelligence; Major General Arnold Punaro, United States Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), who focused on personnel; and

Lieutenant General Gary S. McKissock, United States Marine Corps (Retired), who focused on logistics.

I'm also grateful and pleased to introduce staff director Christine Warmuth, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. We also had the benefit of a group of talented strategic advisors: James Locher, P.T. Henry, John Raidt, Sarah Farnsworth, and Colonel Art White, United States Marine Corps Reserve.

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, we were asked to conduct an independent assessment of the ISFs and to report back to the appropriate committees no later than 120 days from the date of enactment. As laid out in our enacting legislation, our report addresses the readiness of the ISFs in four principal areas: their ability to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, their ability to deny international terrorists safe haven, their ability to bring greater security to Iraq's 18 provinces within the next 12 to 18 months, and their ability to bring an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation.

In addition, the Commission was tasked with an assessment of ISF capabilities in the areas of training, equipping, command-and-control, intelligence, and logistics.

Each of the 10 syndicates was led by a senior commissioner and focused on either a discrete component of the ISFs or a crosscutting functional area. Syndicate inputs were subject to review and integration by all Commission members.

During the course of its study, the Commission traveled widely throughout Iraq, on three separate occasions, spending a total of 3 weeks on the ground to gather facts and impressions firsthand.

I will now refer to some charts, and I will also guide you through where you can find those charts in your individual reports, just mentioning the pages.

On pages 23 and 24 of your report, figures 1 and 2 will demonstrate that we made more than 70 site visits in Iraq—as you can see from the charts—including visits to Iraqi military and ministerial headquarters in the various command centers, training facilities, and operating bases. We also visited Iraqi police stations, joint security stations, and law enforcement academies, and commissioners traveled to border, port, and internal security installations, as well as the coalition facilities designed to assist with Iraqi security training and transition.

These visits were invaluable, as they allowed us a firsthand look at the real work being accomplished daily by members of the ISFs and their dedicated coalition partners.

The Commission met with more than 100 Iraqi officials, more than 100 U.S. current and former government officials, and more than a dozen leading nongovernmental experts on the ISFs.

Finally, the Commission examined previous studies and reports, official data, and documents with any information relevant to the performance and status of the ISFs.

We examined their rate of progress and their prospects for fulfilling the responsibilities of a professional and effective security force.

Before addressing our key findings, I want to emphasize that the findings and recommendations of this Commission were unanimous.

I would also like to note that the Commission could not have performed its work without the generous assistance and support of many, many individuals. In particular, we're grateful for the support provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Multinational Force-Iraq, and the entire military chain of command, as well as the Department of State and Embassy Baghdad. We deeply appreciate the openness we were shown by many officials in the Government of Iraq.

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, the ISFs are composed of two major components: the Iraqi military and the Iraqi police. The Commission examined both components and their governing ministries.

The Iraqi military includes the army, the special forces, the air force, and the navy, and they operate under the Ministry of Defense. They number approximately 152,000 personnel today.

The Iraqi police forces includes the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the border forces, the Facilities Protection Services, and the Coast Guard, and they operate under the Ministry of the Interior. Their aggregate number is approximately 324,000 today.

In terms of overall results, the consensus opinion of the Commission is that the most positive event that can occur in the near-term to influence progress in Iraq is a government-led political reconciliation which leads to an end, or a dramatic reduction, in sectarian violence. Everything seems to flow from this point, to include the likelihood of a successful conclusion to our mission. Absent such an event, it will be more difficult and will take longer to be successful. Our overall evaluation is that real progress has been achieved, but, as we will show, it has been uneven across the ISFs.

With regard to the Ministry of Defense, we judge good progress being made, a strategic vision for the future, an eagerness to take on more responsibility, thousands of young Iraqis are now eager to join the armed forces, and are doing so. We have evidence of a worrisome bureaucracy, from the standpoint of effectiveness and efficiency, which inhibits the distribution of equipment and supplies from getting to the Iraqi front lines. The army is led by four Shia, four Kurdish, and three Sunni divisions that comprise the Iraqi armed forces.

With regard to the Iraqi army, impressive progress in ability and willingness to defend against internal threats to the nation have been noted. Working with police units, where possible, to bolster their capability shortfalls, they are keen to take on more missions. This is an army that is now providing 10 operational divisions in the field, going to 13 divisions in 2008.

I refer you to the chart on army growth, on page 57 of your report, listed as figure 11.

Sectarian problems appear to be minor, as compared to other institutions that we saw in Iraq. Basic elements necessary to grow the army appear to be in place, and are functioning. As I mentioned earlier, there seems to be an unlimited amount of volunteers to serve in this new army.

An alarming development with regard to the existence of duplicate chains of command and intelligence-gathering institutions was noted, and, also was noted, the requirement for needed improvement in cooperation with other ministries; in particular, the Min-

istry of the Interior. This Iraqi army cannot yet operate independently, due to a continuing lack in logistics, supply, mobility, and effective national command-and-control.

While it cannot defend against the external threats to the nation, particularly along the borders of Syria and Iran, it is able to do more each day in the defense—along the lines of internal security.

The special forces of the army of Iraq are judged to be the most capable and professionally effective military unit in Iraq, as good as any in the Gulf region. However, they continue to lack in mobility and support systems, as well.

With regard to the navy and the air force, they are in their early development. It was judged that they are making satisfactory progress. The Commission recommends consideration be given to forming a single maritime force for a nation that has a 36-mile coastline. Currently, the navy and the coast guard are formed under two separate ministries.

Turning to the Ministry of the Interior, the Commission judges this ministry to be very weak, despite recent attempts to change out senior personnel. Little progress has been made to date with regard to the efficiencies and effectiveness in discharging its functions. There is evidence of sectarian partisanship, indications of corruption and of a failed bureaucracy, little evidence of willingness to cooperate with other ministries, and evidence that this ministry is influenced by forces outside of the governmental structures.

I refer you to a chart on the Ministry of Interior Forces Growth, on page 87 of our report.

The Iraqi Police Service, which is under the Ministry of the Interior, numbers approximately 230,000 policemen. The salaries of police are provided by the government, but they don't always reach the local and regional levels, which fuels sectarian tension.

Police by local ethnically representative units works best for the time being. There is an unlimited manpower pool to choose from, but, overall, the progress of police forces is judged to be unsatisfactory.

Regarding the National Police, which numbers approximately 25,000, the Commission has recommended disbanding and reorganizing of the National Police, which is judged to be overly sectarian, composed 85 percent of Shia policemen, heavy-handed in their mission execution, not trusted by people of other ethnic origins, and there are allegations of corruption that pervade this force, as well.

The Department of Border Enforcement, 37,000, also part of the Ministry of the Interior, is judged to be weak, poorly supported by the parent ministry, and unable to make a serious contribution against border threats, particularly coming from Iran and Syria.

Finally, the Facilities Protection Services, which is composed of 140,000 personnel, also suffers from a lack of leadership, equipment, training, and direction.

So, the overall conclusions, relative to our tasking, are as follows:

First is that the ISFs, as a whole, cannot yet defend the territorial integrity of Iraq. This is not necessarily an alarming conclusion.

Number two, improvement has been noted in the internal security missions. For example, in denying safe haven to terrorists. This improvement is likely to continue in the near future.

Number three, it is judged that the ISFs can bring greater security to the provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, assuming a continuing rate of progress.

Number four, the end of the sectarian violence has to be initiated by the Government of Iraq in order to be effective. U.S. and coalition support will be required until independent operational capability to defend against external threats to Iraq is achieved. Size and mission of coalition military forces could be altered in the near future as the Iraqi army and the police force continue to develop.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to close with a few additional observations. In addition to our specific mandate, the Commission desires to add some interpretive context to the findings and the capabilities pertaining to the ISFs. Our goal is to be helpful in trying to arrive at a way ahead that will enable success in this critical mission.

The strategic consequences of failure along national, regional, and global lines are significant. Similarly, the strategic consequences of success are equally impressive.

To reiterate, the Commission's overall assessment of the ISF is that there has been measurable, though uneven, progress.

I'd like to say a few words about the impact of the surge. Tactical success for both Iraq and coalition forces in the Baghdad region has been achieved, and I refer you to page 34 of the report, which has an illustrative figure.

This tactical success has been accompanied by the sudden loss of support for al Qaeda by the population and tribal leaders throughout al Anbar province. This has had the result of gaining approximately 35,000 to 40,000 fighters in support of the coalition, as opposed to fighting the coalition. I refer you to page 29 of your report, to look firsthand at some of the dramatic results that have been achieved in Anbar province.

The sudden rise in the capacity of day-to-day fighting of the Iraqi army also contributes to a favorable and confidence-building phenomenon.

You can also witness, by the contribution of the Iraqi army, unfortunately, a dramatic increase in the ISF casualties. If you would turn to page 38, you will see a chart that depicts both the coalition and ISF casualties as a result of the fighting.

We have achieved limited, but important, police success in local ethnic neighborhoods, especially in Anbar province. The positive trends we saw signaled a possibility of a strategic shift for coalition forces, perhaps commencing in 2008. Operational attention should be increasingly focused, and is increasingly required on the defense of the border regions and on the critical infrastructures of Iraq. The gradual shift of coalition to strategic overwatch positions, accompanied by force adjustments, is possible to envision. This is a very recent development.

The gradual transfer of combat operations against internal threats to the ISF is possible. Attention is needed to offset major destabilization efforts of Iran and Syria, which are ongoing and very worrisome.

The Commission also believes that it's possible to adjust the image of the coalition as an occupying force in Iraq to accompany a strategic shift of forces and mission set. This is an important element in our strategic messaging, both to our people and to the people of Iraq and the world at large. The force footprint should be adjusted, in our view, to represent an expeditionary capability and to combat the permanent-force image of today's presence. This will make an ultimate departure—an eventual departure much easier.

It's important to establish an Iraqi coalition transition headquarters, which would be the single focal point for all transition efforts, in the broad sense, military, political, economic, legal and this would show visible and consistent progress towards transition, which is a crucial message that people need to understand.

The Commission also recommends that all of Iraq's provinces should be transferred to Iraqi control, as a matter of policy. The provincial Iraqi control system, as currently explained, is that one-size-fits-all, which does not work, in our judgment, adequately. Full transfer of authority of all 18 provinces would bolster the Government of Iraq's political reach. I refer you to page 40 of the report.

Seven provinces have been transferred to Iraqi control, and there is a projection for others, as well. But the logic of such a system was not convincing to the Commission, and we believe that political control of the provinces should be transferred to the sovereign government, supplementing the transfer, of course, with mentoring and assistance to enable success.

To further modify our image as occupiers, the Commission recommends that consideration be given to enacting the Status of Forces Agreement as a visible means of reinforcing the sovereignty of Iraq. This would be consistent with the agreements that we have with many other nations, and all of our bases should fly both the U.S. and the Iraqi flags.

Lastly, the Commission noted a internal problem that only the United States can fix, and that has to do with regard to our national capacity to generate equipment in a rapid timeframe identified by U.S. commanders through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. This is a problem that requires some urgent attention. It will, when fixed, measurably contribute to increasing the readiness and capabilities of the ISFs.

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, my colleagues and I are ready to respond to any questions you might have with regard to our study.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Again, thank you, General and your colleagues, for your tremendous service to the Nation.

General, I'm going to ask you a series of questions to try to pinpoint some of the points that you've made in your report.

There are four categories of capabilities by which we assess the ISFs, is that correct?

General JONES. That's correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Category one is an Iraqi unit capable of independent operations. Would that be correct?

General JONES. That's correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Category two would be a unit which is capable of being in the lead with coalition support. Is that correct?

General JONES. Correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, the goal is to get more of the Iraqi units up to category one or two, is that correct?

General JONES. That's correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, there's few of the Iraqi units at level one, where they can operate independently, but, according to the chart that we got from the DOD, the majority of Iraqi units are already at level two. The figure we had is 89 of 159. Is that your understanding?

General JONES. I accept that.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. So that if the majority of the Iraqi units can already operate at either a one or a two level, does that not mean that we could transition the lead to Iraqi units as soon as those units are capable of being in the lead?

General JONES. Senator, if you don't mind, I will ask General Joulwan to augment my answer, because this is his specialty. But I think a general answer to your question would be yes, that we found evidence that Iraqi units are planning their own missions and executing their own missions, in close coordination with the coalition. We found that the presence of advisors and highly qualified teams of coalition members who are embedded with the units is absolutely the link that makes it possible. Of course, I come back on the fact that, even at level two, units of the Iraqi army need considerable combat support, combat service support, as you pointed out.

Chairmen LEVIN. Is it your understanding—and, General, you can just add a quick yes or no—that the majority of the Iraqi units that are capable of being in the lead is not reflected by all of those units being in the lead? There are some of those units that are a category two that are not yet in the lead. Is that a fair statement? Is that your understanding?

General JOULWAN. I would say so, yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, why is that? General, you were telling me, in the office, that the Australians, for instance, had moved much more quickly to put those units of the Iraqis that are capable of being in the lead, in the lead, with the Australians being much more in a support role. Why have we not followed that model?

General JONES. I think the short answer would be that it's situationally dependent. The criteria that exists in the province in the north would be completely different than the province in the south, and I think that metric has to be applied carefully and as evenly as possible. But without—again, trying to find a template that you can impose on the Iraqi army, and then simply walk away from it, is not a good policy.

Chairman LEVIN. Right.

General JONES. So, I think you have to be evenhanded, and you have to do it wherever you can. But the fact that it is going on is encouraging.

Chairman LEVIN. Is it not also your recommendation, on page 44, that Iraqi armed forces, "are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq?"

General JONES. That's correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Should that not happen as quickly as possible?

General JONES. Yes, within reasonable prudence, we agree with that.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, when this happens, is a reduction of U.S. forces likely to result as the Iraqis—and should it result, as the Iraqis assume greater responsibility?

General JONES. I think, of course, that will be the judgment of military commanders on the ground as they assess the totality of their mission. I would simply say that what's encouraging is that the combination of the police units and the Iraqi army, working together, can take on more responsibility for the internal threats, but the borders of Iraq, particularly the Syrian border, the Iranian border, remain very worrisome. So, what we believe is possible is some retasking, realignment, readjustment. Adjustment of forces can imply a reduction. But that would have to be studied as to how exactly to do that.

Chairman LEVIN. On page 130, your Commission finds—and you're referring here, as I understand it, to the number of personnel, military and civilian, as well as to the number of installations and the logistics. You say that, "Significant reductions, consolidations, and realignments would appear to be possible and prudent." Is that your finding?

General JONES. That's correct.

Chairman LEVIN. That's referring to all of the previous itemized items, which are logistics footprints, the number of installations, and the number of personnel, military and civilian?

General JONES. Correct.

Chairman LEVIN. So, that is, in your judgment, possible and prudent?

General JONES. Correct.

Chairman LEVIN. You made reference to this quote in your opening statement: "political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence."

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that a consensus finding on the part of all the commissioners?

General JONES. It is, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Did you make any findings as to why that political reconciliation has not been achieved by the Iraqi leaders?

General JONES. No, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Was that within your purview?

General JONES. It was a little bit outside of our purview, just the observed fact that it was not taking place was what we concluded.

Chairman LEVIN. My time is up.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank the members of this Commission. I don't think we've ever had a more outstanding group of people who have served our country with courage and dedication, such as the members of this Commission, and I'm grateful for their willingness to again serve and provide not only this committee and Congress, but the Nation, with their measured and experienced judgment. I especially want to thank you, General Jones.

I was especially taken by your concluding thoughts where you say, "While much remains to be done before success can be con-

fidently declared, the strategic consequences of failure, or even perceived failure, for the United States and the coalition are enormous." I think that's a very important conclusion. I believe that if we set a date for withdrawal, as we have debated on the floor of the Senate, and will probably again, we would do exactly that. Do you believe that, if we set a timeframe for withdrawal, that that would be in the United States' interest in the region?

General JONES. Senator, I'll speak for myself on this, but I think deadlines can work against us. I think a deadline of this magnitude would be against our national interest.

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. In your statement delivered to the committee, you keep pointing out that we have seen significant recent success. Is that an accurate depiction of some of your comments?

General JONES. Correct.

Senator MCCAIN. How do you account for that?

General JONES. I think a number of things. I'll just cite three, to be very brief. One is the statistical success of the tactic employed, called the "surge," which has had some impressive successes in the Baghdad region. Number two is the recent improvement over the last year, just in the last year, of the capability of the Iraqi army, which has shown itself to be willing to fight, not only by virtue of the number of missions it's taken on, but also by the number of casualties it's suffered. Number three is, in the fight against al Qaeda, and particularly in the Anbar province, which is a province that is one-third the size of the entire country—a very, very encouraging turnaround, where——

Senator MCCAIN. So, part of this success is directly related to the new tactic or strategy commonly known as the "surge," is that correct?

General JONES. I think the surge is a part of it. I think I would also ascribe the success that the coalition has had in training the Iraqi army and also the reversal of al Qaeda, because of their savagery against the people of the province.

Senator MCCAIN. If we went back, by mandating withdrawals and reducing our military presence too rapidly, some of the benefits of the tactic of the surge might be negated

General JONES. I think you have to adjust your force levels very carefully, make sure that you don't create the conditions that would have that happen, that's correct.

Senator MCCAIN. In answer to Senator Levin's question, you would rely to a large degree—not solely, but to a large degree—on the opinion of the commanders on the ground who are doing the fighting.

General JONES. Absolutely.

Senator MCCAIN. I think that's important, because there are a lot of people who are armchair generals who reside here in the air-conditioned comfort of Capitol Hill, who somehow do not trust the judgment of some of the finest leaders that our Nation has produced. There will be various proposals about troop reductions, announcing withdrawals, which may not comport with conditions on the ground.

I just have one other question. If we deploy troops to the Syrian and Iranian borders, that could lead to conflict between U.S. troops

and Syrian or Iranian troops. Have you taken into consideration that aspect of the redeployment to the borders of Syria and Iran?

General JONES. Senator, we have. We judge that the goings-on across the Iranian border, in particular, are of extreme severity and have the potential of at least delaying our efforts inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian border.

Senator MCCAIN. Are we, sooner or later, going to have to address the issue of Iran? That may be a little bit out of the purview of the Commission's charter, but are we, sooner or later, going to have to address the issue of the Iranian activities, including a recent statement by the president of Iran, who said, "Iran will fill the void in Iraq when the United States leaves"?

General JONES. That is a worrisome statement, obviously. But the Commission has concluded that the significance and the level of Iranian activity in Iraq is of such concern that we believe that more attention has to be paid to the territorial integrity of the country and what's going on across the borders. This will be the next step in the growth of the Iraqi army. Ultimately, the police will take care of the internal threats, and the army will defend Iraq. But it is too soon for them to be able to do that, even though that's one of our specific charters. They are just now getting to being able to do stage one, collectively. That's the internal defense. At the rate of growth that we've seen, they will get to the territorial issues, but, until then, our assessment is that coalition forces need to make a statement and move some of the capability out of the internal regions, which are more capably handled now, increasingly by the ISFs, to stem the tide of fighters, resources, weapons, and contraband coming across the borders.

Senator MCCAIN. Unfortunately, my time is up. I would like again to thank the members of this Commission, not only for their present work, but for their past service to our country. We're very grateful. I think you have given us some very, very important and useful information and, I think, a realistic assessment of the situation, at least from what I can determine.

Finally, General Jones, are you satisfied with the level of leadership that we have at all levels of our military that is now in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General JONES. I will speak for the Commission in providing that answer. We were extremely impressed by the leadership, both civilian and military, starting with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, but also the quality of the leadership in both the mission and in the military organization to do the job that they're asked to do.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I join welcoming General Jones and our panelists here, just echoing the sense that many of us who have had the privilege of being on this committee have listened to all of you at different times, and your service to the country is enormously appreciated. The Nation is grateful for your service, and we thank you for your presentation today.

General, you must be able to understand the confusion of the American people listening to your testimony today. Here we have the greatest military that the world has ever seen, fighting in Iraq, a country of 25 million people, which we defeated 10 years ago, fighting them now there for 4 long years and having the casualty rates that we have. Now we're hearing, "It's really an issue of national reconciliation and whether the Iraqis are really going to get their act together." You can understand why Americans are confused when they hear General Casey, in August 2006, say, "I can see that, over the next 12 to 18 months, the ISFs progressing to a point where they can take on the security responsibility for the country, with very little coalition support." They listened to General Casey tell—they're back home, and they're listening—2006—General Casey saying, "12 to 18 months, they're going to be able to fight." Then in June, DOD indicates that a total of 346,000 ISFs have been trained, more and more Iraqi army and National Police are in the lead in these areas. Then we hear your report this morning, 25,000 police are in an organization that's filled with corruption, ought to be disbanded; 37,000 border guards that need a great deal more training, a great deal more support, unreliable; the facilities protection, 140,000, they're weak. How long have we been training Iraqis over there? How long have we been training the Iraqi servicemen? How long has the United States been doing it? We've been doing it now since the time of the invasion, have we not?

General JONES. Correct.

Senator KENNEDY. We did it in the last 3 years, intensively, now. Don't you think Americans are wondering when the Iraqis are going to fight for their own country? When you tell us that it's going to take, now, another 12 to 18 months for the ISFs to be able to take on the security responsibilities, and then you indicate to us that, really, the fundamental issue is the issue political reconciliation. You're not enormously reassuring about the hopes of having a political reconciliation. We have the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report that supports just what you're saying. Government will continue to struggle to achieve a national-level political reconciliation—talking about months, possibly years.

So, what should the American people understand about when the Iraqis are going to begin to fight for their own country? When are they going to be able to relieve American servicemen who have been fighting nobly, courageously, valiantly—be able to get a policy that's worthy of their bravery and valor?

General JONES. Senator, you ask a very good question. It's a very complex situation. We tried to point out that the key to ending sectarian violence has to be found within the Iraqis themselves. They simply have to find the means by which they can lay down their arms. When they do that, the change internally in the country will be dramatic. That will allow a much greater acceleration to the end that we all hope we can achieve.

However, we tried to draw a distinction, which was why we say there's real progress, but that it's uneven, between the capabilities we found in the Ministry of Defense and the emerging Iraqi armed forces, and the Ministry of the Interior and its force structure of police forces. Our assessment is that, where the Iraqi army is con-

cerned, the Iraqi army is fighting. They do have 10 full divisions. They're going to 13 divisions by the following year. We have been to their training bases. We've seen their new recruits. We've seen their noncommissioned officer (NCO) schools. We've seen their academies. We've seen the NATO contribution to training young officers. We believe that, within their capabilities, such as they are, they are doing reasonably well and making a difference. We did not find the same optimism in the Ministry of Interior and the police forces.

So, our respectful conclusion is that more needs to be done to change that.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask you, can the adequate training continue with less than 160,000 American troops, as proposing?

General JONES. Let me ask General Joulwan, who headed that syndicate.

General JOULWAN. Senator, the quick answer is yes. I think what is important——

Senator KENNEDY. Let me go down the line a little bit.

Can it go down to 100,000, and still have the training? What's the figure?

General JOULWAN. I think what we have seen with what we call the "surge is a tactical success creating a secure environment" that should have been done 4 or 5 years ago, when we went in there. We're seeing that now. The issue, to me, Senator, is, how do you reinforce the tactical success that you have with the surge over the last few months? That, to me, is the issue. Remember, the Iraqi army is training and building an army while they're engaged in war. We dismantled the army, and they're training and building while they're conducting a war. I found some very good examples of where they can take the lead. Their special forces can operate independently right now, as far as I'm concerned. They need some enablers. I think we have to understand that.

The issue is—what is the strategy to reinforce the tactical success on the ground? That, to me, is the fundamental issue, and we give some examples here.

As to how many forces that's going to take, I think we need to start transitioning to an Iraqi lead, not a U.S./coalition lead. Whether it's 6 months or 12 months, I think the signs are there to do that, and we have to reduce that dependency. How many Americans that's going to take—as we say in the report, I think we have become overly dependent on the logistics and support areas that can be reduced, as well. So, as we go to what is called the "strategic overwatch," there can be a reduction. But I would leave that reduction to the commanders on the ground and the political leadership of what direction that should go.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

General JONES. Senator, if I could please ask Chief Ramsey to comment because the police aspect of this is extremely important.

Mr. RAMSEY. Thank you.

Senator, the police have not made as much progress as the military. They are not, at this time, capable of filling the void that would be left once the military left the province, having cleared it of insurgents and militia, or at least neutralized the threat. That's due to a variety of reasons. When you look at the Iraqi police serv-

ice, a lot of that is due to the fact that they're ill-equipped to handle that mission. They have soft body armor. They're issued an AK–47 and a couple of uniforms. They're still riding around in thin-skinned vehicles. The day we were talking to the police chief in Baghdad, he had two officers killed while we were there. Then, the day before, he lost three. He lost 550, just out of that one police station, last year. When we were there in July, the death count was up to 230 police officers.

So, they're being lost at an alarming rate, because they just aren't being supported the way they ought to be supported. I think they can make very rapid progress once the Ministry of Interior issues are addressed. That's the Iraqi Police Service, not the National Police. That's a totally different issue.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thank each and every one of you for this very valuable report. I thought your opening presentation covered it very well, General Jones.

I'd like to return to the issue of the borders. Clearly, the Iranian influence coming across that border, be it in weapons or people or trainers or whatever, is a very significant factor imperiling the ability of our forces to bring about greater stability.

Now, I draw your attention to page 129, which I think is a very important part of this report. I'll read it, "The circumstances of the moment may continue to present the opportunity for considering a shift in the disposition and employment of U.S. forces. This could be characterized as a transition to a strategic overwatch posture. Such a strategy would include placing increased responsibilities for the internal security of the nation on the ISF—especially in the urban areas." I certainly agree with that strongly. Further, "coalition forces could be retasked to better ensure the territorial defense of the state by increasingly concentrating on the eastern and western borders and the active defense of the critical infrastructures to Iraq"—namely—that's the power and the electricity. To me, this is the heart of what you recommend. I'd just simply ask this question, because, in our private consultations, you have emphasized that the U.S. forces are better trained and better equipped to handle the mission of border security than are the Iraqi forces. Now, the Iraqi forces may be approaching that, but we have special detection equipment. We have special training. Could one member of the panel here—General Jones, General Joulwan—emphasize how we are better qualified to do that border security, and thereby lessen the Iranian influence, the Syrian influence, which is leaking across these borders, be it weapons or trainers or otherwise?

General JONES. Senator, if I may ask Lieutenant General Berndt to come to the table and—he studied that, particularly, and I'd like to ask him to respond to your question.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General Jones.

General BERNDT. Thank you for the question, Senator.

First of all, if I may, the people that we talk to on the border, both ISFs and their coalition transition teams, they want to do a good job. There's no question about that, in our minds. The prob-

lems that they face are significant, however. The do not have the benefit of the technology, that we would expect to see, to prevent smuggling and weapons and bad people from crossing their borders.

On the Jordanian border, for example, the table of organization calls for 243 people at that port of entry. There are currently 112. They have two backscatter radars to check vehicles, neither of which works. They don't have a central way of checking people's identity to ensure that folks are coming across that shouldn't, or a means of getting intelligence on when that may happen.

As a result, while they want to do a good job, they are just not properly supported to be able to do that, and, in some cases, the director of the port responsible for that port is reaching into his own pocket to pay for things like fuel.

Senator WARNER. Let's focus on the Iranian border, because that's where the critical elements are. What is the type of technology we could provide—what is the type of training our people have, that can supplement the current security situation and, hopefully, make a material difference?

General BERNDT. Yes, sir. There are several things, I believe. There are five backscatter radars at the land port of entry with Iran. At the time that the Commission visited, none of them were working. You can't really check vehicles if you don't have the ability to see what's inside that vehicle. So, they need to be fixed, but there are better systems available. They are more expensive systems.

Senator WARNER. They're in U.S. inventory?

General BERNDT. Yes, sir, they can be purchased. It appears that there's a reluctance to do that, because of the cost. But some basic things—forklifts, cranes—the type of things you would expect that people would have at their disposal to check cargo. We witnessed an 18-wheel truck pulling up full of bananas, and, on the top of that truck were three Iranian young men, literally pulling bananas off the top and setting them on the side so they could see what was in the vehicle. Not a very efficient way of doing business. By their own admission, 95 percent of the things that come into Iraq come through the ports of entry.

Senator WARNER. Did you bring to the attention—General Petraeus and perhaps General Odierno, who, incidentally, I think, is an extraordinarily capable officer—this recommendation, that in our inventory is the equipment to help better seal that border, and our forces could possibly do that job, and supplement it, better than it's now being done?

General BERNDT. We did, sir.

Senator WARNER. What sort of response did you get?

General BERNDT. Not only did we make the recommendation, the recommendation is being made by the coalition transition teams that are co-located with those units. As a matter of fact, from one of the ports of entry I have a 7-page list of requirements for that particular port of entry that were submitted up the chain of command. I don't know this for a fact, so I don't want to get out of my lane here, but the problem is, with regard to the border, that the requests for support, infrastructure, improvement of roads, electricity, water, you name it—they don't seem to go up and then

come back down with something that can be actually used to help those people do the job that they want to do.

Senator WARNER. General Jones, I draw your attention to the NIE that was issued, and it is, I think, an excellent guidepost as to our future strategy in Iraq. I'd like to ask if your Commission concurs with the findings. For example, just the first finding of the NIE stated that the ISFs have not improved enough to conduct major operations of the coalition on a sustained basis in multiple locations, and that the ISF remains reliant on the coalition for important aspects of logistics and combat. I think you've already answered, you agree with that.

General JONES. It's generally consistent with our findings.

Senator WARNER. Good. The increase in the army end strength to address critical gaps will take 6 to 12 months, and probably be longer, to materialize.

General JONES. We would agree, but that's not unreasonable, in army elements.

Senator WARNER. Insurgent militia and insurgent influences continue to undermine the reliability of the Iraqi force units.

General JONES. Probably true.

Senator WARNER. The deployment of ISF units throughout Iraq to Baghdad in support of security operations marks significant progress since last year.

General JONES. Concur.

Senator WARNER. Political interference in security operations continues to undermine the coalition and ISF efforts.

General JONES. General agreement.

Senator WARNER. Lastly, the NIE also assessed that changing the mission of coalition forces from primarily a counterinsurgency and stabilization role to more of a support role, would erode security gains achieved thus far. That seems to be somewhat in conflict with one of your basic findings.

General JONES. It is. I think it's a question of degree and timing—how you do it, when you do it.

Senator WARNER. It's the timing.

General JONES. I think you're not going to turn the page and all of a sudden, switch to another metric. But our finding is that, over time, and starting in the relatively near future, this is the logical next step for how we should use our forces.

Senator WARNER. I would hope the President would take in consideration the valuable findings that you made.

General JONES. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, General Jones. Our policy in Iraq has long been linked to the performance of Iraq's own security forces. As President Bush said, we would stand down as Iraq forces stood up. After more than 4 years of this interminable war, we have yet to see much standing up by the Iraqis. Instead, we have seen more U.S. troops sent into the line of fire. A number of us in the Senate have questioned the rosy assessments routinely provided by the White House about the readiness of the Iraqi forces. Too often, those reports do not seem to match reality. That was the reason

for establishing this Commission, to help us get some truth—truth—truth about the progress of our efforts in Iraq. Your conclusions the Commission reached are deeply troubling, and, to my mind, call into question the whole foundation of the administration's strategy in Iraq. Standing down only after Iraq is ready to stand up seems to be a recipe for an unending U.S. occupation.

General Jones, your report notes evidence of improvements in Iraq's security forces which states that they will not be able to operate independently—independently—for the foreseeable future. Imagine if, after Pearl Harbor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs told the President that it would take him 5 years to raise an army or a navy. It takes us a few months to turn a U.S. citizen into a combat-ready soldier. In Iraq, we have been at this effort for more than 4 years. The reason we are able to train a soldier or a policeman so quickly is because we have to. No one else will do it for us. As long as someone else is willing to assume the risk for Iraq's security forces, I do not see them rushing to fill the breach, themselves.

General, what incentive is there for Iraq to step up and take on its own security if we continue to do it for them?

General JONES. Senator, thank you for that question. I think that, within our report, we tried to express the sense of the Commission, that in units of the Iraqi army we are seeing the development of that spirit, of that willingness to fight for the Nation, and to put their lives on the line. The statistics show that, at the rate of over three-to-one casualties being suffered are being suffered by the Iraqi forces. We find that to be encouraging. We would be much more happy to sit here and also be able to say the same thing about the police forces, which is the next critical link that has to be developed. But, as to the progress of the Iraqi army, I believe that we are of one mind that we were impressed with what we saw. As Chief Ramsey mentioned, with regard to the police force, that if we could get the same type of will and the same type of support generated for the development of those police forces, and the Iraqi government could bring about a reconciliation that would either bring and end or significantly diminish the sectarian violence, then I think we would be on a much more rapid road to progress.

Let me ask my colleagues if they're like to add to that.

General JOULWAN. What we've seen in the Iraqi army is this recent tactical success because of, now, creating a secure environment for them to operate in. They've been afraid to go back to the homes and villages, because they were targeted. There is now some progress. It takes time, when you've dismantled an army like we did, to build and train an army. The trends are in the right direction. How we build on that success—incremental though it is—is going to be important. That is going to take some time. I think we're heading in the right direction. But, again, it's political clarity that's important here, to be able to take advantage of the tactical success that we've had on the military side.

Chief?

Mr. RAMSEY. Senator, as far as the Iraqi police service goes, it's very similar to what was experienced in the army, trying to rebuild a police force in a time when they're in a combat situation. It's not an all-bad news story. There are about 230,000 members of the

Iraqi police service. We visited many of the training sites, and, quite frankly, we were very impressed with the level of training that was taking place. In fact, when we visited Anbar province, at Habbaniyah, the academy there, the courses were being taught by Iraqi instructors, there was a great deal of enthusiasm on the part of recruits. People are working very hard.

The problem on the police side is that there simply aren't enough trainers, and, because of the security environment, they often are not able to get to training sites on a consistent basis to provide the training, so they continue to fall behind.

At the provincial level, they're hiring police officers, not through the normal process, so you have people being hired that are receiving almost no training at all. So, that's a constant problem of trying to keep up.

So, there are some positive things going on, but that's not to say that they don't have significant challenges, because they do.

Senator BYRD. General, an article in this week's Washington Post noted that a fundamental problem with Iraq's security forces is that many are thoroughly infiltrated by sectarian militias. As one U.S. soldier said, speaking of an Iraqi army battalion we are training in Baghdad, "We're trying to get them to develop enemy targets, but the enemy targets are their friends." Some of the conclusions in your report also reference this issue, which seems to go to the heart of the problem in Iraq. No matter how much training and equipment we may provide Iraq's security forces, we can never, never force the political and sectarian reconciliation that is ultimately required from the Iraqis. In fact, we may be inadvertently supporting one side of a civil war against another.

General, to what extent are Iraq's security forces contributing to the growing sectarian split in Iraq? Doesn't this call into question the very core of our strategy?

General JONES. Senator, sectarianism is a endemic problem in Iraq, and it has to be addressed by the Iraqi government, as we've said.

Since there are two portions of the ISF, I'll ask General Joulwan to address the military side of your question, and the Chief to address the police side.

General JOULWAN. Senator, as I said before, it takes time to build and train an army. I think that's what we're seeing going on now. The trends—what we're trying to report here—we think, are in the right direction. It is going to take time. But, without a political overview, without some political clarity, without political movement, capacity-building, I would call it, on the institutional side of political institutions, much of what success or tactical success we're seeing on the military side, I think, will not succeed in the end.

General JONES. Before I pass to Chief Ramsey, the overall conclusion of our Commission was that the sectarianism is a problem throughout the country, that it is less a problem in the military, more of a problem in the police.

Mr. RAMSEY. Senator, a lot of the problems that you've identified on the police side are due to very poor vetting procedures that were followed in the past. It has improved. They're taking advantage now of some biometrics, retinal scans, fingerprints, and the like. Their database obviously isn't very complete, so the results of those

checks aren't always that reliable. But the process is at least beginning.

There is a problem with infiltration of militia and insurgents in Police. Both the Iraqi police service and, we believe, the National Police, as well. But the people are aware of it and are doing what they can to try to rid their ranks of those individuals, but it's a very difficult situation. For those that have been there in the past, and have seen this over time, they say that it is far better than it was. But it still has a long way to go, and that gets right at the heart of trust, when it comes to police, the trust on part of the public, trust on part of the military, trust on part of others, and information-sharing doesn't take place like it should, I think, due, in large part, to the fact that people are afraid if they divulge sensitive information, that information will get in the wrong hands.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

General JONES. I'd ask Dr. Hamre, who would like to make a comment.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, just very briefly. The sectarianism has crippled the Ministry of Interior, and that ineffective ministry is the core problem that's keeping us from developing competent policing.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Dr. Hamre.

Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY [presiding]. As our chairman pointed out, there is a series of votes now. There's several minutes left, if there is a member that wanted to stay. I'd be glad to recognize them at this time, or we'll go into a recess.

Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I thank the Commission for your work in this excellent report.

I guess I would follow up, to some extent, on Senator Kennedy's questions, because clearly this is a very difficult dilemma that our country faces, and that we, sitting on this side, face as well. The theory behind the tactic of the surge was that adding these troops would create the political space for some kind of political reconciliation—"reconciliation" maybe too hopeful a term, but certainly political compromise that could lead to a greater commitment to the stability and security of the country, and an end to the sectarian and personal advantages that were being sought. It is clear in your report, as well as in the NIE, that the Iraqi government will struggle to continue to achieve such national reconciliation.

What, if any, factors that you assessed in your work on the security forces leads you to believe that the government will pursue this political reconciliation?

General Jones.

General JONES. Senator, that question is a little bit outside of our charter. The only thing the Commission observed is that, absent such a reconciliation, which has not been codified, at any rate, even though we were encouraged to hear that—in our conversations with senior Iraqi officials, members of the government, that they are working on it, that they understand the importance of it. But the fact is, it hasn't happened. We regret that because that certainly is a key to accelerating the progress that we would all

like to see in Iraq. So, we've identified that, very strongly, as essentially the starting point for good things to take place.

On the surge, I'd like to just say a few words about that. The surge had two components to it. One was Iraqi, and the other was coalition. The surge itself had an effect, but it had effect in the area where it was concentrated, and that is the Baghdad region. Two other phenomenon that also happened simultaneously to enhance the security situation were the unexpectedly good performance of the Iraqi army, which is a credit to our trainers and those who have brought them online, and also the stunning turnaround in al Anbar province, where al Qaeda lost the popular support of the people, which has resulted in the country's most violent province becoming one of the most peaceful.

So, those three things—the surge, the Iraqi army's performance, and al Qaeda's reversals—have been positive, in terms of the ISFs. But this progress will always be measured against the overall sectarian problem in the country, and it simply has to be a political solution.

Senator CLINTON. Of course, that's our dilemma. How do we get the appropriate pressure on the Iraqi government to do what we know they must do for the Iraqi people to have any future and for us to withdraw and hope that there can be some stability in the region?

I am concerned that we are not getting answers to the questions that we need from the administration. In fact, I think it's fair to say that Senator Warner led the effort to have this Commission created to get an independent judgment, because we've heard so much contradictory information going back, now, so many years. I wrote a letter to the President, yesterday, requesting that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker be prepared to address 20 questions that come from the NIE, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and your Commission report, because, at the end of the day, we have to make judgments on whether or not we believe continuing military presence by American troops, whether they're in Iraq for a day, a year, or 10 years, will make any difference to the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people. I have, obviously, reached a conclusion that I don't see that difference occurring, I don't see the Iraqi government responding. If we take away deadlines, we take away benchmarks, we take away timelines, what is the urgency that will move them to act? You can have pockets of stability. We're now seeing, as the British withdraw in the south, a lot of the militias vying for power within the south. You're seeing the Iranian proxies and the Saudi proxies and everybody else's proxies, looking for advantage.

So, I think that your Commission has certainly performed a great service, but one of the problems is that, in evaluating Iraqi policy, the administration and the Iraqi government keep moving the goal posts for success. I am deeply concerned that we're not going to see any difference in 12 to 18 months, but we'll see more American casualties, and we'll see the opportunity costs of our being bogged down in Iraq, with respect to all of the other challenges we face, from Iran to the Middle East to China and everywhere else.

So, Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the Commission's report, and I'd better go and try to get this vote in.

I thank you all very much.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Clinton.

Senator Warner has a quick follow-up if that's all right with Senator Cornyn.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Following along Senator Clinton's observation, I made a similar observation in my opening statement, but I'd like to have your answer to this question. Is there not a direct correlation between the level of success of political reconciliation and the dangers to forces fighting the insurgents or any other element on the battlefront? Namely, to the extent you get political reconciliation, in my judgment, it lessens the danger to the individual troops, or groups of troops, fighting, wherever it is in Iraq.

General JONES. Senator, you're absolutely right. It clarifies the whole situation, because if you get a meaningful reconciliation, which means that the leadership of the three major ethnic groups tell their militias to lay down their arms, the landscape of Iraq is transformed immediately, in terms of the security to our forces and Iraqi forces. The police have an opportunity to develop into a meaningful force.

If you can impress on the government the need to develop national institutions that are composed of all ethnicities and equally represented, and do this in a sensible way, but without the backdrop of violence and the fear of terror, the transformation in Iraq would be, I think, very rapid.

General JOULWAN. Senator, one of the observations that I came to, when I asked, from the Minister of Defense to his division commanders on down, whether they were Sunni, Shia, or Kurd, they would respond to me, "I'm an Iraqi." I think the army, in particular, there is a possibility to have this integration. I see trends in that direction. I think it's too early to tell, but we ought to try to foster that. We saw that when the NCOs went to the academies, that good NCOs are being developed in a way that really tries to foster this working relationship to get away from sectarianism. But it's going to take time. Remember, we destroyed this army, or dismantled the army, and we're trying to build it up again.

Senator WARNER. I understand that, General, but we have to understand here at home. Every day that goes by, you do not have political reconciliation from the top down. Now, there's some of it beginning at the bottom to come up, like sheikhs and so forth, trying to resolve problems in their provinces. Until it comes from the top down, our troops are at greater risk, and we continue to take our casualties, killed and wounded.

General JOULWAN. That ought to come from Washington straight to Baghdad. You can't expect the military to do that, Senator.

Senator WARNER. No, I'm not suggesting that, because military witness after military witness, over these years that this committee has conducted hearings, have constantly said there is not a military solution to these problems in Iraq. Do you agree with that?

General JOULWAN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, just a quick fine point on that. You would agree, I think, from your report, General and others, that the failure of the Iraqi politicians, the national leaders, to reach political agreement is costing American lives and American casualties.

General JONES. I would agree with that, and I would also add that it's costing Iraqi lives, as well.

Chairman LEVIN. Of course. Absolutely.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. General Jones, thank you. Thanks to the entire Commission for your tremendous continuing contribution to our Nation. You represent a tremendous national resource, and I want to express my gratitude, along with everyone else, for your tremendous assistance in helping Congress understand what we're confronted with and, perhaps even more importantly, the American people.

I just want to summarize a couple of things in the assessment, because while it's obviously a mixed bag, it does represent some good news, as well. I think we can't just ignore the good news, and that is that you find that the Iraqi armed forces are increasingly effective and capable of assuming greater responsibility for internal security of Iraq, and the Iraqi police are improving, although you've noted a significantly more serious problem with them. You assess that over the next 12 to 18 months, there will be continued improvement in the ISF readiness and capability. You make a finding that the "clear, hold, and build" strategy that began, but was not really implemented until this summer, is on the right track and shows potential. You say that the Iraqi army and Iraqi police service have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence.

I want to just ask you straight up, General Jones, if you could speak, either individually or on behalf of the Commission, in explaining the statement on page 129 of the report, when you talk about the strategic consequences of failure. We can all debate, is the glass half full or the glass half empty? What do we do to encourage political reconciliation, which we all know is important to bringing our troops home and maintaining—and achieving stability in the region. I'm not sure that people understand well enough the consequences of our failure in the region. The statement here is that, "The strategic consequences of failure, or even perceived failure, for the United States and the coalition are enormous." Could you explain to mothers and fathers, perhaps watching this on cable news or C–SPAN, why it's important to them and to the security of the American people? Because I think some people perceive this as just a risk to the Iraqis or people in the region. I believe that's not an accurate reading of the risk. Could you explain that?

General JONES. Yes, sir. I'll give you my personal views on this, but I would also invite any members of the Commission to feel free to express their own views.

Senator, to try to be brief but thorough, I believe that there are three levels of strategic concerns here that are at play. The first is national, the second is regional, and the third is global.

On the national basis, the United States has clearly established itself in the 20th century as a Nation of great influence, and achieved many, many great things. As a matter of fact, success on

the battlefield and success in the areas of rebuilding friends and allies, or defeated enemies, if you will, is part of our history, and one that I think Americans are justifiably proud of. As a matter of fact, we refer to one of our generations as "The Greatest Generation," and I agree with that.

The 21st century announces itself as being a century of incredible complexities. What was bipolar in the 20th century is now multipolar. What was symmetric is now asymmetric. The forces that are arrayed against us and our way of life, as a freedom-loving people, are significant.

Whether it's Afghanistan or Iraq, these are the battlefields where this question will be resolved. The answer to those questions are very complex and very time-consuming, but nonetheless, very important.

On a national basis, I personally don't believe that the United States can afford to be perceived as having not been successful in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and I think the consequences for such a perception, or such a reality, will be with us for years to come, in terms of our ability to be the Nation of great influence in the 21st century. I don't think it's predestined that we get it for nothing. We didn't get it for nothing in the 20th century, we won't get it for nothing in the 21st century. The young men and women who wear our uniform and who are representing our country in civilian clothes around the world are doing a magnificent job making sure that doesn't happen. Iraq just happens to be one of the focal points where that primacy is being tested, and the national will is being tested.

So, for all kinds of reasons that have to do with how this country is perceived around the world in the future—maybe 10, 15, 20 years from now, it's important that we be successful.

There's a regional consideration, as well. Iraq, as a stable nation, sovereign nation, is important to the security and the balance of the Persian Gulf. It's important to check the rise of Iranian influence. It's important to stem the efforts of the Syrian Government that—across whose borders about 70 to 80 fighters flow a month, and who are reported to have training camps. It's important that the regional stability of the Gulf be maintained, and the United States being successful on that side of the issue will be a key contributor to it.

It affects the global strategic issue, in the sense that at the basic level—the flow of energy and the importance to the world that the energy from the Persian Gulf and the surrounding states plays in the economic stability of our economies and the economies of our friends and allies.

So, there is a great deal at play here—national pride, national influence in the 21st century, a test of wills—do we have what it takes to stay the course and be successful?—regional balance with global implications. I think all three of those things are very important.

Let me ask my fellow commissioners if they would like to add to that.

General JOULWAN. I would only add, Senator, that, I think, as we go about this, we have to understand we're not alone in this venture. How we work with our allies, how we broaden the base of

what we're trying to do, not only in Iraq, but in the total region, I think, is extremely important. It can't just be "our way or the highway." I think we have to include them in what we're doing, and build that consensus, political as well as diplomatic, military, and economic consensus, for the way ahead. That, to me, is going to be vital in the next year to 10 years.

Senator CORNYN. If we leave Iraq before it has the capability to defend and govern itself, and it results in a failed state, does that make America, and Americans, less safe?

General JONES. I think that precipitous departure, which results in a failed state in Iraq, will have a significant boost in the numbers of extremists, jihadists, however you want to call it, in the world, who believe that they'll have toppled the major power on earth and that all else is possible. I think it'll not only make us less safe, it'll make our friends and allies less safe, and the struggle will continue; it will simply be done in other areas.

So, yes, I think the answer to that question is yes.

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

General, I want to go back to page 130 of your report, because it seems to me that what you're recommending there is critically important to our deliberations.

You've talked about a massive logistics footprint, many installations, U.S. installations, and the number of personnel, military and civilian, and you've said that the unintended message of the size of that is one of permanence, an occupying force, where what is needed is the opposite impression, one that is lighter and less massive.

Then, going down a line, it says that you recommend that careful consideration of the size of our national footprint in Iraq be reconsidered with regard to its efficiency, necessity, and cost. Then, to me, the critical line, because this goes to the heart of what our debate is, that significant reductions—and, as I asked you before, that includes all three—reductions in the logistics footprint, the number of installations, and the number of personnel, military and civilian, that significant reductions in those—consolidations and realignments—would appear to be possible and prudent. I want to put that in what I consider to be a logical order.

First, by my logic, you recommend that we reconsider the size of our national footprint, for a number of reasons, which you state. Second, you say it's prudent to make significant reductions of U.S. military and civilian personnel.

Third, you've said, in another page, on page 44, that Iraqi armed forces—army, special forces, navy, and air force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq.

Now, that leads to the other question, which is the assumption of that greater responsibility by the Iraqi forces, you've indicated, should lead to a reduction in the number of our forces. So far are we together?

General JONES. We're together.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, what you've done, though, as I understand it, you have not said what the amount of the significant re-

duction of those forces is. You have not put a numerical amount on that. Is that correct?

General JONES. That's correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Other than saying it should be significant. We're together?

General JONES. We're together.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, how many of the Iraqi units that are capable of taking the lead—that would be either a unit—category 1 or a category 2 unit—are now not in the lead? Do you have a number for that?

General JONES. I think the reason we're struggling with the answer is because the definition of what it means to be in the lead is a little bit soft.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. But would you agree—and this is my clear impression—that there are a significant number of Iraqi units that are capable of being in the lead now, that are not yet in the lead? Is that fair?

General JOULWAN. Yes, I would say yes. We're talking enablers, we're talking logistics to help them. But I would also say, as we try to say in the report, in 12 or 18 months, which you charged us with, there'll be more of those available. How many more—but there will be more, and, I would think, significantly more, if we do certain things.

Chairman LEVIN. Of course, that's where the enablers come in.

General JOULWAN. FMS.

Chairman LEVIN. FMS. By the way, we're getting into the FMS issue, believe me.

General JOULWAN. That's important.

Chairman LEVIN. Believe me, we're going to get into that. But I want to go back.

The 12- to 18-month charge was what you were asked to look at.

General JONES. Yes, correct.

Chairman LEVIN. You were not asked to say how many Iraqi units, right now, that are either category 1 or 2, could be put in the lead, that are now not in the lead, and what number of American troops that would reduce. Is that correct? You were not asked to do that, or you were asked to do that?

General JONES. We weren't asked specifically to say how many could be in the lead. We were supposed to assess their capabilities—12 to 18 months out.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. I want to go back to what, to me, is really a fundamental question. Do we have agreement on that point, that there are some Iraqi units that are capable of being in the lead now, that are not currently in the lead? Can we just agree on that much?

General JONES. I am still not clear as what the term "lead" means.

Chairman LEVIN. That's category 2. Are there currently category 2 Iraqi units that are not now in the lead in their operations, that have the capability, but that are not now in the lead?

General JONES. I think that depends on the situation. For example, there could be some operations that are launched by the Iraqi units, independent of the coalition, because they don't need too much support. Conversely, there are others that are more complex,

where they would need coalition support, and they might not be in the lead for that aspect of it.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

General JONES. So, I don't think there is one answer to that question.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me go back to page 44, then. When you say the Iraqi armed forces—you identify all of them—are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq.

General JONES. That's correct.

Chairman LEVIN. That's your finding.

General JONES. That is correct.

Chairman LEVIN. The next question is: we have that possibility right?

General JONES. Exactly. We think that it's there. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Now?

General JONES. Now.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, and is there any reason why we should not begin now to transfer that responsibility, and to utilize that capability? Or is that what you're recommending in this?

General JONES. No, I think there are two answers to that. One is that, I think, increasingly, that is what's going to happen. I think we've seen some evidence——

Chairman LEVIN. Not "going to." Should it happen, General?

General JONES. I think there is some evidence that it's happening already, today.

Chairman LEVIN. Should it happen?

General JONES. I think it should happen whenever possible.

Dr. HAMRE. Every single unit we saw still needed to get fuel, ammunition, and uniforms.

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. But they have the capability now. You've said they have the capability now.

General JOULWAN. For certain missions, yes, sir, they have the capability now, and they're doing it.

Chairman LEVIN. So, in other words, what you're saying is that they are utilizing, right now, their capability that they have. Is that what you're saying?

General JOULWAN. The special forces brigade, in particular, is able to conduct, for the most part, independent operations.

Chairman LEVIN. That's category 1. I'm talking about the category 2 forces, which you've indicated on your chart there's a significant number of category 2 forces. Is it not fair to—which are capable, with our support—with our support, of taking the lead. I think your report is clear on it. But is it, or not? Is there not now a significant number of category 2 Iraqi forces capable of taking the lead that are not yet in the lead?

General JONES. Exactly.

Dr. HAMRE. With our support.

Chairman LEVIN. Capable, with our support, of being in the lead, that are not now in the lead?

John, let me repeat it. Are there not now a significant number of Iraqi forces, category 2, which means with our support, capable of being in the lead, that are not yet in the lead?

Mr. RAMSEY. Yes, I think we say yes.

Chairman LEVIN. So do I, but is there some reluctance to say yes here this morning?

General JONES. No reluctance. I think that there's a question of semantics here between what the chairman means by "lead" and what we mean by "capabilities."

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. I'm just saying category 2. You define it. That's your category, right? Are there not now a significant number of Iraqi forces that are category 2 forces that are not yet in the lead, that you believe should promptly be taking the lead—taking responsibility, assuming greater responsibility, in your words? Is that not clearly what you're saying?

General JONES. We're saying that, at level 2, the unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations, with ISF or coalition support.

Chairman LEVIN. My question is, are there not now a significant number of category 2 Iraqi units that have not yet been put in the lead under those circumstances, under those conditions?

General JONES. I'd have to defer to the Active-Duty military, who work with them every single day. My impression is that if an Iraqi unit is in the level 1, level 2 category, that they are conducting operations, and frequently in the lead.

Chairman LEVIN. So, then—when you say that they're "increasingly capable of assuming greater responsibility"—what you're saying is that all the category 2 units in Iraq have now assumed greater responsibility. Is that what you're saying? Or that they should assume greater responsibility?

General JONES. That, in our judgment, if they reach this category, they are able to, with help, that they're increasingly able to take on more and more missions for the internal security of the country.

Chairman LEVIN. I understand, and should, therefore, take on that responsibility?

General JONES. Should take on that responsibility.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you made an assessment as to how many of those category units have not yet taken on that responsibility? Have you made that assessment in your report?

General JONES. No, I don't think we have.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

Senator Thune.

Senator THUNE. General, members of the Commission, we appreciate and thank you for your good work and your willingness to come up and present your findings.

General Jones, I have a question dealing with the Interior Ministry, more with the police force than with the armed forces, but I know that the Commission was not specifically tasked to assess the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, even though you weren't specifically—tasked the Commission does address it. Since it is so integral to the development and the readiness and the capability of the ISFs, we appreciate your good work in that area.

The Commission's report finds that, "The ISFs, military and police, have made uneven progress." While the Iraqi armed forces, especially army, have shown clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructure that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability, the Iraqi police forces are hampered by—and

this, again, a "corruption and dysfunction within the Ministry of Interior." The Ministry of Defense is assessed as being one of the better-functioning agencies of the Iraqi government, and so my question is, what can be done to achieve the same level of success with the Ministry of Interior, since the Iraqi police force is so essential to the security and stability in Iraq?

General JONES. Senator, thank you. I'll ask Chief Ramsey to respond to your question, as he did most of the work in this area.

Mr. RAMSEY. Thank you, Senator, for the question.

I think there are a couple of things that can be done. We've talked a lot this morning about the military surge. As one of my colleagues, Terry Gainer, mentioned, we need a similar surge in policing, as well. We need more trainers. For example, we need to have an infusion of qualified people to assist the Ministry of Interior in developing the structure it needs to be more effective. We have to work very aggressively toward getting rid of some of the issues that really plague Ministry of Interior, which I think is the biggest reason why the police progress has been so uneven. The officers in the field are not getting the equipment that they need, they're not getting paid on a consistent basis.

There is certainly the perception that sectarian issues are preventing a lot of these things from taking place. The National Police, for an example—85 percent Shia, 13 percent Sunni. I have never, in 38 years of policing, experienced a situation where there was so much negativity around any particular police force. It was unbelievable the amount of negative comments we got, whether we were speaking with Iraqi army, with Iraqi police service—it didn't seem to matter—community members—there was almost a universal feeling that the National Police were highly sectarian, were corrupt, had been accused of having death squads and the like. A lot of that perception, I believe, is a carryover to a lot of the feelings that many had toward some of the issues in the Ministry of Interior.

I think these are fixable problems, with the exception of the National Police. We do believe, in our recommendation, that the National Police be disbanded and reorganized with a different mission. Part of their problem is the fact that their mission has been unclear. It's not clear whether they're supposed to be a light infantry military type unit or a police unit. They're not very effective, because they lack the trust that they need in order to perform their jobs, either with their partners or with the community at large.

The other police force, the Iraqi police service, I believe, can make very rapid progress once the problems with Ministry of Interior are addressed. The balance now, in terms of the Iraqi police service, using al Anbar province as an example, they are actively recruiting people into the police force, from the same ethnic background as the people that they're serving. That seems to be working very well. Sheikhs are very involved in trying to get recruits. The military, I think, that are working there, really understand and get it. They understand the importance of the police being able to get up to speed to be able to take over some of these responsibilities. When you go to the Kurdish region, certainly the same situation exists. They have a little bit of a headstart, obviously, because they haven't had the degree of violence that they've had in other

provinces. But the police there are capable of being able to perform as a police force, and they don't have nearly the problems you see in other provinces.

But it's the Ministry of Interior that is really holding back the police, in our opinion. I don't think there's any question, in my mind. I think that the National Police, it's beyond repair, even though I know there are people who don't agree with that. But we were unanimous in our assessment, as police leaders, that their mission needs to be redefined.

Senator THUNE. The challenges that the Iraqi government faces have been described as building an airplane while you're flying it—and, in this case, also getting shot at. But the question I have is, given those challenges facing the ISFs, is it possible to remove some of the sectarianism that you have talked about from the ranks without requiring a complete overhaul of the Iraqi police force?

Mr. RAMSEY. I think—with the Iraqi police service—and I'll approach these from two different standpoints, because I think the two groups are quite different—with the Iraqi police service, I think what you're starting to see now, at the provincial level, is recruiting of officers from that province that understand that community and that are trusted. You don't have nearly the problems that you have with the National Police forces being brought into different provinces, and you don't have the conflict that comes from that sort of thing taking place. So, with the Iraqi police service, I don't think that they are, for the most part, that far away from establishing themselves as a viable police force. Most of their problems, again, stem from their inability to get equipment, to be trained on a consistent basis, because, in some cases, the environment is such that trainers cannot get to academies in order to train; the vetting process that they're using is getting better, but has a long way to go, so they have been infiltrated by criminals, by militia, by insurgents. Even though, in many instances, we're seeing where that's being weeded out, still it is a serious problem. The National Police, on the other hand, I think, because of its composition and because of the opinion that many have toward the National Police, I don't think the same things can be effective. I think they need to have their mission redefined, and that's what we're recommending.

Senator THUNE. What's the feasibility of moving the Iraqi police force under the Defense Ministry?

Mr. RAMSEY. There's a couple of things that I personally—and our syndicate—feel, and we're aware that that was a recommendation, but we're opposed to it, for a couple of reasons. One is that a civil police force ought to be overseen by civilians, not by military. I think that that's very important. I also think that one of the most critical factors is that, when you have the Ministry of Defense—and, although they're doing a lot better than the Ministry of Interior, they're still very fragile—to put that added burden on them could cause problems for them, in general. It also creates an imbalance, I believe, of power within Iraq, when you look at the military already being in the Ministry of Defense, and if you add police on top of that, that could cause some long-term problems.

We have to find a way to get the Ministry of Interior up to speed. The Iraqi government has to fix the Ministry of Interior. Moving a problem from one ministry to another is not going to fix the problem. The baggage that the National Police are carrying is such now that it doesn't matter where you put them, they're not going to be trusted, they're going to be highly ineffective, because they don't have the trust of the people that they have to work with and the people that they have to serve.

General JONES. Dr. Hamre would like to say a word.

Dr. HAMRE. The Ministry of Interior was captured, really, by the Shias as something to protect themselves, for fear of the rise of the Sunni again. Because the ministry is so dominated by Shia sectarian factions, it is impeding the development of a real police force. The law allows the local provinces to hire the cops, but only the Federal Government gives them money. It's this tension—this is like the State of South Dakota hiring policemen, but only Washington can give you a budget, and if you have party differences that they're using to try to leverage each other—that's what's going on. We have to fix that.

If you were to move it over to the Ministry of Defense, it would be like adding a cup of vinegar to a barrel of wine. It would poison the whole barrel. We have to fix it.

Senator THUNE. Thank you.

I see, Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. But thank you for your response.

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Thune.

General Jones, thank you very much, and thanks to the members of the Commission. I think you've done an extraordinary piece of work here, and a real service in this debate, which is at a historic turning point, about Iraq.

You were asked to do an independent report. It is independent. It's totally nonpolitical. I think that's what gives it its weight.

As I was reading the press on it this morning, and listening to some of my colleagues, respectfully, this is the old story of, "What you see is—depends on where you stand." This is not all good news, but, I must say, on balance, I find the report to be extremely encouraging. It wasn't so long ago that the testimony we had about the Iraqi military portrayed it as pretty much a rag-tag army, where, on the day that they got paid, they basically all went home, and stayed home for 2 or 3 weeks, and then came back close to the next payday. I think you're showing us, also, that—when we asked how many of the units were rated at the levels 1 or 2, according to the metric we have, very few. Today, we can say that more than half—a good, sizable majority—are at that level.

So, I'm encouraged about this, particularly—and I appreciate very much the metaphor that the report uses, where you say that building the ISFs in Iraq's exceedingly diverse and complex security environment is roughly akin to trying to build an airplane in midflight while being shot at. That sounds right to me, and that makes it all the more encouraging that the Iraqi military has made the progress it has.

I want to ask you a few questions, consistent with that. Your report notes, "noticeable improvements in the Iraqi army's ability to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations," and,

again, "even when American units are absent, the Commission observed indications that Iraqis are taking the fight to the enemy.'"

So, I ask you, is it accurate to say that the development of the Iraqi army, in your opinion, has made significant progress over the past 12 months, and will, in all likelihood, in your estimation, continue to make progress over the next 12 months?

General JONES. Senator, with your permission, I'd like to call General Abrams to the witness table for the answer to your question.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That would be a great honor.

General JONES. He's done an awful lot of work on this particular issue and, we feel is well-qualified to represent the Commission.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good to have you here, General Abrams.

General ABRAMS. Good to see you again, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You've been drafted again by General Jones on this occasion.

General ABRAMS. These friendships go for a long time. Some days they're up, and some days they're down. [Laughter.]

But it has been an honor to be a part of this.

Just by way of introduction, most of us traveled, not through the staffs, but were able to talk to the people on the ground doing the work on both sides of this. I think General Jones and I came away with a shared experience in one incident, and it was this—presence of this Australian battle group in al Nasariyah. What I would share with you is, in terms of progress, what came to us is the confidence of our people that are embedded from the coalition, with these units. This was an environment where Shia-on-Shia battles were occurring. This province had been turned over—basically, had been provincial Iraqi controlled, and that you had, frankly, a U.S. presence and overwatch and both the political action team and an economic team directly involved in, not only the communities, but also the military structure.

What we got out of the exchange is that, increasingly, the Australian battle group's view—who was charged with the responsibility to provide overwatch—was not only the ability of the army, but, in this specific instance, the ability of the police force and the army to work together, to develop intelligence on likely targets, to go after this very complex environment of Shia-on-Shia engagements, were able to sort that out. They did describe to us, in terms of limitations of logistics and fire support and the like.

For what we took away from that model, if you will, that experience down there, this was what we considered to be a very difficult series of operations, done day and night over sustained periods of time. We saw evidence of this occurring in other areas, where the coalition was not in a dominant role. It was, in fact, in a support role. Those that had visited over there in the course of the last 3-plus years, that accompanied us and were a part of the Commission, felt confident that this was a new horizon of their ability to lead, to direct, and to engage in what were sophisticated operations.

We found, as we traveled the hotly contested area in Baghdad, which, quite frankly, is where we saw the emergence of this—what the Commission is referring to as counterterrorist capability—we

view that capability in terms of military-force application at the highest end and degree of difficulty to be able to pull off.

The special operations units of the coalition referred to this brigade, in many instances, as an equal partner that had the ability to go into these neighborhoods, work on targets that were directly either al Qaeda or directly linked to providing sanctuary to al Qaeda, and do it at a comparable level. We found that to be a significant departure in the performance, not only of that brigade and its leadership, but the autonomy of the decisionmaking process that was outside of the coalition to be able to properly employ that. Those would be representative examples, that I would share with you on behalf of the Commission, that give indications that we witnessed, during our 3 weeks, a context of capability that, frankly, I think, has been borne out by the very difficult investments that have been made by our troops and our leaders.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General ABRAMS. We were very confident by it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, I appreciate that firsthand recollection very much. It's powerful, and it's dramatically different than what we heard not so long ago. If I can ask the indulgence of Senator Webb, I just want to follow up with a quick question, building on that. One of the papers today had the headline on your report, "ISFs Won't Be Ready for 12 to 18 Months." In the report, you say, "coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, realigned, and retasked as the army is able to take more responsibility for daily operations." Your specific conclusion is that, "it is reasonable to believe that such adjustments could begin in early 2008, depending on the continuing rate of progress of the ISF"—in other words, not ordered by us, but depending on what the judgments are. I take it that the connection between those two—the fact that some people grabbed on to "12 to 18 months" and—to operate independently, and still you're raising the possibility that the Iraqis will be able to take on enough that we may be able to reassign or bring home some of our troops—is based on the fact that they don't have to operate independently to take on some of the responsibility that American coalition forces have now, as General Abrams just described. Do I have that right?

General JONES. I think you do, Senator. I think you have that right. I would like to just leave it, in the mindset of people who are listening or watching, that there are two levels of progress here, at least from our Commission's standpoint. One is the capability of ISFs, which is the army and the police together, to take care of the internal problems—the violence, the crime, the sectarian problems, al Qaeda inside Iraq—and then there's the larger problem—or the second level of problem of the army coming into its full maturation of defending the borders of Iraq against nation-states outside of Iraq. That second level is where the Iraqi army will eventually get to. I believe that it's not realistic to expect that they could be there in 4 years, but, at the rate they're going, they're going to get there. So, what we're suggesting is, because of the increased ISF capability inside the country to take care of internal matters, recognize that's still significant, that there is a possibility to consider that other forces of the coalition could begin to pay a little bit more attention to the critical infrastructure and the borders, which are

very porous and are significantly affecting the recovery, internally, in Iraq, as a result of the smuggling and——

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that, and—so that some of the ISFs, without being able to operate independently, nonetheless would be able to take on, in partnership with coalition forces, some of the responsibility the coalition forces have now.

General JONES. Correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Bayh is next.

Senator WEBB. Unfortunately, when I indulged you, Senator Lieberman—I not only lost my place, but we have a 10-minute vote, and it appears that I'm going to have to go vote. If I may just make a quick statement.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sorry. I apologize to you. I owe you one.

Senator WEBB. I wanted to be here to give my appreciation to the people who did this work. Unfortunately, you know the process, all of you, and this is an amendment that I'm actually a cosponsor of, I'm going to have to run down and vote on.

As quickly as I can in the time that we have, I want to make sure, for my own understanding, that I am getting the data right on your report. In the executive summary, the ISF is defined as "the military, the Iraqi police, and the Department of Border Enforcement." The last two, I assume, administered by the Ministry of Interior. Is that correct?

General JONES. Correct.

Senator WEBB. The numbers that have been thrown around are 152,000 military, 194,000 for the Department of Border Enforcement, and then, Chief Ramsey, you mentioned, I believe it was 230,000 police. Is that correct?

Mr. RAMSEY. As far as the police go, Senator, the 230,000 refers to the Iraqi police service. There's another 25,000 National Police in addition to that.

Senator WEBB. Okay. But those three are additive, right? So, if we put them together, that's a minimum of 576,000 individuals counted in the ISF.

General JONES. That's correct. In my opening remarks, I said 324,000 make up the totality of the police forces, the coast guard——

Senator WEBB. I have to run—when you're talking about the casualties in your report, and the percentage of those casualties, as measured against the Americans, what you basically are having—if you take that number and put it against even the top number in the surge, 3.6 times the American forces. So, what you're seeing still is probably—and also depending on where these casualties are taking place, because so many of them, as Chief Ramsey pointed out, have been police being knocked off in their local environments—that I would just submit that, in and of themselves, the casualty numbers do not indicate that the Iraqis are out in the same places and doing the kinds of things that the Americans are—for the record, since I have to leave.

General JONES. If you play the percentages and you accept that we're comparing the army of Iraq against the coalition, which is probably a fairer metric, simply because we don't have policemen over there, you could come up with different conclusions.

Senator WEBB. I would say, there are ways to——
General JONES. There are different ways——
Senator WEBB. This has been used by your group.
General JONES. Right.
Senator WEBB. That's why I think it needs to at least be put into some perspective, because even the Americans—they're a deployed force, but a huge percentage of the American force is in the logistical tail on this.
General JONES. Exactly.
Senator WEBB. So, just for the record, I think the Iraqis still have a long way to go, in terms of the types of things you're talking about. I regret I don't have a full amount of time here to have a further discussion.
General JONES. Thank you.
Senator WEBB. Thank you.
Senator SESSIONS. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your insight and the time and effort you've given to this, and the expertise you bring to it.
I believe General Petraeus's phrase was, when he testified before us before he went over to do the surge, he defined the challenge as difficult, but not impossible.
General Jones, how would you see the long-term view of Iraq, just based on your commitment? I'll ask the others if you briefly would share your thoughts to the American people, is this a hopeless thing? What are our realistic prospects for a long-term situation in which there's some stability and a functioning government that's not threatening to the United States?
General JONES. Senator, I think that General Petraeus's words were correct. I think it is a difficult situation, it's multifaceted. I think most of my colleagues have been involved in other situations like this, unfortunately, nationbuilding and reconstruction and the like. Generally, whether you look at Kosovo or Bosnia or other places like that, it's a generational problem, it's not a, necessarily, generationally military problem. But what we're looking for is that balance—or that moment in time when the balance goes from the big "M" in military to the big "P" in political reconstruction, and there's a handoff. We saw that in Bosnia, we've seen that in other places. But it is a generational problem. So, it's about bringing about, in Iraq, not only safe and secure conditions, but a completely different method of government, jumpstarting an economy, rule of law, the whole aspect of transition is just enormously complex.
Regardless of how we got there, we are where we are. It is, strategically, enormously important, not only nationally, but regionally and globally, for this to come out to and be seen as a success. Our report is, I think, not only unanimous, but very hardhitting in certain areas, intentionally, to make the point that there are some good things happening, and we are all excited to see that's certainly encouraging—but that there's more work that needs to be done, and we wanted to be very specific about where it is we think that work should be done. It doesn't mean it can't be done.
Senator SESSIONS. Did any of your Commission members, or any significant number of them, conclude that this could not work, it was a failed effort, and we just ought to figure a way to get out, regardless of the consequences?

General JONES. I don't believe that there is a commissioner who feels that way.

Senator SESSIONS. I think maybe a year or so ago, when so much bad news was occurring, that American people began to doubt that, could we be successful? Were we going to have a realistic chance? I think they will consider being supportive in the future if we can say, honestly, that, yes, it's difficult—and it is difficult, and I will admit that—and I think the biggest error we made is underestimating how hard it is to take a dysfunctional government and create a functioning government. That is a very difficult thing. If you look at history, it's been done very few times. Yes, Germany, and, yes, Japan, but those are hierarchical, unified societies in ways that Iraq is not, and had traditions of law and order that they didn't have, and it was just not quite the same, to compare Iraq to Germany or Japan.

Chief Ramsey, I've been interested in the police situation for some time. I think being western as compared—the lack of prison space in Iraq to New York's prison system—I did the numbers, before that, for Alabama, and I concluded that Alabama has—with 4 million people, has 38,000 beds. I believe that now there's about 24,000 in Iraq. On a per-capita basis, that number, to be at Alabama's level, would be pushing 200,000. So, you've been a chief, you've dealt with police officers. What does it do to a police officer who goes out and arrests a no-good criminal, and they turn him loose the next day? What does it do to the neighborhood and community if you can't detain people who need to be detained?

Mr. RAMSEY. Senator, let me just say that we did not look specifically at corrections while we were in Iraq. Terry Gainer and I did visit one location, where some prisoners were being held. We had an opportunity to talk to a few of them about their treatment and the like, but we did not really study that particular issue while we were in Iraq. The whole system needs to be reviewed, and we do mention that in our report, that it's not just the police, we do have to look at prosecution, we have to look at the judges, we have to look at corrections. You have to look at the entire criminal justice system and make it function properly if you hope to see any long-term gains and success.

Senator SESSIONS. Which is hard to do.

Mr. RAMSEY. Very hard.

Senator SESSIONS. Hard to be in a country that hasn't had a tradition of doing that correctly. I want to move away from that to ask you, next about the National Police. This is a very delicate thing. We solved it in the United States, historically. We have local sheriffs, we have local police chiefs, and we have Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Marshals on the Federal side, and all of these things. But it's a mix. My time is about up, so I would just ask this question, the average policeman that's walking the beat in Baghdad, is paid for by the national government, but he answers to supervision that's local.

Mr. RAMSEY. Right.

Senator SESSIONS. That's an odd way to maintain order. Dr. Hamre?

Dr. HAMRE. Yes, that's the central problem. That does not work. Our police force over here in the United States is paid for locally.

Over there, all the money is coming from the Ministry of Interior. It's captured by the Shia militias. So, the money is not getting out to these provinces. Over half of their budget was left on the table last year, they didn't distribute it to the police. This is a problem.

Senator SESSIONS. It's a difficult challenge for them, to walk a beat by yourself in an area where you and your family could be assassinated if you enforce the law. So, it's a challenge to the police.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.

Senator Bayh, would you, if you're alone at the end of your questions, recess until we get back? There will be a few of us coming back. Thank you.

Senator BAYH [presiding]. With the assistance of our able staff, I would be delighted to, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service and this report, and for your patience here today. Let me, at the outset, apologize if any of the questions that I am about to put to you have been asked previously, because I was absent, voting. So, if it is a little bit redundant, I apologize in advance for that. It's an occupational hazard in this line of work, when we have votes going on and hearings, simultaneously.

In assessing the kind of forces and the configuration of forces necessary to achieve security in Iraq, of course you have to assess the kind of threats that they're facing, internally and externally. I'd just like to ask you, General, just very briefly—our intelligence services and other experts have indicated, publicly, that, in their opinion, 2 percent or fewer of the adversaries that we're facing in Iraq, and that the Iraqis are facing in Iraq, are foreign jihadis, are al Qaeda and Iraq affiliates, that 98 percent or more are Iraqis fighting amongst Iraqis over the future of Iraq. Is that consistent with your understanding?

General JONES. I think we would agree with that. Let me ask General Berndt. Yes.

Senator BAYH. You've offered a number of good opinions here, and a number of other opinions. Let me transition to a series of questions you had with Senator McCain and some others.

You indicated it was your personal opinion, somewhat beyond the purview of the Commission, about the advisability of setting a deadline, timelines, that sort of thing. Your consensus is that political reconciliation among Iraqis is the key to long-term security. I think you used words, "it may be more difficult, it may take longer," but, in essence, without that, this is probably never going to work out very well. Isn't that the bottom line? So, one of the questions we face is, what, if anything, can we do to promote the process of political reconciliation?

General JONES. No, this is very important, and it certainly is going to make things much harder, and take much longer, without it.

Senator BAYH. Indeed, security in that country, without political reconciliation, is probably not achievable.

General JONES. Probably.

Senator BAYH. Right. So, here's my question. We've pursued a strategy over the last 3 or 4 years of trying to build up the com-

petence of the Iraqi political leadership so that they would be more likely to make the hard decisions, the tough compromises necessary to achieve political reconciliation. We felt that confident people were more likely to do that than insecure people. Doesn't seem to have worked real well. Your report indicates that that process is not going adequately. So, some of us have concluded that trying to force them in a better direction, with some notions of accountability, consequences for failure to act, some notions of timelines, that sort of thing, are more likely to make the process of political reconciliation come about than simply just saying, "If you don't do it, that's okay, we're still with you, no consequences," which is what we've had for the last 3 or 4 years. So, I'm interested in your opinion about why—I guess my own view would be—to continue enabling their dysfunction is the appropriate course of action? Why not accountability? Why not consequences? Why not some timelines?

General JONES. Senator, you're correct, that's a little bit outside of the scope of our taskings, but——

Senator BAYH. I'm only asking, because you offered your opinion.

General JONES. I understand. I'll be happy to continue to develop that opinion.

First of all, in terms of what we're trying to achieve here, what the coalition is trying to achieve in Iraq, is a long-term proposition. Three and 4 years, in terms of the magnitude of what we're trying not do—frequently simultaneously—building an army while it's being shot at, whatever metaphor you want to use—this is hard work, and it's going to take a long time.

Iraqis, the citizens themselves and their government, are going to play an increasing role in this, and they're just getting used to what that means, I think. However it comes out in the long run, national reconciliation and putting an end to sectarian violence is one thing that has to happen. A decade ago, we were having similar discussions about——

Senator BAYH. Should there be no consequences for their failure to act, where's the sense of urgency on their part? They're dithering while their country is in great distress.

General JONES. Of course. A decade ago, we were having the same type of discussion about Bosnia and the ethnic killings and the murders and assassinations that were going on, and seemingly out of control. I think you're absolutely right, I think there should be consequences. I think it's up to coalition governments to express themselves in the way that only governments can. Certainly a commission can't do it, except to point out the fact that this is one of the hurdles and obstacles that is delaying the progress that we all think will be possible once you clear this hurdle. The fact that it hasn't been done yet doesn't mean it won't be done. I hope that it will be.

Senator BAYH. I have a couple of other things I want to ask about. We all want to be successful, we all know that political reconciliation is essential to bringing that about. The debate that we're having is, what is most likely to encourage the Iraqis in that direction? It has seemed to some of us that the strategy we've pursued for 3 or 4 years hasn't born much fruit, and that perhaps a different approach is worth trying. That's the essence of what I'm trying to say.

Here in your concluding section, which I thought was good and interesting—"Concluding Observations," under "Strategic Shift"—you make the statement—"coalition forces could begin to be adjusted in early 2008." Now, there's a lot assumptions that underlie that. I'd like to ask you, what confidence level do you place in that assumption?

General JONES. I think our Commission felt that, based on the measured and observable progress of the Iraqi army, in particular, and hopefully some of the accompanying progress by Iraqi police forces, that, if this continues on the current glide slope that we've seen, that the Iraqis will be able to take on more and more of the day-to-day responses to the internal——

Senator BAYH. Would you say your confidence level is high, medium, or low?

General JONES. I would say that it's high, that it's going to continue over the next 6 months to a year in a very positive direction.

Senator BAYH. In a direction that would enable us to begin to adjust our troop levels?

General JONES. That will give us some options with what we can do with our forces in a different way, yes, sir.

Senator BAYH. That would be about contemporaneous with the spring estimate of—we're running up against the 15-month deployment period.

General JONES. We said early 2008, but we'd certainly defer to the local commanders and authorities.

Senator BAYH. The British have withdrawn substantial numbers of their forces from the south, and I was reading, recently, that they are basically withdrawing to their principal base there in the south. Now, it's different there. You have fighting among Shia groups, as opposed to Shia-Sunni fighting down there. But there are rivalries and so forth. What lessons, if any, can we learn from the British redeployment there, about the future of Iraq as we, according to your high-confident assessment, may begin to also redeploy our forces in the springtime?

General JONES. I think the overall lesson learned with regard to Iraq is there is no template that you can apply to Iraq and have it be valid for the region. The situation in the north is dramatically different from the south; the situation in the west and the east is also different; central Baghdad has its own dynamics.

The thing that troubled us, as members of the Commission, was the degree to which Iranian influence is exerting itself in the southern part of the country. Four provinces in the south have been transferred to provincial Iraqi control, and we believe that that doesn't mean that you should not pay attention to those regions and be careful about what's going on there, because it is worrisome. But the Shia-on-Shia fighting is essentially a reflection of the fact that the majority of Iraqis seem to want an independent Iraqi, they don't want to be dominated by a neighboring country, and most of the Iraqis that we spoke to in that region said that they are going to take care of this problem, ultimately, themselves. I think that we're going to have to pay attention to the border questions, to make it more difficult for Iran to exert as much influence as it has in the internal affairs of Iraq in the coming years.

Senator BAYH. Thank you gentlemen, I'm about to miss a vote. So, I apologize.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. General Jones, I want to talk to you about two different issues. The first is the recommendation in the report having to do with the National Police. I would welcome Chief Ramsey's comments on that, as well. When I first read your assessment of the National Police as, essentially, being ineffective, and the subsequent recommendation that it be disbanded, it brought to mind what I think was a disastrous policy decision to disband the Iraqi army in the early days of the war, thus creating a large number of trained, armed, alienated, and unemployed men who subsequently joined the insurgents or the militias. In talking to you before the hearing, I learned that that is not really an appropriate parallel.

For the record, so that everyone has the benefit of the discussion that you and I had, could you or Chief Ramsey describe exactly what percentage of the police force you're talking about and the fact that the National Police is a smaller group among the security forces?

Chief Ramsey?

Mr. RAMSEY. Yes, Senator. Thanks for raising that issue, because there is a lot of confusion around that particular recommendation.

The National Police consists of about 25,000 members. The Iraqi police service has 230,000, roughly. So, it is not the entire police force that we're talking about. We're talking about a separate department that is significantly smaller than the Iraqi police service.

We also are not talking about total disbandment, to the point where people are just going back out into provinces and become armed insurgents and all that sort of thing. We're talking about redefining their mission. We believe that there are many functions within policing that are highly specialized, require a great deal of skill and training, that the provincial police may not be able to sustain, long-term, such as explosive ordnance disposal or bomb squads, SWAT teams or emergency response teams, urban search-and-rescue, which in the United States is largely fire-centric, but, obviously, police could perform that particular function, river patrols, air support. All those kinds of functions could be performed by a group, national in scope. That's what we're recommending. Small groups in the provinces, but being controlled centrally.

That would take about 6,000 people, roughly, maybe perhaps a few more, of the 25,000. The remaining people could go in either the army or to the Iraqi police service, where there's still help needed.

Counterinsurgency is obviously very important in Iraq. For now, the National Police, that is probably one of their principal functions, as they are currently organized, which has led to a lot of issues, quite frankly. Last October they disbanded an entire brigade because of 26 Sunnis allegedly kidnapped, 7 of which were later murdered, and the National Police—or at least a brigade within the National Police—believed to be responsible for that. Those are very serious allegations, and it's highly sectarian, and our sense was that, if they were given a real police mission—and right now, their mission is unclear, whether it be a military unit

or a police unit—that that would solve a lot—or at least lessen—of the issues and problems surrounding the National Police.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

General Jones, the second issue I want to bring up with you concerns the transition to a new mission that you've described in your report. Your report suggests that coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, realigned, retasked as the Iraqi army becomes more and more capable. You look ahead to the first quarter of 2008, when this might be able to be accomplished. This is very similar, in many ways, to the new mission proposed by the Iraq Study Group and also proposed by Senator Nelson and I in a proposal where we've suggested that our troops focus on border security, counterterrorism operations, training and equipping of Iraqi troops, and protecting Americans and American infrastructure.

My question for you is, how soon do you think we could begin that transition to a new mission for our troops? I'm not talking about setting a timetable or deadlines for withdrawal, but transitioning the mission, I believe, is important. I think we need to do that as soon as possible. Could you give us more guidance on when you believe the kind of realignment that you recommend could begin to take place?

General JONES. Senator, thank you for that question. I would just simply say that such a transition is probably going to be incremental. It will not be a certain date, when the mission changes dramatically, but accomplished over time, depending on the situation, the capabilities of the units, the progress that we hope will continue to be made by the ISFs. But we saw some evidence, in some areas, that it has actually already started. General Abrams mentioned Nasariyah province, with the Australian brigade down there, and their relationship with the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army has already begun to show signs of instituting that kind of overwatch transition.

So, I think it will be sequential, but our report suggested early 2008, but, really, the commanders on the ground can determine that, the transition of the mission.

Dr. HAMRE. I'd defer to my colleagues who studied the military mission more directly, but we recommended that we stand up a transition command that would help facilitate this very thing. I don't know if my colleagues would care to comment on it, but it's one of our recommendations, that we institutionally lead this with structure at the top, in a command.

General JONES. I'm glad Secretary Hamre raised that issue. I believe we feel very strongly, as a Commission, that what is lacking in the briefing sets that one gets when you go to Baghdad is a sense of the center of mass of transition. You can get answers to a transitional question if you ask the military or if you ask the Justice Department or if you ask other aspects of the government, but you don't get a sense of transition being discussed, in the broad sense, in any one place. So, we recommended, as one of our suggestions, that such a place be established. It sends a good, clear intent of what we're there to do, and it also is a place where you can measure the progress that we're making with regard to transition. It goes beyond simply the police and the military. It would include legal reform, economic reform, unemployment, the services—polit-

ical reforms that governments must go through, and how the ministries are working. Capturing all that in a center, so that people can see where we were a year ago, where we are today, and what the plan is for the future, we think is an important message to send forward, and that's why we made that recommendation. So, built into that would be the military aspect of it.

Senator COLLINS. General?

General JOULWAN. In my view, what is needed for this transition is a political surge to match the military surge. That is beyond the scope of what—our soldiers and the Iraqi soldiers have provided an opportunity here for that to take place. How we do that is going to be very critical in the next 4 to 6 months, and I think it's very important, at least from my view, that you understand that.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you for your great work.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, I've been interested in violence in Iraq. The reason for that is, there's been some differences on reports, and even some dispute on those differences. In the Commission's report, it cites that there are signs of improvement in the security situation in Baghdad, based on reductions in the average number of daily attacks and the daily number of sectarian killings. Experts from the GAO, however, dispute the accuracy of those conclusions. The data that forms the basis for the military's conclusions have not been publicly released.

General, did the Commission review of the data on violence independently arrive at the conclusion that the levels of violence have decreased? Or did it rely on the military's previous assessment of the levels of violence?

General JONES. Senator, we relied on the data that we were provided by both Iraqi authorities and also our own authorities in Baghdad. We have no reason to doubt the validity of those figures. Clearly, anytime you inject 30,000 U.S. troops in a capital region that is, in this case Baghdad, you're going to affect the level of violence. It's going to go down, I guarantee it. The other participant in the surge was a significant number of Iraqi police and Iraqi troops in the same region, so, thankfully, that surge—that tactic did result in the numbers going down significantly.

I can't swear to their absolute accuracy, down to the individual, but I'm certainly confident in—and the Commission is unanimous in—the feeling that it did have that effect.

Senator AKAKA. General, many of the Commission's recommendations rely on continued U.S. military presence in Iraq. The Commission's report states that the Iraqis would not be able to assume responsibility for their own security for the next 12 to 18 months. The Iraqi logistics organization has estimated to need even longer time to fully develop. We've heard differently on that, as well.

General Jones, what kind of U.S. troop levels would be needed to provide the support recommended by the Commission? How long would those troop levels need to be sustained?

General JONES. Senator, our mandate was to evaluate the capabilities of the ISFs and the likelihood of their continued progress

over a defined period of time, and we did not get into the scope and the structure of U.S. forces, with the exception of coming to some conclusions that would suggest, as we said in our concluding remarks, that some sort of reassignment, remissioning, retasking of those forces would be possible as a result of the progress that the Iraqi army and the security forces are making. That was about as far as we could go in the 90-day timeframe, without doing considerably more analysis. I presume that the military authorities that are presently executing the mission can give you a better answer than we can.

General JOULWAN. Can I just add, on that—which is a point I think we all agreed on. On the logistics side, for example, it was clear to us that there is an Iraqi way and then there's an American way. Many of us felt that we're trying to impose an American way on logistics and other areas, when an Iraqi way may be good enough. We mentioned that in the report, and I think we need to go back and look at that. We've mentioned that to the commanders on the ground, that perhaps the Iraqi way may suffice, and that may, indeed, in the long-term, work better.

So, I wanted to bring that out, because I think that's important in our discussions as we consider the way ahead.

Dr. HAMRE. They have never failed to make payroll. When it's something important to them, they get it done.

General JOULWAN. We forget, they moved large corps on the battlefield in the 1980s—on a front wider than the central front of Europe in World War II, and they did that in the 1980s. So, I think there's something here to go back and look at; is there an Iraqi way of doing this?

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for that.

General, it appears that the longer our military has spent in Iraq, the more it is viewed by the Iraqis, and possibly by other countries in the region, as an undesirable occupation force, and culturally, as you just mentioned—that could be part of the reason.

General, in the Commission's assessment of the security situation in Iraq, and in developing its recommendations, to what extent did the Commission consider the long-term effects of our presence in Iraq on the Iraqi citizens and how it might affect their cooperation with U.S. and coalition forces? What were the Commission's conclusions on that?

General JONES. Senator, we did assess that, and our findings are contained in the last chapter of our report, which suggests that we should do a number of things to lessen the perception that we are, in fact, an occupying force. We believe that it is time to look at our footprint, it is time to look at the number of bases we have, our disposition, the number of forces, to make sure that we have the right number of personnel there, but not an excessive number, and that we are sensitive to the perceptions that, rather than being an expeditionary force, which is temporary, we might inadvertently be giving the impression that we are, in fact, an occupying force. We've made several recommendations to that effect. We believe that transferring control of all the provinces to the sovereign government would be a good thing. We believe that a transition headquarters would be a good thing. We believe that taking a look at our footprint, and reducing it, rescoping it wherever possible, would

be a good thing. If you take all of those things together, it would lessen the image of the coalition being an occupying force.

Senator AKAKA. I know, as you pointed out, you particularly were dealing with the Iraqis. Is there any evidence that the Iraqis are sympathetic with the administration's claims that we have to fight terrorists over there and that we do not have to fight them here?

General JONES. I think that we've seen evidence that, at least in certain parts of the country, they would feel that way. I think my overall personal conclusion is that I came over there with the fact that the Iraqis that we spoke to, be they Shia, Sunni, or Kurd, are desirous of an independent nation able to stand on its own. We think that there are some impediments to that happening, and some of them are internal, but we also believe that the destabilizing factors brought into play by Iran and Syria do play a significant role in this, as well.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General Jones.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, let me just echo what others have said, and that is to thank you, as well as all the members of the Commission, for the great work you've done. I can't think in my 13 years in Congress of a more important Commission than this group of individuals, nor a more important issue to consider than this particular issue. I commend all of you for taking the time, obviously giving it the great effort that you've given it, and we thank you for that.

You touched on an issue in your opening comments, and you allude to it in your report, that has been pretty obvious to me from the start, at least when we began trying to train the Iraqi soldiers and the security police, and that's the issue of leadership. I've been concerned about parallels and the fact that we can take a young kid out of a high school in the United States and send him to Fort Jackson or Fort Benning or any of our training installations, and we make a soldier out of him pretty quickly, but we haven't been able to do that over there. In one of the early hearings that we had, I was told by one of your former colleagues that that was an issue that we were going to have to face, because these people had never been able to exhibit leadership. If they were under the rule of Saddam, if they showed some form of leadership or wanted to be a leader, unless they agreed with Saddam, they had their head cut off or their family was threatened, intimidated. I think, obviously, that has been the case, and it's been very difficult to get the gut feeling out of a large group of these folks to be able to develop themselves as leaders. I'm not sure how we do that, but I want you to expand on it.

I was thinking, as you were introducing everybody from General King down to my buddy General Punaro that every one of these folks is a great leader in their own respect, and somehow we have to be able to develop that leadership within the grassroots of the Iraqi army, the security police, as well as the government side. I don't see it, and I'm wondering if there's anything I'm missing, or is there anything that we ought to be doing that we're not doing to try to move that ball down the field with respect to leadership?

General JONES. Senator, thank you very much for that question.

We were privileged to have as members of this Commission two very distinguished sergeants major, Sergeant Major Brown and Sergeant Major McMichael. With your permission, I'd like to ask Sergeant Major McMichael to come to the table and respond to that grassroots-level question about the basic Iraqi leadership at the NCO level that he observed. I think you'll be interested by his answer.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Sure.

Sergeant MCMICHAEL. Good morning, sir, and thank you for the opportunity to respond to your question.

It is obvious, with our assessment and having the opportunity to observe the Iraqi NCO corps, that they have a great need for an effective NCO corps, and that will take them down to the grassroots. The problem is the ability to allow them to be properly trained. As we had the ability to, and the opportunity to, observe their academies and their training—entry-level training—we have great training facilities and great teams there that are providing the training. The problem is that they have to be able to understand the training, and we have to adjust the training to their level. As we have said here on the panel earlier today, it is not a U.S. model, it is not a NATO model, it is the right model. We're trying to provide them with that.

We have seen that they are grasping the training. Without the NCO piece, it would be very difficult to have a military that has the cohesion or the effectiveness not only to respond to orders, but to follow them effectively.

We have to understand that the NCO corps that we have in our great military, in our great country today, did not happen overnight. It took a while to build what we now know as sergeants majors or chief master sergeants or master chiefs. They did not develop in a microwave effect, of "pop it in, and they popped out." They grew from the grassroots up. They have to have that same opportunity. But, in growing their NCOs, they also have to have the ability to train their officer corps along with it to accept this new entity that their NCOs will bring to the table. To train the NCO to be effective, and then put them back into the forces and not allow them to do what they've been trained, will allow no progress whatsoever.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Do you have confidence that that can be done in the short-term, versus long-term?

Sergeant MCMICHAEL. I have confidence, sir, that it can be done. The terms of effectiveness will be how effective we are providing the training and their willingness to accept it. To put a timeline on it will actually not be able to mirror what we are confident of what we do every day, because we come from a great educational background and system. Many of their individuals in their military have a fourth-grade education. That does not indicate that they're not intelligent enough to grasp it, because if we observe their training, both in weapon training and other small-unit-level training, they had no remedial courses. To me, that meant that they were grasping the training and the information as it was provided for them.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Gentlemen, again, thank you very much for a job well done, once again, we appreciate it.

General JONES. Senator, if I could just piggyback on the Sergeant Major a little bit, at the officer level, we are very much watching the development of the next generation of Iraqi officers. Frankly, this will be no surprise, but the younger officers really get it, but they're going to have to wait their turn, although it'll probably be accelerated as the older generation moves out. But this is the generation that is going to make the difference in Iraq. On that score, we were pretty optimistic by what we saw.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Good. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, not only for your work on this Commission, but for your lifetime service to the Nation in many different capacities.

General Jones, General Joulwan, you probably know as much about the force structure of the Army and the Marine Corps as anyone, and my understanding is that, given our present force structure, unless we take draconian steps to increase deployment times overseas, that by next April the surge, the additional 30,000 troops, approximately, will end. Is that a fear? Or is that your understanding?

General JONES. My understanding is that there will be a point when the surge will end, yes sir.

Senator REED. Roughly next spring?

General JONES. I think it's forecasted for that, but I don't know, exactly.

Senator REED. So, in one sense, really, reducing the forces is not an option, it's a reality. The question, I think, is, when is that date? Is it March? Is it April? Is it June? Is it May? Which raises, I think, one of the more fundamental questions here. The increase in forces would justify a mission of population control. Those forces go away next year sometime. So, what are the missions that a smaller force cannot only support, but would be more central to our interest in Iraq? General Jones, General Joulwan, do you have any thoughts?

General JONES. We've suggested that assuming the continuing rate of progress in the Iraqi army, and a renewed effort with regard to the police forces, which would result in being able to handle the internal threats to the country, and hopefully, some evidence of national reconciliation that diminishes sectarian violence, then the rate of progress can be enhanced.

But, having said that, with regard to what's going on right now, the rate of progress in the Iraqi army seems to be improving to the point that we can consider, not only alternate missions, but alternate force structures to take on some of the things that are not being done very well, and that is the territorial defense, the border defense, the critical infrastructures of the country upon which the government relies on for its popularity—electricity, water, all kinds of services. So, we think that, assuming a steady rate of progress, that the coalition, over time, could be retasked towards that mis-

sion, and that would mean new numbers and new capabilities; hopefully, fewer.

General JOULWAN. Senator, implicit in your question was, somehow we may have time, early 2008, to the issue of, will the troop deployments, because stretched thin or not, they're not—at least my standpoint, that was not our intent. We based that on what we saw in development, in our professional judgment. I want to make that clear, that I think it's important here that we see tactical success. How we build the strategy now to build on that strategy is key, and we think, going to a strategic shift of some sort, we can see possible reductions next year.

Senator REED. This is where you sit is what you're seeing, basically, and I understand, your mission was to evaluate the ISF, to see what progress—independent of any other factor. But, at the same time—and I think we're all aware of this—there are huge strains on the land forces—on Army and the Marine Corps—and that—everything I have heard, from the people that I respect and admire and were being quite forthright, are indicating that, by next spring, unless you increase the deployment time to 18 months, call up Reserve and/or National Guard units at a much more accelerated rate, then this surge will end. Essentially, that's what General Petraeus told me in Baghdad about a month ago. So, I think we have to be realistic about what happens. Regardless of the progress of your folks on the ground, our troops are coming down. What are the missions?

But let me ask you, a different way, something I think is critical. This is not central to your mission, but you were there, you have a sense of it, I think, and you have great expertise.

The real question here, I think, is, when those troops come down—April, May, June—how reversible are the tactical successes that we're seeing today on the ground? Where is the force that's going to come in and replace them? Where is the political coherence and the political infrastructure that will build on these gains? How long will it take—and we've seen this repeatedly—as our forces are drawn down—necessarily, by the force-structure constraints—will it take for the insurgents to begin to backfill, to begin to express theirself?

General JONES. The rate of progress that's forecast for the Iraqi army is to grow to 13 divisions in 2008, from the 10 that they have now. So, assuming they're able to do that—and we see no reason to believe that they can't—manpower is available, the volunteers are standing in line to join, the training bases are established, the schools are up and operating, the equipment is in the pipeline—they should be able to grow to 13 divisions, and that's 3 more than they have now, and they'll be tested, and they'll be taking over more and more of that internal security. Under that scenario, that ultimate reduction of our forces is commensurate with the increase in theirs, and that's the challenge the commanders would have to face.

Senator REED. So, you don't anticipate at least a temporary period of time in which our force is drawn down, the Iraqis forces that you've looked at closely, are getting up to a level of expertise, but a gap in which, once again, the insurgents can exploit a de-

crease in our forces and the inability of the ISF? You don't anticipate that at all?

General JOULWAN. I think you always have to anticipate different options, but if we see the continued improvement that we've seen on the ground during our visits, if we can speed up the foreign military sales, the equipment, they have $2 or $3 billion in the bank in New York ready to buy things that's plugged up. That's our problem, not their problem. So, if we give them the means, there may be substantial improvement by next spring in the ISFs, particularly the army. We ought to say, how can we facilitate that—stay out of the political side of it, but, how can we facilitate that? That's incumbent upon a lot of folks here in Washington. But I think there's opportunity here. I think we ought to try to see if we can capitalize on it.

Senator REED. My time's expired. I think, as you pointed out, the resources are growing, there are resources we have to provide. Particularly, this foreign military sales issue is, to me, a disaster. We've known about it for a year, we can't get equipment to them they pay for. But the real question which resonates throughout your report and throughout your testimony today is—do the Iraqi people have the will to do these things? Frankly, after 4 years—I would poll you individually, but my time's expired—that's a highly debatable point.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General JONES. Senator, if I could respond to that, though, because I think that's an important thing.

One of the things that the Commission did is, we actually took a poll of the Multinational Force commanders, all eight commanders, and we asked General Petraeus to do this for us. It's a poll that is unsigned, but we asked some interesting questions, and I'd like to share some of the responses. These are the most senior commanders on the ground—eight, representing the coalition.

The assessment of the progress that has been made by the ISFs towards attaining the capabilities required to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq. The choices were: excellent, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory. Within the MOD, six responded "satisfactory," and only two "unsatisfactory."

With regard to attaining the capabilities required to deny international terrorist safe havens: seven "satisfactory," one "unsatisfactory."

Assessing what progress has been made by ISFs towards attaining capabilities required to bring greater security to the province in your area of operations: seven "satisfactory," zero "unsatisfactory," one "not applicable," for some reason.

Assessment of the progress that had been made by ISFs towards ending sectarian violence and achieving national reconciliation—this is, again, the Army, only—six "satisfactory," two "unsatisfactory."

Ethnic composition of sectarian and its impact on performance: two "moderate," five "negligibly."

Capabilities required to significantly enhance independent direct combat operations against the al Qaeda and other forces hostile to the government of Iraq—choices: 12 to 18 months, 18 to 36, or

more than 36—three said "12 to 18 months," four said, "18 to 36," and one said "more than 36."

Finally, the assessment of the progress that has been made by ISF towards creating the administrative, financial, training, and other institutions needed to sustain the force: "satisfactory," four, "unsatisfactory," three.

So, just to give you a flavor that—the response to these questions—very important—by the people—by the commanders who are actually running the Multinational Forces on the day-to-day basis, working with the Iraqis. The trend lines are favorable, and I think this is a meaningful finding.

Senator REED. My time's expired, but, again, gentlemen, thank you for your service and your comments.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to add my thanks to your service. The panel has provided us a lot of insight. I'm sorry if I'm asking questions already asked. That's the way the Senate is. That's the price you pay to come here, I guess.

The old strategy, as I understood it, was: keep the military footprint fairly low, train, transfer power, and leave. It seems to me that the insurgents benefited from that old strategy, because they grew in power and influence. Is that a fair statement about what we did before the surge? Did we have enough troops? Did we make a fundamental mistake after the fall of Baghdad I guess is what I'm asking?

General JONES. This Commission started on a certain day, and we didn't visit the details of the past. But, obviously, I think, if you polled each one of us, we'd all have our own opinions, but certainly everything didn't go quite the way we visualized it collectively. But I think our consensus is that, regardless of what may have happened in the past, that there's some indications that things are moving in the right direction in some quarters, and that's encouraging. That's the first bit of, I think, positive news that I think that we've heard in a long time.

Senator GRAHAM. General?

General JOULWAN. Personally, I think that you're correct. If we had it to do over again, I think the planning would have been different, that what we would try to do is create a secure environment after Baghdad fell, and we didn't. But we are where we are. I think what we're doing now is trying to assess where we are, what we can recommend for the future.

Senator GRAHAM. For what it's worth, my assumptions were wrong. It's okay to say that around here. I thought it would be, after the fall of Baghdad, that the model we had would work. But it was pretty clear to me, after about 6 months, it was going in the wrong direction. After about 3 years, it was crystal clear we were going nowhere fast. So, the new strategy seems to have paid some dividends.

Rather than talking about just all the good news here from our side—the police have always worried me. I was there for the election, and I came back to the White House with Senator Biden, Sen-

ator Chambliss and—four of us went over. The one thing that struck me was how the Iraqi army viewed the police. The Iraqi army did not have a very high opinion of the police. I have been over there eight times now, and I think the Ministry of Interior is one of the most sectarian groups—maybe this new guy is making improvements. Do you see any improvements on his watch in terms of firing some of the battalion commanders?

General JONES. We've noticed the recent actions. Our report is fairly critical of the Ministry of the Interior and everything that flows from that ministry. So, the ability of the ministries to work together is virtually nonexistent.

You're right, police and and military didn't work together.

Senator GRAHAM. I think you're dead-on. I've been saying that in different capacities—when you sit down—done a little legal work over there, and you're sitting across the table with some Ministry of Interior folks, they just don't give you a warm, fuzzy feeling about—the judges are different. Did you spend any time with the judiciary?

General JONES. Unfortunately, we did not.

Senator GRAHAM. Did you get to go to the Rule of Law Green Zone, by any chance?

General JONES. Yes, we did.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. That's a compound where they're trying to secure the judges, and I think hats off to General Petraeus there.

Why is the Ministry of Interior so different?

Dr. HAMRE. You have to remember the election, the Sunnis sat out the election. So, the people that really helped populate the first part of the government were the Shia. The Shia have felt victimized by the Sunni for years. So, they looked at the Ministry of Interior as a bulwark of support for them, for fear of the rise——

Senator GRAHAM. Why not the army? Why didn't they look at the army the same way?

Dr. HAMRE. They didn't. I can't explain that. They basically turned the National Police into a praetorian guard. It is a Shia praetorian guard.

Senator GRAHAM. Is there something about the army that's different, in terms of its command structure or history, what do you think, General? I think that's an important question. Why not the army? Why the police?

General JOULWAN. Senator, I watched this from my work for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the 1980s, where the Iran-Iraq War was fought on—as mentioned earlier—a very large frontage, and they were Iraqis fighting Iranians. They were Sunni, Shia, Kurds. There is a national identity here. As I mentioned when we talked to commanders from the Minister of Defense on down, and I said, "Are you a Sunni, a Shia"—he said, "I'm an Iraqi." So, I think within the armed forces—the army, in particular—there is this identity. I think we need to build on it. That's, at least, the point we're trying to point out.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you have any confidence that the Minister of Interior that they have now will turn this around?

Dr. HAMRE. He doesn't go to the ministry.

Senator GRAHAM. Let me just do a poll. Does anyone thing the guy in charge now can turn it around—has the desire to turn it around?

General JONES. I think he should be given credit what he's already done. But he certainly has not had enough time to either say he will or he won't. But there's no doubt in our minds that it has to be done. It's not negotiable.

Senator GRAHAM. So, this guy, in your opinion, could do it. He has the willingness to try?

General JONES. The actions that he took to take out a significant number of leaders because they were sectarian, and the fact that it happened, is encouraging, but there's an awful lot that needs to be done.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

General JOULWAN. Senator, there was a great comment made to me, that the Sunnis know that they have lost, the Shias haven't realized they've won.

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, I think that's pretty true. I'll just end on this thought. One of the things that strikes me very disturbing is that there are a lot of Sunnis that are qualified to join the police, they just can't get hired.

General JONES. That's correct.

Senator GRAHAM. All over Baghdad, when I was there doing some Reserve duty, working on rule-of-law issues, there's 1,700 qualified Sunni police candidates who have been vetted by us, in parts of Baghdad that are out of control, that could really make a difference, and we can't get the government to hire them. Did you find that to be a problem?

General JONES. Yes, we did find that.

Mr. RAMSEY. Yes. Senator, when we took a look at the police, we did see that as a serious issue. There's really no reason why that's not taking place. The National Police, in particular, 85 percent Shia, only 13 percent Sunni. Most of the problems lie right there with the National Police. Not to say that the others aren't having some issues, but most of the real criticism and problems are really with the National Police. That has to change.

The other point that you made earlier that I think is a difference between the army and the police, the police are basically being led by former military leaders that don't have a background in civil policing. Whereas, the coalition has done, I think, a remarkable job of putting quality training together, doing the best they can to really try to bring people up to speed, it takes time to really understand to operate as a police force in a different where you do have a rule of law. It is just totally foreign to them, and it's difficult, and it's going to take a little time before they're able to really, I think, be effective. With the National Police, they're under strength in their officer corps by about 45 percent. So, command and control becomes an issue. So, there's just a lot of issues and problems that are impacting the police, and that's not even talking about the dysfunction of the Ministry of Interior, which is, I think, the overriding problem that they have. But all those things, combined, are just retarding the growth of both the Iraqi police service and, certainly, the National Police, with their other problems.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, and the revenues come through the Ministry of Interior to all the police, and that's the central problem.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Corker.

Senator Corker: Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

I want to echo the comments made when this hearing began. We are all honored that you are here, and deeply appreciative of the service you've provided, both in the past and today.

I've prided myself on never asking a question that's already been asked. I'm not sure I can do that today, the way this hearing has gone, with votes in between. I'm sure this actually has been asked. But, when I left the hearing, there was discussion about the border and discussion about some of the basic equipment necessary to secure the border, especially between Iraq and Iran.

I've been in General Odierno's office twice this year, and, on his cocktail table in his office, he has there a lot of Iranian arms, if you will, that have come in from there, and it's basically on display so that everyone who comes into his office knows that arms, if you will, are coming into Iraq from Iran, which, obviously, everybody thinks is a big, big issue. Could you expand a little bit on the border issue? It just seems so elementary, especially when it relates to the equipment pieces. We're spending $10 billion a month. I know I had conversations with General Hadley early on about making sure General McCaffrey had been before us, in the Foreign Relations Committee, talking about the lack of expenditures on equipment, the fact that if we'd just spend some basic dollars on equipment, we could really lessen the effort, if you will, that we were having to do by our own men, militarily, because we'd be giving them the equipment to do the things they need to do. I wondered if you could just expand on that a little bit, and I apologize, I'm sure somebody else has asked that question.

General JONES. Glad to do it, Senator. If I could, I'd like to call on Admiral Johnson, who also spent time on the border—General Berndt is also our expert—but to give Admiral Johnson a chance to respond to that very important question.

Admiral JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator.

Indeed, we have gone over some of this ground before. Fact of the matter is, we got a late start on border security force. It's only been in the last year to 18 months that we've given it a fairly serious effort to help them establish a security force.

It's under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, and, as has been discussed previously, that's one of the more ineffective ministries we have in the Iraqi government.

The force is some 37,000. They are making progress. They seem very eager. We visited three different border-crossing facilities. I visited one on the Iranian border. General Berndt visited one on the Jordanian border and one on the Syrian border. All the forces were eager. But there's no standard operating procedure, they have a very rudimentary capability. They don't have modern-day equipment that can examine cargo, such as backscatter arrays that can look inside of cargo vans. There were five of them at the Iranian site that we visited, none of them worked. They don't have the

more modern gamma-ray facilities. They didn't even have cranes or forklifts that would lift cargo off so they could examine it.

Furthermore, this is the primary Iranian-Iraqi border crossing, and, since the war began, the Iranians made the trans-shipment point on their side of the border, put up berms and walls so the Iraqi trucks go over to the Iranian side of the border, behind this berm, transload the equipment or whatever the goods and services are that are being imported into Iraq—onto Iraqi trucks, no one sees what takes place there or what transpires. They drive over to the Iraqi side. We witnessed a few people crawling over the trucks, maybe looking into them, looking at whatever manifest the driver might have, but that was the extent of the effort taking place there. That was all the capability they had.

So, we have a long way to go in this area.

Senator CORKER. We've been training servicemen now for 3 or 4 years. This is one of those things that you would think you could solve in a week or 2 weeks. This is infuriating to know that this is happening, and that, truly, I think that two of you, with a few folks—one of you, probably, with a few folks—could figure out a way to solve this problem, like, yesterday. Is that simplifying this thing?

Admiral JOHNSON. It probably is simplifying, a little bit. I think that there could be a much greater sense of urgency in this particular area, and it would have some impact. But this is a very long border. It's roughly equal to what we have with Mexico in the United States. So, even if you had better equipment at the border crossing points, to be able to zip up the border is a monumental task.

What General Jones has referred to, maybe, as transition takes place in the coming months, we could help and exert a greater effort in this particular area, which is of a strategic importance to us to tighten up that border. But they need a lot more training. They need standard operating procedures—and they need more modern and technical equipment. The Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), there's no real list of who should be allowed into the country. Many of the passports that are used are not scanable passports anyway, even if they had a PICSES site system and they had electrical power to run it. So, there are some rather significant challenges there.

Senator CORKER. I know a big part of the problem is that people are coming and going, and that's something that's very difficult to contend with. We have the same problem here in our own country, and has been around for a long time.

Admiral JOHNSON. We were reminded of that frequently.

Senator CORKER. Yes. The issue, though, of equipment coming and going, of arms coming and going, seems to me to be something far simpler to resolve. You don't have to have documents to know that there are explosive devices on the back of a truck. Could you speak to the order of magnitude of that problem, as it relates to affecting us in a negative way in what we're doing in Iraq itself—the order of magnitude of those arms, those munitions, those weapons coming across the Iraqi border into their country?

Admiral JOHNSON. I think the display on General Odierno's table there in his office speaks to that. The stuff comes every day. I

haven't even begun to talk about the sea border, which is also very porous, particularly down in the Basrah area, where it's controlled by Shia militia. So, I'm not saying that we can't make progress, and we can make a dent in it, but to be able to zip up that border so that stuff can't get in, I think, is nearly impossible. So, what you're going to have to do is internally take away the ability of people who are so inclined not to be able to use that stuff. I think that that's the approach we need to take, at the same time we continue to build up the capacity of the border security force and professionalize them. There's also the whole issue of corruption, which we haven't discussed, which is very severe in this particular area of government capacity.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Corker, thank you so much.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I think you should depart with the sense of mission accomplished here, if I can use that phrase, in terms of—you've fulfilled the charter that Congress specified, in my judgment, and you did it admirably, individually and collectively. I thank you.

General JONES. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. But, as I look at the future, there's an awesome decision that has to be made by our President, under his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, as to what changes should be made in our strategy as we look at the future. Certainly, we've covered, clearly, the troop requirements and how the leading will begin to fall if we maintain the current deployment, which I rigidly would adhere to, no deviation in the current length of time these able soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are serving.

Anyway, back to my point—and then you look at General Petraeus. I was trying to think of the parallels in history when a single officer has had to make a decision that is so determining of the future, not only of this military operation in Iraq, but the determination of the future of our Nation's status in that region, our credibility, our ability to deal with Iran in nuclear power, in nuclear weapons as they're dealing with, and all of the other decisions. So, we're at a very major pivotal point in this conflict. I think back to Eisenhower, trying to struggle with the decision of when and how we would initiate Operation Overlord to go into Europe with our forces. It really is extraordinary. I join with you and others, saying that I think that General Petraeus can make that.

But strategy of the future, it seems to me, can no longer be based on a predicate of the reconciliation that you've emphasized from the top on down. I see no signs of that coming into place in a timely or an effective manner to really begin to affect this strategy. It'll be a missing component of the decisionmaking. That's why I'm drawn to your recommendation, on pages 130 and 131, about provincial Iraqi control—since it's not functioning at the top, at least give the provinces the measure of autonomy under the existing constitution in Iraq to govern and do things for themselves. You say, "For the sake of Iraqi sovereignty, and to lessen the perception that we are occupiers, all provinces should be transferred to Iraqi con-

trol immediately." That's a very profound finding, and I support that.

I'm interested, what reaction did you get from the administration, particularly General Petraeus and others, when you brought forth that recommendation?

General JONES. Senator, we did touch on that in our briefings, and it was received with interest and, I think, the seriousness with which something like that should be considered. I think it's being discussed in various centers at DOD and the National Security Council (NSC).

Senator WARNER. All right. I think that's sufficient. They took it, did not reject it.

General JONES. Took it.

Senator WARNER. My last question would be, in your report, you talk about transferring our forces to perform critical infrastructure security. That translates into the very basic needs of water, removal of sewage, electricity, all of those things by which the average Iraqi citizen can judge that his nation is moving forward or remains basically stagnant, as it is now. All these years, all of the investment that this country has made into trying to bring up those essential services for decency of living and existence have not materialized. Now, how would we undertake that security operation differently than what we have to assume is the ineffective security now being provided by a combination of whatever coalition forces and Iraqi forces is taking place? How would we go about augmenting that such that electricity and water and sanitation and other essentials can be given equally to the Iraqi citizens, no matter where they live?

General JONES. Senator, as the ISFs become more able, obviously the result of that would be that they would take on more of the problems associated with the internal security threats that we currently experience. Having more troops available means that some of the other issues that we have not been able to devote, as much as we would like to have done, to that aspect of external security and assuring the safety and security of the most critical infrastructures of the country, could be accomplished.

Senator WARNER. By our forces as they transition from overwatch——

General JONES. Could be as part of the strategic——

Senator WARNER. Right.

What would we do differently than is being done today? Is it just the size of the forces, the technology we would bring, the equipment?

General JONES. I think it's the availability of forces to do those kinds of things. I think Admiral Johnson and General Berndt spoke about the critical situation along the borders. That's one aspect of it. Obviously, if terrorists can keep impeding the flow of progress, in terms of electricity and water and other basic elements of life, that is very destabilizing and contrary to our mission. So, as you get more mass and more capability, we can do more of these things. That will help, certainly, turn the attitude of the average Iraqi citizen, in support not only of the coalition, but in support of his own government.

Senator WARNER. I thank the witness.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

This is the beginning of an important fall discussion dealing with the commitment we've made in Iraq, what we're going to do, what our level of commitment will be, and what the prospects are for success. I thank you very much for your wisdom and mature judgment on these issues.

I take away a few things. One, that the situation is not hopeless. I think some of our constituents may have just felt like throwing up their hands, and, "There's no way we're going to be successful." I do not believe that, and I'm pleased that you do not, because a failure would be a very bad thing for our country, as you note in the report.

I think it's important—General Jones, you noted that—you conclude that the Iraqi people do want a unified Iraqi government. They would like that as a goal. I think that's important, fundamentally, as to whether or not we can be successful. You've noted it would take a long time. I just want to pursue that a little bit. I agree, it's going to take a long time to have an established government here. But that does not mean, when we convey that to the people of this country who provided the soldiers and the resources to fight it, that we have to maintain the same level and the same expense level, does it?

General JONES. Right.

Senator SESSIONS. You're providing us some ideas about how we can begin to draw down that expense and that troop-level commitment. Is that fair to say?

General JONES. That's absolutely correct, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. So, that would certainly be my vision and hope, that we could draw down our commitment, have more of the burden carried by the Iraqi people, and that we can end up with a stable, decent government that's an ally to the United States, and not a base for terrorist activities, and would not result in the kind of end that would embolden the enemy and would cause them to make a decision where would they attack next. If they're successful here, the next thing that they would do is to decide where next they're going to attack. I think we would be on the defensive.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing.

I would just note, I believe the press have previewed your report a bit more negative than I hear it today. I hear yours as a fundamental, wise evaluation that gives us a cause for belief that we can prevail here. Likewise, I think the spin on the GAO report was more negative than it deserved. But we certainly face difficult, difficult challenges. It's not an easy thing. This is a very difficult thing. But, given where we are, I think your report is very helpful.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Corker, do you have any additional questions?

Senator CORKER. The gentleman said that we haven't delved into even the issue of corruption yet. Has there been much discussion of that as it relates to security today in this hearing?

General JONES. Not specifically.

Senator CORKER. I'd like for you to expand a little bit on that and how that is affecting what's happening on the ground. I'd like to begin by asking if the oil that is coming out of the ground in Iraq—is it metered?

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, the estimate is that about 400,000 barrels of oil is pilfered every day.

Senator CORKER. 400,000 barrels is pilfered. Are there meters—which, again, is a basic elementary step—are there actually meters on those wells?

Dr. HAMRE. I don't know the answer to that.

Admiral JOHNSON. I can't speak for the well heads, but I visited the offshore loading platforms, and the modern one, the new one that we have just poured a considerable amount of money in, is state-of-the-art. It's one of the top six, in terms of capacity, in the entire world. It does have modern-day metering capacity on it, with telemetry back to the Ministry of Oil in Baghdad, so they can see precisely how much is being shipped every day.

Now, I might add that, when we were there, the U.S. Navy security folks that were resident on this platform told us, as a sidebar, that the Iraqi Southern Oil Company people, who are also resident on there, are urging the construction company, who has put in this telemetry and metering equipment as they finish up the project, to shut it off before they leave. So, that speaks to some element of corruption and what have you, as an example. But, right now, I can tell you that there's very good telemetry.

Now, the northern rig does not have telemetry, and there's some conjecture of where that oil that gets shipped out of there—it's a very small amount compared to the southern facility—but that doesn't have telemetry.

So, they don't have a good feel for exactly what's being shipped, except from the modern one, today, which they have very good——

Senator CORKER. The estimate of the number of barrels of oil that are being pilfered is what?

Dr. HAMRE. Between 200,000 and 400,000 a day. It's been steady at that rate.

Senator CORKER. Are those funds, that are obviously being generated by someone, being used to counter our efforts there?

Or are they funds that are being used—I hate to say this—to help our efforts there? What is happening with those 400,000 barrels?

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, you see a combination—and, actually, General King should speak to this—but I think you'll see a combination of criminality and insurgency that gets blended unevenly. Some of this is just pure criminal activity, and some of it is definitely flowing into the hands, into the resources of insurgent and militia elements.

Jim, why don't you come up here, speak to that? I think it's important.

General KING. Sir, I think we could just define, also, that an amount of this does lead itself into terrorism being financed, and to be used against the coalition forces. However, because of the criminal element being so tightly tied in with Shia-on-Shia or Sunni of various factions with it, it is hard for us to give an accurate assessment about the flow of funds, although we do know that

the flow of funds that goes out of the country does enable forces to come back in.

Senator CORKER. It would seem to me that figuring out how much oil was coming out of the ground is like the border question a minute ago. Figuring out the amount of oil that was coming out of the ground, and where it was going, would be a more elementary solution than some of the more difficult issues of sectarian violence that we are dealing with that involve human behavior. Again, these things are mathematical and can be metered. Is there a reason that we've not employed methods to keep 400,000 barrels of oil, which is indicated to be the case, from going into the wrong hands or into hands that are not legally holding those oil reserves or oil?

General KING. I'm not capable of answering that statement fully, or accurately, but I would offer that, just as the way that the coalition forces have been now, it depends on where you have to use your forces. What would it take to be able to do that? I think that we would find that, in partial, with some of the oil and other things that are going out, that would be simultaneous with the border security, both going out through Turkey as well as through other areas.

Senator CORKER. These don't have to be army personnel. We have, I'm sure, people around the world in civilian activities that figure out how much oil is coming out of the ground and who's paying for it, right?

Dr. HAMRE. But, sir, the black marketing really started during the years of embargo on Saddam. That's how he raised $400 million a year to build palaces. There's this very elaborate, large black-market activity that's very mature in this country. So, a guy pulls up, he says, "Okay, only write down 1,500 gallons in my tanker truck," and you put in 3,000, and he's taking the other 1,500 off into a diversion. This is very widespread. This is a big, heavy-duty black-market activity in this country.

Senator CORKER. Are you saying the reason that we're not intervening is that that would create other issues, other revolts for us to deal with, and this is just a common practice, and, to try to intervene creates other issues that we would have to deal with as a country?

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I shouldn't comment on that. My sense is that we have had our hands full with a whole range of things, and this was a problem, but it wasn't as imminent and immediate as people shooting at us.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me just conclude with a few clarifying questions. I hope this will be brief.

On page 46 of your version, you've indicated, again, that, "The armed forces of Iraq are capable"—and that's present tense—"of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq." I think each of us have noted that, and the importance of that conclusion. That seems to be one of your thrusts, is that we want them to take over greater responsibility, and that they are presently capable of assuming greater responsibility. Would you agree with that?

General JONES. Correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, on page 60 of our version, 62 of your version, there's a statement that, "There is rising confidence

that progress is being made at the rate that will enable Iraqi army tactical formations and units to gradually assume a greater leadership role in counterinsurgency operations." That's totally consistent with what you said on page 46.

General JOULWAN. In the next 12 to 18 months.

Chairman LEVIN. That's the part that's confusing. Page 44 is present tense, that they are presently capable of assuming greater responsibility. Am I correct that the reason the words "12 to 18 months" are in there is because that was your mandate, that's what you were tasked to do?

General JOULWAN. Correct.

Chairman LEVIN. "Could this happen in the next 12 to 18 months?" and your answer is yes.

General JOULWAN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. But you're not saying that that cannot, and should not, occur promptly, as soon as that capability is established. You're not saying you want to delay that.

General JONES. We're not saying that, no, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

On page 61 of the binder, "Without continued training, mentoring, and key combat enablers from the coalition, it would be difficult for the Iraqi army to progress to a point where it can conduct effective, independent counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Further, it is likely that hard-won progress made to date would atrophy."

That is "without continued training, key mentoring, and key combat enablers." Would the slight rephrasing also be true that "with continued training, mentoring, and key combat enablers from the coalition, that the Iraqi army will be able to progress to a point where it can conduct effective independent counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, and that, under that circumstance, it is likely that hard-won progress to date could be sustained"? In other words—do you see what I'm saying?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

General JOULWAN. Yes, I agree.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, you agree with that.

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. General Jones, to you and your colleagues, again, this was a little bit of an unusual thing. The Senate's always unusual, but this is more unusual than usual, because of what we had to do, in and out, but you've handled it very, very well, and I think my colleagues have. Some of my colleagues who clearly were here to ask questions were aced out when somebody who had a prior preference suddenly appeared. I apologize to them, but I think we all understand it. We know you're old pros around here, you understand this, too, and we're not only appreciative of your effort here in this report, but also of your patience with the way in which this had to be handled, given the five votes that interrupted this proceeding.

Thank you very much for your service, and we'll stand adjourned and hope you get lunch.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH

THE SURGE

1. Senator BAYH. General Jones, in your view, how much of the military success the administration is reporting the surge has wrought is sustainable?

General JONES. The surge is the combined effort of coalition and Iraqi security forces (ISF); the U.S. contribution to the surge was only fully realized in the summer of 2007. It is too early to fully assess the effects of the surge, but there are signs of encouraging tactical successes in the Baghdad region. Violence levels in Baghdad have decreased measurably during the period of the surge. The average number of sectarian killings in Baghdad has decreased, and the average number of daily enemy attacks has decreased as well. At the same time violence is still a fact of life in Iraq and in Baghdad in particular.

The Commission found that the "clear, hold, build" strategy being implemented by the ISF as part of the surge and as part of the broader counterinsurgency campaign is heading in the right direction and shows real potential, but noted that neither the Iraqi armed forces or the police forces could execute these kinds of activities without coalition support.

If the coalition continues to provide key enabling support and training to the ISF over the next few years, the Commission believes the ISF will be able to build on the military results of the surge and bring increased security to more areas in Iraq, which in turn could lead to a more durable security environment in that country.

2. Senator BAYH. General Jones, how much of that success could be transferred to Iraqi forces?

General JONES. As noted in the Commission report, the ISF can bring greater security to the provinces in the near-term, but neither the Iraqi armed forces nor the Iraqi police forces can provide security and stability without significant coalition assistance. The Iraqi armed forces are growing more able to combat Iraq's internal threats, and over time they will be able to take on more responsibility for daily combat operations. If the ISF continue to progress as they have during the last year, the Commission believes that the coalition could being adjusting its forces, realigning them and re-tasking them to more of a "strategic overwatch" posture, beginning as soon as early 2008.

3. Senator BAYH. General Jones, what timeline would that transfer take place?

General JONES. See answer above.

SECTARIANISM

4. Senator BAYH. General Jones, can sectarianism be rooted out of the security forces absent a broader political reconciliation between Iraqi sects?

General JONES. The Commission emphasized in its written report and in its testimony before Congress that the most important step toward progress in Iraq is a political reconciliation process led by the Government of Iraq. While the Iraqi armed forces and police services have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, these forces reflect the society from which they are drawn. Absent a political reconciliation process, it is unlikely that the ISF will be immune to sectarianism.

SUPPORT

5. Senator BAYH. General Jones, what would happen to the Iraqi army and police if U.S. forces were not providing the backbone of logistic, transport, and equipment support?

General JONES. In its report, the Commission concluded that the Iraqi armed forces are becoming increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for internal security. It also concluded that while the Iraqi police are improving, this progress is not occurring at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. In the near-term, neither the Iraqi armed forces nor the Iraqi police forces can operate independently or provide security over time without relying on coalition forces for combat support and combat service support.

6. Senator BAYH. General Jones, how do coalition and American strategies differ in terms of providing combat support and combat service support assistance to the ISF?

General JONES. During its trips to Iraq, the Commission did not observe significant differences among members of the coalition in terms of how forces provided combat support and combat service support assistance to the ISF.

7. Senator BAYH. General Jones, is the United States in danger of providing too much of a crutch to the ISF in terms of logistical, communications, and transportation assistance?

General JONES. In its written report, the Commission did note specifically that both the Iraqi armed forces and the Iraqi police forces need to develop functioning logistics and maintenance systems. The Commission observed that in some areas coalition experts may be pushing the Iraqis toward solutions that are more complex and elaborate than is necessary.

8. Senator BAYH. General Jones, how can we help ensure that this doesn't happen?

General JONES. Identifying the tipping point between assistance and dependency is a challenge, particularly when the presence or absence of coalition assistance can make or break ISF participation in actual operations. The Commission observed that in many instances, coalition forces are sensitive to the dangers of dependency and are working closely with ISF to help them become self-sufficient.

For instance, when the Commission visited the Baghdad Police College, leaders of the school asked coalition representatives to reconsider their decision to terminate the coalition's contract for "life support" services in November 2007, but coalition representatives held fast and reiterated the need for the Police College to become self-reliant. In the area of logistics, where development of functioning Iraqi systems is particularly important, the Commission recommends that the coalition work with ISF to develop an "Iraqi solution" that gets the job done to an adequate level, even if that solution does not result in optimal efficiency and speed.

IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES

9. Senator BAYH. General Jones, why have the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) been so much more successful than other components of the ISF?

General JONES. The ISOF have been more successful than other components of the ISF for several reasons. The determining factor in ISOF's success has been the ability of U.S. Army Special Forces since 2003 to continuously exercise their specialty of training foreign counterparts, building trust through repeated tours, shared operations and hardship, and carefully selecting operations that build the capabilities and confidence of Iraqi units.

Foreign internal defense and force development-force multiplication have for 50 years been an Army SOF mission set; and this mission set has been executed to the best of their ability in Iraq. The coalition, working and living closely with ISOF, has been able to ensure that ISOF is capable of missions and tasks other Iraqi forces are not—including logistics and maintenance. The "student to teacher" ratio allows the coalition to focus on a range of tasks that trainers involved with the regular Iraqi Army cannot. Also, members of the U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group and 10th Special Forces Groups are back in Iraq on their fifth or even sixth tour, rotating in and out of country every 7 months and providing remarkable continuity in building long-term relationships with Iraqi counterparts. This has also allowed U.S. Army SOF to build up a strong junior officer and noncommissioned officer corps in ISOF, through continued mentoring and instruction. Resident U.S. Army Special Forces Teams assigned to ISOF live with, train, provide combat enablers, accompany on operations, and provide a continual U.S. Army Special Forces presence and commitment to the success of ISOF. This has created a Special Forces coalition effort with shared hardships, operational time, soldier and leader bonding, and exposure during combat operations.

Because of the relatively small size of the ISOF—at present, a single brigade—its leaders are able to cull the recruit pool. In a smaller group, it is also easier to inculcate a shared culture of national service and pride. ISOF not only have strong capabilities, but they have confidence in their capabilities. U.S. Army SOF have put into place an operational paradigm of detailed planning, rehearsal, combat operations, after action discussions, and training again to address any shortfalls.

10. Senator BAYH. General Jones, why are they so much farther ahead of the Army? Is it due to the small size of the force?

General JONES. The response to question number nine explains why the ISOF are in many cases ahead of the Iraqi Army in their development. In brief, ISOF training

began in 2003 and there has been remarkable continuity in this effort, including the rotation in and out of country of the same U.S. Army SOF teams. Unlike the military training teams working with the Iraqi Army, the U.S. trainers working with the ISOF consistently fight alongside Iraqis and share the same living spaces. Moreover, the ratio of U.S. trainers to Iraqi special operations soldiers is higher than it is for the military training teams working with the Iraqi Army because the overall size of the ISOF is much smaller than that of the Iraqi Army.

11. Senator BAYH. General Jones, who is the force comprised of and what is their training? Who are their trainers?

General JONES. The ISOF is the operational component of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Command. The ISOF is a brigade-size force composed of approximately 1,500 soldiers: a counterterrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit.

The ISOF is trained by U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (5th and 10th Groups), as outlined above in more detail. Their training is mostly in direct action missions against targets in semi-permissive and non-permissive urban environments. They train continuously in a "shoot house"—an indoor tactical shooting range that mimics an urban housing complex and allows soldiers to practice forced entry and marksmanship, even under pitch-dark conditions (using night vision equipment).

A key component in developing an Iraqi counterterrorism capability is the ongoing effort to double the number of soldiers in the ISOF. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, this expansion will include an additional commando battalion with forward-based commando companies in Basra, Mosul, and Al Asad.

12. Senator BAYH. General Jones, how can lessons learned with ISF Special Forces translate into better successes for the Army and National Police?

General JONES. Translating best practices and lessons learned from Special Forces to regular forces is a challenge even for U.S. forces. The best lesson to draw from the ISOF experience is that Iraqis can take the lead and operate at a high level of proficiency. ISOF are among the best special forces in the Middle East, and that is testament to what Iraqis can accomplish when provided the right training, equipping, and leadership development. Many of the best practices in training that the U.S. Special Forces have applied to ISOF have already been transferred in some measure to the regular forces through Military Training Teams and Police Training Teams.

[Annex: The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq follows:]

THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), Chairman

SEPTEMBER 6, 2007

THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ

SEPTEMBER 6, 2007

Public Law 110-28 directed the entity created by §1314 (e) (2) of that Act to make its report to the following committees of Congress:

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate
Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate
Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives
Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:

As you know, Public Law 110-28, enacted on May 25, 2007, commissioned an independent private entity made up of individuals with credentials and expertise in military and law enforcement matters to conduct an independent assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). This report is to be submitted to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations/Affairs within 120 days of enactment. As members of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq we are pleased to submit, within the statutory timeline, our findings and recommendations in the attached report.

As required by the legislation, our report addresses the readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, their ability to deny international terrorists safe haven, their ability to bring greater security to Iraq's 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and their ability to bring an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation. In addition, the Commission was tasked with an assessment of ISF capabilities in the areas of training, equipment, command, control, intelligence, and logistics.

Finally, we were asked to consider whether, after several years of training, equipping, and mentoring by Coalition forces, continued support would contribute to the readiness of the ISF to defend its territorial integrity, prevent Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, increase security throughout the nation, and end sectarian violence.

The Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq is made up of 20 Commissioners whose cumulative service exceeds 500 years of military and more than 150 years of law enforcement experience. In pursuit of the facts bearing on the legislative mandate contained in Public Law 110-28, the Commission spent three weeks on the ground in Iraq and conducted extensive briefings and research. We visited more than 70 sites and interviewed more than 150 individuals. The Commission put its collective "boots on the ground" and visited troops and experts

in the field. Additionally, the Commission conducted extensive meetings with senior military and civilian leaders from Iraq, the U.S. Mission, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, and Coalition forces. We have been given the highest quality of support by the Defense Department, the State Department, and our national military and civilian representatives in Iraq.

The Commission is confident in its report to Congress and wishes to express its appreciation for having been given the opportunity to make a contribution to this important issue at this critical time. Our report and its conclusions and findings represent the unanimous opinions of the Commissioners. Finally, our report is submitted as an unclassified document. There is no classified annex.

Sincerely,

James L. Jones, General USMC (Ret.)
Chairman
Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq





James C. King

Duncan McCausland

Gary S. McKissock

Alfred McMichael

Richard Potter

Arnold L. Punaro

Charles H. Ramsey

John F. Timoney

John A. Van Alstyne

Charles Wilhelm

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Statutory Mandate. The Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq was chartered by the United States Congress in Public Law 110-28, signed into law by President George W. Bush on May 25, 2007, to assess the readiness of Iraq's military and police forces to fulfill four major responsibilities: maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq, deny safe haven to international terrorists, bring greater security to the country's 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and bring an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation.

Further, the Commission was tasked to evaluate the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (military and police) in key functional areas, including training, equipping, command and control, intelligence, and logistics, and to consider the likelihood that continued U.S. support would contribute to the ISF's readiness. Finally, the law directed the Commission to report its full findings to Congress.

At the request of Congress, the Commission is submitting its report in advance of its statutory deadline so that policymakers can consider its findings concurrently with other progress reports on Iraqi security that will soon be submitted to the executive and legislative branches.

Organization. To carry out this important assignment, the Commission, chaired by General James L. Jones, former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, assembled a highly qualified team of 20 prominent senior retired military officers, chiefs of police, and a former deputy secretary of defense. This independent team, supported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, brought to bear more than 600 cumulative years of military, defense, and law enforcement experience and expertise in the professional disciplines that it was chartered to examine.

To properly address the broad range of topics assigned by Congress, the Commission was organized into 10 syndicates. Each syndicate was led by a senior Commissioner and focused on either a discrete component of the ISF or a crosscutting functional area. Syndicate inputs were subject to review and integration by all Commission members (see Table 1).

Activities. During the course of its study members of the Commission traveled widely throughout Iraq on three separate occasions for a total of 20 days to gather facts and impressions firsthand. Commissioners conducted site visits to Iraqi military and ministerial headquarters and to various command centers, training facilities, and operating bases. They also visited Iraqi police stations, joint security stations, and law enforcement academies; and Commissioners traveled to border, port, and internal security installations, as well as to Coalition facilities designed to assist with Iraqi security training and transition (see Figures 1 and 2). The Commission met with more than 100 Iraqi officials, more than 100 U.S. current and former government officials, and more than a dozen leading nongovernmental experts on the Iraqi Security Forces.

Commissioners met with the Coalition and Iraqi authorities, both military and civilian, who oversee the manning, training, equipping, and operational effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, and spoke to the personnel responsible for transitioning security functions from the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) to the Iraqi government. Commissioners spent time with trainers, transition

teams, operational units, and trainees, as well as Iraqi citizens. They consulted with current and former senior U.S. government officials. Finally, the Commission examined key official data and documents with information relevant to the performance and status of the ISF, their rate of progress, and their prospects for fulfilling the responsibilities of a professional and effective security force.

ISF Defined. The Iraqi Security Forces are composed of two major components: the Iraqi military (Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force), which MNF-I estimated in a June report to encompass more than 152,000 service members and which operates under the authority of the country's Ministry of Defense, and the Iraqi police (local Iraqi Police Service and National Police), along with the Department of Border Enforcement, which the command estimates to number 194,000 civilian security personnel administered by the Ministry of Interior.[1]

This study examines both components. Each is integral to the country's ability to protect its territorial integrity, deny safe haven to international terrorists, and bring security and stability to Iraq's 18 provinces. Though not specifically tasked to assess Iraqi ministerial capacity, the Commission addresses this issue because ministries are integral to the development, readiness, and capability of the country's security forces.

Context. The development of the Iraqi military and police into an effective total force capable of providing security and enforcing the rule of law has been a major focus of the Government of Iraq and the multinational Coalition.

The task of building the forces while they simultaneously engage in security operations, both in partnership with the Coalition and independently, presents the Government of Iraq with many difficulties and challenges. Senior Coalition military commanders characterize this process as "building an airplane while you're flying"—and, in this case, while getting shot at. Similarly, the challenge to Iraq's leaders of developing a loyal, professional, and cohesive military and police under battle conditions, while working to form a national government able to reconcile bitter historic tribal, ethnic, and religious differences, is a daunting one.

Security Environment. Iraq's security environment is exceedingly diverse and complex. It is characterized by a multitude of threats arising from the struggle for power among sectarian rivals, radical Islamic terrorist groups (including al Qaeda), Sunni insurgents, Shi'a militia, and criminal elements. The various factions possess a diverse range of aims, agendas, and capabilities.

These combatants, and the level of violence and instability they incite, manifest themselves differently throughout the country. Security conditions vary significantly among the provinces and localities, and they are influenced heavily by an area's geography and demographic composition, the intensity of sectarian tension, the quality of political leadership, and available resources.

In the north, Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and other groups vie for control of land and natural resources, particularly in the areas of Kirkuk and Mosul. In the south, where Iranian interference is

[1] Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress, June 2007, p. 30. The ISF also consists of a Coast Guard, under the Ministry of Interior, and the Facilities Protection Service. Officially under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, at present the Facilities Protection Service operates under the direction of multiple ministries.

acute, Shi'a groups fight one another for political and economic domination. In the west, Sunni insurgents continue to fight the Shi'a-dominated government and the Coalition for the purpose of restoring Sunni political power and prestige. Terrorist groups including al Qaeda are at war to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in Iraq. In Baghdad, the political, cultural, and economic epicenter of Iraq, the security situation is characterized by ethno-sectarian struggle and rampant criminal activity. The situation is complicated by the violence incited by terrorists, militias, and religious extremists who seek to inflame sectarian tensions, destabilize the government, and influence public opinion, particularly in the United States.

Overall, the factional tension and violence within Iraq is fed by the slow and disappointing pace of national reconciliation; intensified by the inflow of foreign fighters, terrorists, and weapons; and promoted by neighboring countries, such as Iran and Syria. These two countries and certain non-state entities are generally acknowledged to be pursuing sectarian, political, and security objectives within Iraq and providing manpower, weapons, and support to proxy fighters and militia. Their activities substantially aid and contribute to factional discord, violence, and instability within Iraq.

Particularly in the west, and in key areas surrounding Baghdad, the security environment is being positively influenced by tribal elements who have turned against al Qaeda and are seeking to reduce violence. The most recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq stated: "There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq's security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in January 2007. The steep escalation in rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks."[2] The body of the Commission's report includes graphics provided by the Coalition depicting the trends in the security environment.

ISF Overall Assessment. The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq. With regard to external dangers, the evidence indicates that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near term.

While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from Coalition forces. In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months.

In the aggregate, the Commission's assessment ascribes better progress to the Iraqi Army and the Ministry of Defense and less to the Ministry of Interior, whose dysfunction has hampered the police forces' ability to achieve the level of effectiveness vital to the security and stability of Iraq.

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[2] Director of National Intelligence, *National Intelligence Estimate*, August 2007, p. 1.

The Iraqi police are improving at the local level predominantly where the ethnic makeup of the population is relatively homogenous and the police are recruited from the local area. Police forces are hampered by corruption and dysfunction within the Ministry of Interior. In some areas, they have been vulnerable to infiltration, and they are often outmatched in leadership, training, tactics, equipment, and weapons by the terrorists, criminals, and the militias they must combat. The rate of improvement must be accelerated if the Iraqi police are to meet their essential security responsibilities.

Ministry of Defense Assessment. The Ministry of Defense is assessed as being one of the better-functioning agencies of the Iraqi government. It is building the necessary institutions and processes to fulfill its mission of overseeing and resourcing the Iraqi armed forces. The ministry can plan and budget at a basic level, but budget execution requires significant improvement. It has established basic administrative systems, and operates an adequate training system. However, bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization hamper its capacity. These flaws reduce the operational readiness, capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military.

Army and Special Forces Assessment. In general, the Iraqi Army and Special Forces are becoming more proficient in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; they are gaining size and strength, and will increasingly be capable of assuming greater responsibility for Iraq's security. The Special Forces brigade is highly capable and extremely effective. It is trained in counterterrorism and it is assessed to be the best element of the new Iraqi military.

The Iraqi Army possesses an adequate supply of willing and able manpower, a steadily improving basic training capability, and equipment tailored to counterinsurgency operations. There is evidence to show that the emerging Iraqi soldier is willing to fight against the declared enemies of the state, with some exceptions remaining along ethnic lines. The Army is making efforts to reduce sectarian influence within its ranks and achieving some progress. The Army's operational effectiveness is increasing; yet it will continue to rely on help in areas such as command and control, equipment, fire support, logistical support, intelligence, and transportation. Despite continued progress, the Iraqi military will not be ready to independently fulfill its security role within the next 12 to 18 months. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that substantial progress can be achieved within that period of time.

The challenge for the Army is its limited operational effectiveness, caused primarily by deficiencies in leadership, lack of disciplinary standards, and logistics shortfalls. Some of these shortcomings are typical of unseasoned units and formations being supported by a newly formed government. Many of the problems can be attributed to marginal leadership at senior military and civilian positions both in the Ministry of Defense and in the operational commands. Identifying the next generation of Iraq's leaders early and placing them in key positions will be one of the major contributors to advancing the effectiveness of the Iraqi military.

Air Force Assessment. The Iraqi Air Force's relatively late establishment hampers its ability to provide much-needed air support to ground operations. It is well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable air force. Though limited by the availability of properly skilled personnel, and by an inclination to value force

size and acquisition over operational effectiveness, it is nonetheless progressing at a promising rate in this formative period.

Navy Assessment. The Iraqi Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its mission. However, it is making substantive progress in this early stage of development: it has a well-thought-out growth plan, which it is successfully executing. Its maturation is hampered by the Ministry of Defense's understandable focus on ground forces and counterinsurgency operations, as well as by its bureaucratic inefficiency. The Iraqi Navy will continue to rely on Coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the foreseeable future.

Ministry of Interior Assessment. The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.

Iraqi Police Service Assessment. The Iraqi Police Service is fragile. It is better trained than in past years and is establishing presence in some areas, but the force is underequipped and compromised by militia and insurgent infiltration. In general, the Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combating the threats they face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.

The National Police Assessment. The National Police have proven operationally ineffective, and sectarianism in these units may fundamentally undermine their ability to provide security. The force is not viable in its current form.

Border Security Assessment. Iraq's border security forces are generally ineffective and need more equipment, training, and infrastructure before they can play a significant role in securing Iraq's borders. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor support from the Ministry of Interior. Overall border security is undermined by the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external infiltration of the border security forces are widespread, and the borders are porous.

Overall Capacity Building. To maintain progress in the development of the ISF over the next 12 to 18 months, the national government has to establish a competent and reliable administration to provide for the full range of support required to sustain the military and police. Doing so includes establishing functional procurement, storage, and asset management systems and providing the proper weapons, vehicles, spare parts, medical supplies, ammunition, communications assets, and other vital equipment.

Additionally, the ministries of Defense and Interior must focus on meeting the needs of their manpower in terms of benefits, career development, and support. The Iraqi government will also have to assume responsibility for ensuring that adequate services are provided to security forces,

especially when they are operational. Essential services include medical, transportation, maintenance, ordinance disposal, and supply. To overcome current shortfalls and deficiencies, the Iraqi government will need to rely heavily on Coalition support to develop the appropriate practices, procedures, and organizations to accomplish these tasks to an Iraqi standard that will enable the Iraqis to directly take the lead for independent security operations.

Additional Observations. The Commission's work and the main body of this report have focused on the issues assigned by Congress. Nevertheless, the opportunity for Commissioners to immerse themselves in the dynamics of this complex engagement while in Iraq, coupled with the extraordinary access the Commission was afforded, has given rise to associated observations and findings. The Commission believes that sharing them is vital.

The Commission has done so in the concluding chapter so that Congress and the nation at large can take full advantage of the total lessons learned from its work. While the Commission was not assigned to comment on such subjects as Iraqi governance or general trends associated with our ongoing national efforts, this final chapter seeks to share observations and suggest answers to questions regarding the road ahead with respect to Iraqi security and to the larger issues that arise from this study, including the important question: "What does this all mean in terms of the future in Iraq?"

To conclude, the Commission recognizes the leadership, contributions, and sacrifice of the men and women of the United States armed forces and of our allies who have created the conditions for Iraq to emerge as a free and independent nation. The nation's military and civilian professionals have without question approached a daunting task with the same level of dedicated service to our nation that continues to be the pride of the American people past and present.

CONCLUSIONS, KEY FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—Military and Police

Conclusion: The Iraqi armed forces—Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability, but not the ability to operate independently. Evidence indicates that the ISF will not be able to progress enough in the near term to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military and external threats.

Finding 1: *Although the Iraqi Army and Special Forces have demonstrated significant progress in counterterrorism capabilities at the operational level, the Iraqi Police Service and National Police have many challenges to overcome and cannot yet meaningfully contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Iraq. The border security forces are assessed as being ineffective.*

Finding 2: *The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to bring greater security to Iraq's provinces varies by region and by organization within the ISF owing to many factors, including political leadership, security environment, sectarianism, and available resources.*

Finding 3: *The "clear, hold, build" strategy being implemented by Iraqi Security Forces is on the right track and shows potential, but neither the Iraqi armed forces nor the police forces can execute these types of operations independently.*

Finding 4: *The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but ultimately the ISF will reflect the society from which they are drawn. Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq.*

The Ministry of Defense

Conclusion: The Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for policy development and implementation as well as resource allocation for the Iraqi military, is building the necessary institutions and processes to fulfill its mission. However, its capacity is hampered by bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization. These flaws reduce the operational readiness, capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military. As the MOD continues to mature, it should assume the ministerial-level functions that currently fall to the Coalition.

Finding 5: *Inefficiencies and overcentralization within the Ministry of Defense and its inability to fully execute its budget impede the combat readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces.*

Finding 6: *The ability to contract efficiently is important to the MOD's mission to sustain the Iraqi armed forces. The MOD currently lacks effective processes to execute contracting requirements.*

Finding 7: *The MOD consistently compensates the members of the Iraqi military, but it has difficulty accounting for personnel.*

Finding 8: *The level of information sharing and cooperation between the Iraqi intelligence community and the Iraqi Security Forces is not satisfactory—a problem exacerbated by bureaucratic competition and distrust among duplicative intelligence organizations.*

Finding 9: *Parallel lines of direct communication to military units have been established under the control of the Prime Minister. He is perceived by many as having created a second, and politically motivated chain of command, effectively communicating orders directly to field commanders. Such a practice bypasses national command lines, which should flow through the Minister of Defense and the Commanding General of Iraqi Armed Forces.*

Finding 10: *The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and hampers their readiness and capability. Renewed emphasis on Coalition mentoring and technical support will be required to remedy this condition.*

The Iraqi Army and Special Forces

Conclusion: The Iraqi Army and Special Forces possess an adequate supply of willing and able manpower and a steadily improving basic training capability. The Army has a baseline supply of equipment for counterinsurgency, but much of this equipment is unavailable for operations owing to maintenance and supply chain management problems. They are making efforts to reduce sectarian influence within their ranks and are achieving some progress. Their operational effectiveness, particularly that of the Special Forces, is increasing, yet they will continue to rely on Coalition forces for key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. Despite progress, they will not be ready to independently fulfill their security role within the next 12 to 18 months. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that substantial progress can be achieved to that end.

Finding 11: *In addition to protecting the nation against external military threats, the Iraqi Army can and should also play a role in preventing unconventional threats migrating from points outside of Iraq. The Army currently does not have sufficient forces to enhance border security and conduct counterinsurgency operations simultaneously.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Iraqi Army's size and capability should be developed as part of an Iraqi national security strategy that defines the roles and missions of the ISF to address both internal security and border security needs. The Army as well as the nation's police forces are currently emphasizing internal security; only ineffective border security forces are focused on controlling the borders. The Iraqi Army must contribute to both border and internal security. A national*

commitment to expand the Army's mission beyond counterinsurgency to include border security must be reflected in Army and MOD plans and policies.

Finding 12: *The Iraqi Army has become more effective in supporting Coalition-led counterinsurgency operations from the start of Iraqi and Coalition surge operations in early 2007. The reliability of Iraqi Army units continues to improve, and some units now are an integral part of the Coalition team for counterinsurgency operations. The overall rate of progress of the Army is uneven. Some units perform better than others; but there is rising confidence that progress is being made at a rate that will enable Iraqi Army tactical formations and units to gradually assume a greater leadership role in counterinsurgency operations in the next 12 to 18 months. However, they will continue to rely on Coalition support, including logistics, intelligence, fire support, equipment, training, and leadership development for the foreseeable future.*

Finding 13: *Iraqi Special Operations Forces are the most capable element of the Iraqi armed forces and are well-trained in both individual and collective skills. They are currently capable of leading counterterrorism operations, but they continue to require Coalition support. They remain dependent on the Coalition for many combat enablers, especially airlift, close air support, and targeting intelligence.*

Finding 14: *The Iraqi Army is short of seasoned leadership at all levels, and a lack of experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers hampers its readiness, capability, and effectiveness.*

Finding 15: *A noncommissioned officer corps is not part of Iraq's military tradition, but it will be invaluable to making the Army more combat-effective.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Developing leadership in the Iraqi Army will require continued support from Coalition advisors and units. Ongoing employment of a "train the trainers" approach, and continued emphasis on the development of a functioning noncommissioned officer corps, is essential, though developing leaders will take time to achieve.*

Finding 16: *The Iraqi Army is currently structured for counterinsurgency operations with a goal of manning 13 divisions by the end of 2008. The current divisions are experiencing absenteeism, both authorized and unauthorized. MOD has established a standard of 85 percent "present-for-duty" at all times. To achieve this, units will be manned at 120 percent of authorized strength, and the abundance of volunteers for service in the new Iraqi Army should make the attainment of this goal possible. This higher manning requirement will place additional strain on equipping and combat training programs.*

Finding 17: *The implementation of an Iraqi code of military discipline, professional development programs, and benefits for members of the armed forces is key to improving readiness. The Commission finds that inadequate implementation of these initiatives adversely affects personnel retention and leadership development. Developing future leaders must be an important objective of personnel programs.*

Finding 18: *The Iraqi Army is adequately equipped for counterinsurgency. However, equipping the Army with more armor, artillery, and mobility is tactically advantageous and communicates a powerful message to the Iraqi people and to the enemy about the growing strength and capability of the Iraqi Army.*

Finding 19: *Logistics remains the Achilles' heel of the Iraqi ground forces. Although progress is being made, achieving an adequate forcewide logistics capability is at least 24 months away.*

Finding 20: *The current shortfall in logistics is emblematic of the urgent need to solve a major issue in terms that the Iraqi government and military can adopt. U.S. strategies and solutions rely heavily on outsourcing of logistics, an approach that has met resistance from the Iraqi leaders. In many cases, the "Iraqi way," though not always optimal, is sufficient. The solutions for the Iraqi armed forces must be developed with the goal of achieving an Iraqi standard that allows for Iraqi culture, traditions, and abilities.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *To operate independently, the Iraqi Army must develop a functioning logistics and maintenance system. The Coalition should continue working with the MOD to develop a system that meets Iraqi needs.*

The Iraqi Air Force

Conclusion: The Iraqi Air Force's relatively late establishment hampers its ability to provide much-needed air support to ground operations. It is well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable air force. Though limited by the availability of properly skilled personnel, and by an inclination to value force size and acquisition over operational effectiveness, it is nonetheless progressing at a promising rate during this formative period.

Finding 21: *The long-term capability of the Iraqi Air Force will depend on its success in recruiting quality personnel, and will require greater emphasis on basic and technical training.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Together with its Coalition partners, the Iraqi Air Force must increase the quality of its recruits and the capacity of current and planned training programs, while also increasing the manpower authorizations to compensate for chronic absenteeism. Emphasis on the value of training must be relentless.*

Finding 22: *Although aircraft procurement has been adequate to date, maintenance and sustainment systems lag well behind the procurement program and thus impede overall Iraqi Air Force capability.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq must redouble its efforts to inculcate the value of quality maintenance and support into the culture of the MOD in general, and of the Iraqi Air Force in particular.*

Finding 23: *Although the Iraqi Air Force has had a very late start compared to the Iraqi Army, the present design of the Iraqi Air Force is appropriate for its current mission and it is making significant progress.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Given its good progress to date, the new Iraqi Air Force should stay its present course of developing a counterinsurgency air force with a view toward establishing quality operations and maintenance capability for integration into the joint fight. As these skills are refined, reliance on Coalition support can diminish.*

The Iraqi Navy

Conclusion: The Iraqi Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its mission. However, it is making substantive progress in this early stage of development: it has a well-thought-out growth plan, which it is successfully executing. Its maturation is hampered by the Ministry of Defense's understandable focus on ground forces and counterinsurgency operations, as well as by bureaucratic inefficiency. The Iraqi Navy will continue to rely on Coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the foreseeable future.

Finding 24: *The low profile of the Iraqi Navy within the MOD, as well as the ministry's inadequate budget allocation and execution, significantly impede Iraqi naval operations and development.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Coalition advisors must assist the Iraqi Navy leadership in advocating budget priorities within the MOD. The strategic importance of the Iraqi Navy must be better articulated to the Government of Iraq, in terms both of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and of providing the security needed to ensure the efficient flow of exports. Larger issues of poor ministerial capacity and poor budget execution must also be addressed with Coalition support, as detailed more extensively in the discussion on MOD capacity (Chapter 4).*

Finding 25: *The Iraqi Navy area of responsibility is small, complicated, and of vital strategic importance. Relations among the nations bordering the area of responsibility and their respective navies and coast guards are fragile at best. Furthermore, the international maritime borders with Iran and Kuwait are contested and not clearly demarcated. These issues warrant greater attention from both the MOD and the Coalition.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Absent clearly defined territorial seas, the Iraqi Navy's battle space will be further complicated. Although the Commission realizes that resolving this issue is made more difficult by long-standing animosities between these nations and may not be feasible in the near term, it is important that the profile of this issue be raised within the Government of Iraq and the country team.*

Finding 26: *The Iraqi Navy does not have a collaborative relationship with the Iraqi Coast Guard, though the two services operate in close proximity and have complementary missions. This lack of coordination has the potential to create vulnerable seams in a critical strategic environment.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Coalition should work with the MOD, Iraqi Navy, and Coast Guard to examine the feasibility and potential advantages of merging the Navy and Coast Guard into a single service with responsibility for coastal maritime security. If unity of command cannot be attained by combining both forces under the MOD, then better cooperation and coordination has to be developed to prevent a serious gap in security.*

Finding 27: *The new Iraqi Navy has made significant progress over a very short time period, particularly in planning, but it remains heavily reliant on the Coalition for training, logistics, and maintenance support.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *An ongoing Naval Transition Team presence in Umm Qasr is essential and should be continued.*

The Ministry of Interior

Conclusion: The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.

Finding 28: *Sectarianism and corruption are pervasive in the MOI and cripple the ministry's ability to accomplish its mission to provide internal security for Iraqi citizens.*

Finding 29: *The MOI lacks sufficient administrative and logistics capability to support the civil security forces it controls.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The MOI, with the support of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, must reform its organizational structure, develop a five-year strategic plan, and build sufficient administrative capacity to sustain Iraq's civil security forces in the field in a manner that is free of real or perceived sectarian favoritism.*

Finding 30: *The MOI cannot execute its budget, a failure that undermines the effectiveness of the civil security forces in the field.*

Finding 31: *The Ministry of Interior and provincial authorities share responsibility for management and payment of the Iraqi Police Service. Serious deficiencies in these efforts have led to pay and morale problems and have heightened tensions between the central government and the provinces.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The MOI Transition Team should continue to work with MOI officials to establish workable mechanisms to better manage and resolve pay problems affecting police forces. This should be done in coordination with provincial authorities.*

Finding 32: *The MOI has little control of the forces that make up the Facilities Protection Service (FPS). The allegiance of many Facilities Protection Service personnel has been to individual ministries, parties, tribes, and clans rather than to the central government, and such division of loyalties undermines their ability to provide security.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Coalition should support consolidation of the Facilities Protection Service by encouraging the establishment of national implementing orders. As consolidation proceeds, the Coalition should assist the MOI to ensure that the Facilities Protection Service personnel can be properly vetted, trained, and equipped.*

Iraqi Police Service

Conclusion: The Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combating the threats that officers face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.

Finding 33: *The emphasis on local recruiting and assignment in the Iraqi Police Service is showing promise in establishing security at the local level; strong personnel vetting processes will remain vital.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The MOI and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with provincial authorities to ensure that established vetting procedures are used consistently throughout the country to combat militia, criminal, and terrorist infiltration of the Iraqi Police Service.*

Finding 34: *Police training in Iraq is improving, particularly in areas where training is led by Iraqi instructors partnered with civilian police advisors.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should continue transitioning the lead for training to the Iraqis wherever possible and should consider instituting a "train the trainers" program throughout the provinces to facilitate this process.*

Finding 35: *U.S. military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this arrangement has inadvertently marginalized civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness of the training and advisory effort.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Leadership of the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team and the Police Training Teams should be transferred to senior civilian law enforcement professionals.*

Finding 36: *The number of civilian international police advisors is insufficient to the task of training the Iraqi Police Service.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Coalition—not just the United States—should fund and recruit the requisite number of international police advisors.*

Finding 37: *Training programs to date have emphasized quantity of police trained over quality of training, thereby undermining the long-term effectiveness of the force in favor of force generation efforts.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Particularly in light of a significantly high number of personnel in the Iraqi Police Service who have not yet undergone Coalition training, the Ministry of Interior and Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should seek higher-quality police recruits and vet them more carefully as they continue to address the training backlog.*

Finding 38: *The Iraqi Police Service lacks a formal police leadership academy, a deficiency that impedes leadership development.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Iraqi Police Service should work with its Coalition advisors to establish a formal Iraqi Police Academy that is focused on developing civil policing skills in senior officers and includes a separate first-line supervisor training program.*

Finding 39: *The Iraqi Police Service is underequipped to combat the threats it faces and suffers persistent shortfalls in vital equipment.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should work with the Iraqi government to provide adequately armored vehicles and heavier weaponry to the Iraqi Police Service, particularly to police stations in urban areas or other areas where improvised explosive device (IED) and explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks are prevalent.*

Finding 40: *Quality intelligence is central to the ability of the Iraqi Police Service to take the lead for security, but intelligence supporting police operations is limited and information sharing with other security agencies is weak.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *All Iraqi security agencies and the Iraqi Police Service must work together to establish information-sharing systems, practices, and protocols that meet their requirements. The MOI should work with the provinces to establish mechanisms to share information from the national level down.*

Finding 41: *The Iraqi Police Service has extremely weak investigative and forensic capabilities that greatly limit its effectiveness.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *As the Iraqi Police Service continue to develop, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should work with the MOI to increase the investigative and forensic capabilities of the police service by expanding the Major Crimes Task Force, increasing the number of crime lab facilities in major cities, increasing training courses for criminal investigators, and establishing an investigator rank within the police service.*

Finding 42: *The Iraqi Police Service is but one element of a broader justice system that is not yet well established in Iraq.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Government of Iraq, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, should collaborate to create and implement a framework to enable the rule of law in Iraq. The Coalition should continue to strongly support these efforts.*

Finding 43: *The police are central to the long-term establishment of security and stability in Iraq. Today, the Iraqi Police Service is incapable of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to develop a detailed strategic plan to transition primary responsibility for internal security in Iraq from the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Police Service.*

The National Police

Conclusion: The National Police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the force is not viable in its current form. The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized.

Finding 44: *In its current form, the National Police is not a viable organization. Its ability to be effective is crippled by significant challenges, including public distrust, sectarianism (both real and perceived), and a lack of clarity about its identity—specifically, whether it is a military or a police force.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized under the MOI. It should become a much smaller organization under a different name with responsibility for highly specialized police tasks such as explosive ordnance disposal, urban search and rescue, special threat action, and other similar functions.*

The Department of Border Enforcement

Conclusion: Iraq's borders are porous. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor ministerial support from the MOI. Border forces often lack the equipment, infrastructure, and basic supplies to conduct their mission. Overall border security is further undermined by the division of responsibilities between the MOI and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external influence and infiltration are widespread. Absent major improvements in all these areas, Iraq's borders will remain porous and poorly defended.

Finding 45: *The overall capacity of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate is undermined by weak MOI capacity. Further, border security commanders have little confidence that the MOI will address their needs and concerns.*

Finding 46: *The divided responsibility for land, sea, and air ports of entry between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Transportation, together with the lack of unity of effort between these ministries, undermines the effectiveness of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate.*

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Government of Iraq should establish clear guidelines to facilitate unity of effort between the MOI and MOT for border security and move quickly to consolidate overall responsibility for border security under the MOI.*

Finding 47: *The MOI has not created standardized concepts of operations, operating procedures, or processes for the Ports of Entry Directorate to apply at Iraq's land ports of entry; each appears to be run according to the initiative—or lack thereof—of the local commander.*

Finding 48: *Many land ports of entry have neither the quantity nor the quality of monitoring and detection systems required for border security operations to function effectively.*

Recommendation: *The Coalition should continue to emphasize to the MOI that the territorial integrity of the country relies heavily on the Department of Border Enforcement's ability to secure the borders and that funding for detection and monitoring equipment for those forces should be accorded a very high priority to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of ports of entry security forces.*

Finding 49: *The Department of Border Enforcement lacks sufficient logistics, support systems, and infrastructure to sustain many of its forces in the field.*

Recommendation: *Coalition forces should strongly encourage the Department of Border Enforcement to implement its national Headquarters Distribution Plan while continuing to provide logistical and maintenance support in the near term so that Department of Border Enforcement and ports of entry personnel can accomplish their mission.*

Finding 50: *Corruption is a serious problem at many land ports of entry. This fact has not yet been adequately addressed.*

Recommendation: *Eliminating corruption will most likely be a generational undertaking in Iraq, but Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, and civilian agencies should work together to try to increase Border Transition Team oversight of Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate facilities, as well as to develop a standardized training program emphasizing leadership and professional ethics.*

Table 1. ISF Independent Assessment Commission Organization

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), Chairman

Ministry of Defense Syndicates

Iraqi Army
General George Joulwan, USA (Ret.), Syndicate Chair
General John Abrams, USA (Ret.)
General Charles Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.)
Lieutenant General John Van Alstyne, USA (Ret.)
Command Sergeant Major Dwight Brown, USA (Ret.)
Sergeant Major Alford McMichael, USMC (Ret.)

Iraqi Special Forces
Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA (Ret.)

Iraqi Air Force
General Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.)*

Iraqi Navy
Admiral Gregory Johnson, USN (Ret.)*

Ministry of Interior Syndicates

Iraqi National Police and Iraqi Police Service
Chief Charles Ramsey, Syndicate Chair
The Honorable Terrance Gainer
Colonel Michael Heidingsfield, USAF (Ret.)
Assistant Chief Constable Duncan McCausland
Chief John Timoney

Other Ministry of Interior Functions
General Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.), Syndicate Chair*
Admiral Gregory Johnson, USN (Ret.)*
Lieutenant General Martin Berndt, USMC (Ret.)

* Denotes dual Commission role

Cross-Cutting Issues Syndicates

Logistics
Lieutenant General Gary McKissock, USMC (Ret.)

Intelligence/Command and Control
Lieutenant General James King, USA (Ret.)

Resources
The Honorable John Hamre

Personnel
Major General Arnold Punaro, USMC (Ret.)

Figure 1: ISF Independent Assessment Commission Site Visits (Iraq)



1. Tal Afar
3rd Iraqi Army Division HQ

2. Mosul
Multi-National Division-North HQ
2nd Iraqi Army Division HQ

3. Kirkuk
Kirkuk Air Base (Iraqi Air Force)

4. Sulaymaniyah
Joint Iraqi Police Academy
Provincial Directorate of Police HQ

5. Habbaniyah
Habbaniyah Iraqi Police Academy
Regional Training Center - Habbaniyah
Multi-National Forces - West (MNF-W) HQ
MNF-W ISF Training Facilities
Iraqi National Maintenance Site
1st Iraqi Motor Transport Regiment

6. Zurbatiyah
Point of Entry Border Station

7. Taji
Camp Taji
Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence
Iraqi Counterinsurgency Academy
Iraqi Military Intelligence Academy
Iraqi Signal School
Regional Support Unit - Taji
Iraqi Army Services Support Training Institute
Taji National Depot
Regional Training Center - Taji
1st Brigade Combat Team 1st Cavalry Divison
Iraqi Army NCO Academy
CMATT Command
Taji Air Force Base
Saba' Al Bur Joint Security Station-West

8. Arab Jabour
Patrol Base Whiskey One

9. Numaniyah
Numaniyah Iraqi National Police Academy

10. Basra
Multi-National Divison-Southeast
10th Iraqi Army Division
U.S. Regional Embassy Office
Department of Border Enforcement - J-7
Iraqi Chief of Police

11. Umm Qasr
Umm Qasr Naval Base

12. Offshore Oil Terminals
al-Basra Oil Terminal
Khor al Amaya Oil Terminal

13. Tallil
8th Iraqi Army Division
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division
Iraqi Army Commanders for Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar Provinces

14. Trebil
Point of Entry Border Station

15. Al Walid
Point of Entry Border Station

Figure 2: ISF Independent Assessment Commission Site Visits (Baghdad)



1. International Zone
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih
Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq HQ
Tactical Training Command
NATO Training Mission
Iraqi National Defense University
Iraqi National Command Center
Baghdad Operations Center
Iraqi Office of the Commander-in-Chief
Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement

2. U.S. Embassy Annex

3. Iraqi Ministry of Defense

4. Iraqi Ministry of Interior

5. Baghdad Police College
Baghdad Provincial Directorate of Police HQ
Provincial Directorate of Police
Karkh Directorate Police Headquarters

6. Haifa Street Joint Security Station

7. Iraqi National Police Headquarters

8. Rustimiyah
Iraqi Military Academy - Rustimiyah
Iraqi Joint Staff College

9. Al Madai'in JSS (Al Karradah District)

10. Baghdad International Airport
Camp Dublin
- National Police Emergency Response Unit
- Iraqi Center for Dignitary Protection Training
Al Muthanna Air Base
- Iraqi Air Force
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Command

11. Camp Victory
Multi-National Corps - Iraq HQ
Multi-National Force - Iraq
Iraqi Assistance Group
Iraqi Ground Forces Command
6th Iraqi Army Division
Command Operations Post Cleary
Multi-National Division-Center HQ

12. Command Outpost Attack (West Rashid)

CHAPTER 1: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN IRAQ

To put the Commission's assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces in an appropriate context, it is important to understand the internal and external threats facing Iraq and its people, as well as the requirements that those threats impose on the Iraqi Security Forces. The societal forces defining the security environment in Iraq today are enormously diverse, complex, and violent, and they directly affect the stability of the broader Middle East. The conflicts in Iraq today flow from differences over religion, from historical divides, and from disputes in Iraqi society that were unleashed following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They also reflect the broader power dynamics of the region. The Iraqi Security Forces are attempting to develop and operate in the midst of an extraordinarily complex environment—an environment that significantly challenges far more mature international security forces as well.

Iraq's modern history is the story of different groups and tribes merged into a single nation-state by European powers. After the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, the Franco-British plan to unite Mesopotamia was executed through the imposition of rulers and drawing of maps in European capitals—without the censuses of or consultation with the local interested parties. In carving modern Iraq out of the former Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, a largely Kurdish north was combined with a largely Sunni Arab center and a largely Shi'a south (See Figure 3). This consolidation papered over existing problems and created new ones.

Figure 3: Religious / Ethnic Areas in Iraq (as of April 07)



Source: U.S. Department of Defense

The Kurds in Iraq number more than 4 million, representing perhaps 20 percent of the total Iraqi population. Significant Kurdish communities in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Iran, and Syria bring the total Kurdish population of the area to more than 25 million. Surrounding states conceive the possibility of Kurdish secession in Iraq as an inspiration to their own Kurdish minority populations, and thus as a threat to their own territorial integrity. The Sunnis also represent another 20 percent of the Iraqi population. Iraq's Sunnis traditionally have lived in the center of the country, an area without substantial oil or other economic resources. With support from the Ottomans, the British, and the Ba'athists, Sunnis ruled Mesopotamia for more than 400 years—until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The Shi'a make up about 60 percent of Iraq's population, living principally in the south, the area that possesses most of Iraq's known oil reserves and has access to the Persian Gulf. Many Iraqi Shi'as feel that after years of oppression, the time has come for them to assume a leading role in Iraq, and they profess pride in being the first inhabitants of an Arab state in centuries to be Shi'a led.

Iraq is bordered by Iran, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Syria and Iran have long played a significant role in Iraq's affairs. Iran, a large Shi'a state governed by an avowedly revolutionary theocracy, is largely Persian, not Arab. In 1980, after a series of border disputes and growing tension between Saddam's Sunni regime and the Shi'a ruling government in Iran, Iraq invaded Iran, and the two countries battled for eight years and lost more than one million lives between them. So great and widespread was the sacrifice that in many ways, the Iran-Iraq War is as much a defining element of Iran's political culture as the Islamic Revolution itself. Today, Iran's cultural and political influence is expanding significantly in Iraq, as pan-Shi'a networks help consolidate Iraqi Shi'a power. Iranians are agreed among their leadership that Iraq should never be allowed to emerge as a powerful and hostile rival. Consolidating Shi'a control with Iranian influence over the central government is one way to achieve their goals. High among Iran's goals is to undermine U.S. influence in Iraq, since a successful, secure, and pro-U.S. Iraqi government will thwart their regional ambitions.

Syria severed relations with Iraq in 1982 after siding with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, but the two countries renewed formal diplomatic relations in 2006. Today some 1.5 million Iraqis fleeing their country have crossed the border into Syria, and the growing refugee population is becoming a difficult issue in their bilateral relationship. Syria shelters former Ba'ath Party officials, and many of the foreign Sunni insurgents in Iraq are believed to enter through Syria. Like the Iranian government, the Syrian government believes that a U.S. success in Iraq is adverse to its own interests. But whereas much of the Iranian support appears to go to Shi'a groups and militias, it is Sunni insurgent groups who draw their support from Syria.

Other Arab governments have their own reasons for protecting the interests of Iraq's Sunnis. Though they may stop short of direct support to Sunni insurgents, they are not as aggressive as they might be in cutting off such aid from private sources. Sunni tribal leaders certainly enjoy overseas support, and some of that money goes toward protecting Sunnis—protection that has sometimes manifested itself as attacks on Shi'a.

Overall, each of Iraq's neighbors is concerned about developments in that country, and each has invested in some way—often through armed proxies—to protect itself from those developments. The resultant downward spiral in security has meant that each of these countries feels threatened by

the situation in Iraq, but the perils these surrounding countries face are in no way as great as the dangers currently confronting Iraqis themselves.

Against that history and set of regional dynamics, the most significant threats currently facing Iraq are generally agreed to be al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Sunni insurgent groups, Shi'a militias, and the largely negative involvement of neighboring countries in Iraq's internal affairs—especially Iranian support of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Badr Brigade.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Al Qaeda in Iraq was credited with only 15 percent of the insurgent attacks in Iraq at the beginning of 2007, but its attacks were typically the most destructive, sensational, and destabilizing.[3] According to the Department of Defense, al Qaeda in Iraq is responsible for approximately 90 percent of the suicide bombings in Iraq and the kidnapping of more than 250 foreign workers. Abu

Figure 4: State of Al Qaeda - Iraq



Source: MNF-I

[3] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida," CSIS working draft, July 16, 2007, p. 7; available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070716_sunni_insurgents.pdf.

Hamza al-Muhajir—an Egyptian—has been al Qaeda in Iraq's leader since the death of the organization's founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in a Coalition air strike on June 7, 2006.[4] Although al Qaeda in Iraq's leadership is foreign—a reality that members have tried to hide through information operations—its makeup is likely 90–95 percent Iraqi.[5] Even so, 80 percent of al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bombings are carried out by foreigners.[6] The relationship between al Qaeda in Iraq and the greater al Qaeda leadership in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region remains unclear, but the groups share common goals and openly support one another through the media and sworn loyalty oaths.

Al Qaeda in Iraq has consistently sought to destabilize Iraq and instigate sectarian violence in an effort to oust U.S. forces from the country. Its 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was a turning point that led many in the international community to reconsider support for Coalition operations in Iraq. Similarly, al Qaeda in Iraq's February 22, 2006, bombing of the Shi'a Askariya Mosque in Samarra was an early accelerant of sectarian violence in Iraq, catalyzing retaliatory attacks against 60 Sunni mosques and the killing of more than 400 Sunnis by Shi'a militias in the bombing's immediate aftermath.[7]

There are indicators in some parts of Iraq that popular support for, and even tolerance of, al Qaeda in Iraq's presence may be weakening significantly, in large part because the local population and its leaders resent al Qaeda in Iraq's coercion and brutality. In Anbar province, which makes up one-third of Iraq's landmass, Sunni tribal leaders have formed alliances with Coalition and Iraqi forces during the past six months to hunt members of al Qaeda in Iraq operating in the west (For key al Qaeda in Iraq members captured or killed, see Figure 4). Strong Coalition involvement with the local sheikhs has significantly transformed the security environment in that region—once the principal stronghold of Sunni extremist activity manifested in part through al Qaeda in Iraq operations. The ongoing ISF and Coalition presence in Anbar province encourages the population to cooperate with Coalition forces and has markedly spurred police recruiting efforts. Though these new Sunni allies have yet to earn the complete trust of the Government of Iraq—and vice versa—they have dramatically improved the security situation in Anbar province (see Figure 5), providing Coalition forces with valuable intelligence leading to the captures of top al Qaeda in Iraq leaders. There are positive indications that popular support for al Qaeda in Iraq is decreasing dramatically in other provinces as well.

The Sunni Insurgents

Hard-line Arab Sunni Ba'athists began the insurgency in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime. They were originally backed by small groups of foreign fighters—mostly secular Arab nationalists—who had crossed into Iraq before the beginning of the war to support the Ba'athist cause.[8] Today Sunni insurgents target Coalition forces, Iraqi forces, and government personnel

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[4] Kenneth Katzman, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, Congressional Research Service, RL31339: April 27, 2007, pp. 29–30.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[6] Cordesman, "Iraq's Sunni Insurgents," p. 3.

[7] Cordesman, "Iraq's Sunni Insurgents," p. 32.

[8] Mohammed Hafez, "Fresh Air: Martyrs Without Borders," interview on National Public Radio, July 23, 2007; available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12169774.

Figure 5: Anbar Attacks



Source: MNF-I: As of 10 Aug / Please Note: Aug is projection

or those seen as cooperating with them, as well as Shi'a Iraqis and militia members.[9] Their goal is to restore Sunni rule in Iraq. The main Sunni insurgent groups currently operating in the country are the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance, and the Mujahideen Army in Iraq. These groups are believed to be responsible for roughly 70 percent of attacks.[10] Most Sunni insurgent groups are made up of former soldiers and Sunni Arab civilians led by former Iraqi military officers. They have been concentrated in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province, as well as several majority Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, including Amiriya, Adhamiya, Fadhil, Jihad, Amal, and Doura.[11] The recent U.S. and Iraqi troop surge has focused on these violent areas, forcing many insurgents to retreat from their traditional home bases into outlying provinces such as Diyala, which has seen a major spike in insurgent activity since the beginning of the surge.[12] These groups are also increasingly active in the northern, majority-Kurdish provinces and around the multi-ethnic and contested cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.

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[9] Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Rudolfo, "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas," Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Special Report, July 2007, p. 9.

[10] Cordesman, "Iraq's Sunni Insurgents." p. 7.

[11] Katzman, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, p. 29.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Shi'a Militias

There are approximately 80,000 Shi'a militia members in Iraq. Their roots go back to the underground resistance to the Ba'athist regime, but the militias rapidly grew in strength after the Coalition invasion, in part to fill the security vacuum left by the sudden collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, and also to ensure that the Ba'athists would not rise again. Shi'a individuals in government and other positions of authority throughout Iraq remain deeply insecure about their place in the new Iraq, despite their majority rule of the country.[13]

Approximately 60,000 of these militia members belong to Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), 15,000 to the Badr Brigades, and 5,000 to smaller organizations.[14] Jaysh al-Mahdi is loyal to the young anti-Western cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The group controls most of Sadr City, a Baghdad slum containing more than 2.5 million Iraqis, and is also increasingly active in southern Iraq. While remaining a fierce critic of the U.S.-led occupation, Muqtada al-Sadr has repeatedly called for Jaysh al-Mahdi to avoid direct confrontation with Coalition and Iraqi forces during the current surge. At the same time, there are increasing signs that Sadr is unable to exercise control over all factions within Jaysh al-Mahdi, and that Iran's influence over the militant arm of this organization is growing.

The Badr Brigade[15] is the Iranian-trained military wing of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC, formerly SCIRI), which is currently the largest Shi'a political party. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council controls the most seats in Iraq's parliament and governing coalition.[16] The Badr Organization is led by a member of the Iraqi parliament, Hadi al-Amiri, and also operates primarily in southern Iraq.

The Badr Brigade and Jaysh al-Mahdi are both believed to have infiltrated many of Iraq's ministries and security forces. Various units within the National Police have likely been penetrated by the Badr faction, while Jaysh al-Mahdi is believed to exercise significant influence over Iraq's Facilities Protection Service, which employs more than 140,000 armed personnel.[17] Militia members who join the ISF often remain loyal to their local militia, and may take part in sectarian "extracurricular" activities. The Iraqi government is making efforts to counter the negative influence of these groups. For example, in October 2006, Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani fired 3,000 ministry employees, and seven of nine National Police brigade commanders have been removed in the past six months because of sectarian behavior.[18]

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[13] National Intelligence Council, "Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead," National Intelligence Estimate, January 2007.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[15] The Badr Brigade is also called the "Badr Organization" by some experts, as the militia claims to have de-militarized.

[16] Lionel Beehner, "Iraq: Militia Groups," *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 9, 2005.

[17] Jeremy Sharp, *The Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences*, Congressional Research Service, RS22093: January 18, 2007, p. 5.

[18] Katzman, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, p. 32.

Iranian Influence in Iraq

Iraq's borders with Iran are long, porous, and subject to wide-scale corruption at points of entry. While the exact nature, depth, and breadth of Iranian involvement in Iraq is not fully known, there is general consensus that Iran is a rapidly increasing threat to Iraq's stability (see Figure 6).

American intelligence and military officials have stated publicly that there is clear evidence of Iran's providing funding, weapons, ammunition, training, and other forms of support to militia in Iraq, particularly in the southeastern region of the country. For example, U.S. officials have repeatedly asserted that members of the Al Qods Force of Iran's Revolutionary Guard have been arming Iraqi Shi'a militias with weapons and explosively forced projectiles (EFPs), which defeat up-armored vehicles.[19] Multi-National Corps–Iraq has stated that EFPs were used to carry out 99 attacks in July 2007, accounting for fully one-third of Coalition combat deaths. EFPs accounted for 18 percent of combat deaths of Americans and allied troops in Iraq in the last quarter of 2006.[20]

In December 2006 and January 2007, U.S. forces detained seven Iranians suspected of being dispatched agents of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard; five remain in U.S. custody.[21] Muqtada al-Sadr's close connections with certain Iranian factions make Jaysh al-Mahdi the most likely recipient of the aid flowing from Iran, but Iran's assistance may not be limited to Shi'a militia groups. In April 2007, Coalition officials announced that they had also uncovered evidence of Iran's aiding some Sunni insurgent groups in an apparent attempt to undermine overall Coalition policy in Iraq.[22]

Iranian influence has also contributed to increased Shi'a-on-Shi'a violence in the south, as factions vie for power and control of the region's natural resources and infrastructure. Many leading Shi'a politicians currently in power in Iraq spent decades in exile in Tehran and formed links that are certain to continue to affect the direction of Iraq's internal politics.

The Role of Iraq's Other Neighbors

Among Iraq's neighbors, Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey have played the most productive roles in assisting the Government of Iraq. Jordan has hosted ISF training, while Kuwait is an invaluable logistics hub for ISF and Coalition supplies. Jordan has accepted some 750,000 Iraqi refugees, but it recently closed its borders as it no longer feels it can manage the unending flow of refugees.

Although their numbers are relatively small, foreign fighters of different nationalities flow into Iraq mainly through networks in Syria (see Figure 6)—a problem that the Syrian government has not taken effective measures to stop.[23] Iraq's relations with Saudi Arabia have also become

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[19] See, for example, Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, July 2, 2007, Multi-National Forces–Iraq press briefing, available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12641&Itemid=131.

[20] Information related to EFPs, unless otherwise noted, is from Michael Gordon, "U.S. Says Iran-Supplied Bomb Kills More Troops," *New York Times*, August 8, 2007.

[21] Katzman, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, p. 32.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[23] Jim Garamone, "Abizaid Says Percentage of Foreign Fighters Increasing in Iraq," American Forces Press Service, March 27, 2005; available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31091.

increasingly strained, as more than 50 percent of all foreign fighters—and especially would-be suicide bombers—appear to be coming from Saudi Arabia.[24]

Means and Methods of Violence

Thanks to the legacy of the Ba'athist regime, insurgents and militias in Iraq are extremely well-armed. During his rule, Saddam Hussein purchased an enormous arsenal of conventional weapons, including huge stockpiles of artillery, tanks, mines, mortars, explosives, and ammunition of all types.[25] As Coalition forces advanced into Iraq in spring 2003, Ba'athist security forces melted away, leaving large, unguarded depots and armories that were quickly looted. Insurgents and militia members may also be buying on a black market weapons originally intended for the Iraqi Security Forces.[26]

Figure 6: Iraq – External Influences



[24] Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq and Foreign Volunteers," CSIS working draft, updated November 2005; available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051117_iraqforeignvol.pdf. See also Sam Dagher, "Anti-Saudi Tide Rises in Iraq," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 9, 2007; Helene Cooper et al., "U.S. Officials Voice Frustration with Saudis, Citing Role in Iraq," *New York Times*, July 27, 2007.

[25] Although a large portion of Iraq's arsenal was destroyed in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, there still remained packed depots throughout Iraq.

[26] Government Accountability Office, *DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces*, GAO-07-711, July 31, 2007.

The war in Iraq features the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on a sweeping scale. Throughout the conflict, IEDs have been responsible for the majority of casualties. Their main components are explosive material, an ignition device, and a trigger. Explosive materials are abundant, and ignitions and triggers can be made from almost any small electronic device or collection of spare parts. Derivatives of the common "package-size" IEDs are vehicle-borne (VBIEDs), suicide vests, or even entire blocks of houses wired together (house-borne or HBIEDs).

VBIEDs have been the most effective weapon of insurgents in Iraq. VBIED attacks include the truck bomb that hit the United Nations headquarters on August 19, 2003, and killed Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. Most IEDs are planted with a wire or pressure trigger or are remotely activated. This method is a force multiplier for the enemy, and it allows placement by unskilled foot soldiers while bomb makers and leaders remain undetected and out of danger. The tactical impact of IEDs is very similar to that of antipersonnel or antivehicle land mines; however, because of Iraq's urban terrain and the ease of IED construction, IEDs are more difficult to detect.

Levels of Violence and Their Impact on Iraqi Society

Violence remains a fact of life in Iraq. Those insurgents who perpetrate this violence are elusive, operate covertly, and seek to avoid direct engagement with Coalition and Iraqi forces. While violence has recently declined sharply in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province—the former stronghold of the insurgency—attacks have risen in Diyala, Balad, Basra, and Amarah. Violence remains endemic in Baghdad, despite measurable gains made since the implementation of Fardh al-Qanoon (the Baghdad Security Plan) in February 2007 by Coalition and Iraqi forces.

Since the beginning of Fardh al-Qanoon, the average number of sectarian killings in Baghdad has decreased. The average number of daily attacks has similarly fallen [27] (see Figure 7). While these numbers may simply reflect the decision of many of the Shi'a militias to maintain a low profile during the Coalition-led surge, there are signs of improvements in the security situation in Baghdad.

Iraq's violent environment has placed its population under extreme duress. Iraq's population at the time of the 2003 invasion was about 26.5 million. Currently, more than 40,000 Iraqis leave Iraq each month. There are at least 2 million Iraqi refugees throughout the Middle East, whose presence places increasing pressure on Iraq's neighbors, and an additional 2.2 million displaced persons within Iraq.[28] Seventy percent of Iraqi residents lack adequate water supplies, compared with 50 percent in 2003.[29] Twenty-eight percent of children are malnourished, compared to 19 percent before the 2003 invasion. Ninety-two percent of Iraqi children suffer learning problems due to the stress of the war. Sadly, international funding for humanitarian assistance in Iraq has plummeted, from $453 million in 2005 to $95 million in 2006.[30]

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[27] Katzman, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, p. 31.

[28] "Iraqi Refugees Flee War-torn Country," *Lehrer News Hour*; available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec07/refugees_07-26.html.

[29] Oxfam, "Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq," Briefing Paper 105, July 2007; available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/bp105_humanitarian_challenge_in_iraq_0707.pdf/download.

[30] Oxfam, "Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq."

Figure 7: Ethno-Sectarian Violence: Baghdad Security Districts



Source: MNF-I

Iraqi society is being convulsed by sectarianism that if not swiftly and significantly curtailed could contribute to a rapid deterioration of Iraq, with "grave humanitarian, political, and security consequences."[31] Iraq's overall security environment is very complex. Elements of terror, ethnic violence, insurgency, meddling by external actors, and criminal activity all combine to define, in varying degrees, the nature of the threats. The Commission assesses that despite all that remain to be done, the single most important event that could immediately and favorably affect Iraq's direction and security is political reconciliation focused on ending sectarian violence and hatred. Sustained progress within the Iraqi Security Forces depends on such a political agreement.

[31] National Intelligence Council, "Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead," Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate: January 2007, p. 8.

CHAPTER 2: OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

This report assesses each element of the Iraqi Security Forces in terms of its military readiness to contribute to the security of Iraq. Though many of the challenges facing the ISF are common across the military and police forces, each force has unique characteristics, potential strengths, and evident weaknesses. This chapter provides the Commission's perspective on the overall ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to conduct four critical missions: maintaining the territorial sovereignty of Iraq, denying safe haven to terrorists, providing greater security in the provinces, and ending sectarianism to promote national reconciliation.

Although the ISF have made significant progress in many areas, the Commission finds that they are not yet able to execute these missions independently. Without continued combat support, combat service support, and assistance from Coalition Military Transition Teams, it is unlikely that the ISF will achieve, in the near term, the proficiency and readiness needed to provide security for Iraq.

Figure 8: Glide Path: Iraqi Security Forces



* Manning level of combat battalions raised to 120% owing to Operation Fardh al-Qanoon lessons learned (FMS funded).

Source: MNF-I

Overview of Iraqi Security Forces

The Iraqi Security Forces are composed of Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces.[32] The Iraqi Army and Special Forces, Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Navy report to the Ministry of Defense. Under the Ministry of Interior are the National Police, the Iraqi Police Service, the Department of Border Enforcement, the Facilities Protection Service, and the Coast Guard (for current and projected ISF end strengths, see Figure 8).

In 2004, the Coalition established the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq to focus exclusively on helping to establish and develop the Iraqi Security Forces so that the Government of Iraq would be able to provide for its own security. The command is responsible for working with the Government of Iraq to generate and train Iraqi Security Forces, and to develop administrative capacity within the ministries of Defense and Interior to support the ISF. The Multi-National Corps–Iraq (the tactical unit responsible for command and control in Iraq) has joined in helping to develop the ISF, with an emphasis on providing Military Transition Teams and Police Transition Teams that partner with Iraqi military units at the division, brigade, and battalion levels and with police forces at the provincial, district, and police station levels.

Since 2003, United States has spent $19.2 billion on the development of the ISF.[33] Iraq has spent approximately $16.6 billion for the same purpose, but in 2007 its expenditures for the first time exceeded those of the United States.[34] In 2008, the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq anticipates that Iraq will spend about $11.6 billion on the ISF, and has recommended that the United States contribute $5.5 billion.

Although this chapter examines each of the four missions in turn, it is clear that the missions themselves are interrelated: many of the capabilities needed to accomplish one specific mission are needed to accomplish the others as well. In order to deny terrorists safe haven in Iraq, the ISF must ultimately be able to secure Iraq's borders, an objective that is central to maintaining Iraq's territorial security. Denying terrorists a safe haven will contribute to bringing security to the provinces. In a similar vein, to accomplish any of these four missions, the ISF and the ministries that organize, train, and equip them must have functioning administrative and budgeting systems; logistics and supply chain management systems; and combat support such as aviation support, intelligence, and communications.

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[32] Kenneth Katzman, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, Congressional Research Service, RL31339: April 27, 2007, pp. 35–36.

[33] U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 2007, p. 41.

[34] In 2007, the Government of Iraq spent $9 billion compared to $4.5 billion by the United States (telephone interview with Lieutenant General Dempsey, Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 1, 2007, http://www.defendamerica.mil/specials/2007/blog/docs/Dempsey_June01_07_transcript.pdf).

Maintain Territorial Integrity

To maintain Iraq's territorial integrity, the Iraqi Security Forces need to be able to protect the country from external threats, secure the nation's borders and maritime approaches, and control its air space. To fulfill these missions, the Iraqi Security Forces must be able to recruit, train, equip, and retain sufficient officers and soldiers who are loyal to the nation. They also must be able to project and sustain forces around the country, collect and act on military intelligence, command and control forces effectively, and conduct military operations successfully.

Today, the ISF is not able to secure Iraq's borders. The Iraqi Navy and Air Force do not control Iraq's maritime approaches or airspace, and the Ministry of Defense does not have the systems in place to project and sustain its military forces independently.

Iraq has 2,268 miles of land border—compared to 1,951 miles of the U.S.-Mexican border—as well as 36 miles of coastline. The nation's borders are porous, and at least two of Iraq's neighbors are actively contributing to instability within the country. Arms, munitions, and foreign fighters regularly come across the Iranian and Syrian borders. Not only is Iran providing matériel to militia groups but there are also distinct signs of Iranian influence at the political level in Iraq. Saudi Arabia has not taken effective steps to stem the flow of Saudi foreign fighters and suicide bombers into the country. However, discussions with Coalition commanders and intelligence officials in Iraq made it clear to the Commission that Iran's activities raise the greatest concern for future stability, and are making it more difficult for the Coalition to achieve its goals in Iraq.

The Iraqi armed forces are not yet a major factor in Iraq's border security effort. Iraq's 37,000 Department of Border Enforcement personnel are just over one-third the numbers that monitored Iraq's border during Saddam Hussein's rule. Border forts and land crossings lack equipment to inspect and monitor people and cargoes coming into the country. Many border facilities are crumbling, and corruption is a serious problem at many points of entry into Iraq.

Although Iraq's armed forces are not yet able to independently defend Iraq from external threats, they are increasingly capable of managing counterinsurgency operations. More than 75 percent of the battalions in the Iraqi Army can plan, conduct, execute, and sustain counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support,[35] though the degree of that support—particularly in logistics—can be substantial at times. The improvement in the Iraqi Army was aptly captured by the comment of a senior American general who noted that "a year ago we just wanted the Army to stand and fight with us and not run away—today we don't even have to think about that."[36]

As part of Fardh al-Qanoon (the Baghdad Security Plan), the Iraqi Army has participated in a large number of high-intensity operations and demonstrated an effectiveness and level of determination far greater than what Coalition forces observed during joint operations in 2005 and 2006 (this is illustrated by casualty figures, see Figure 9). The Iraqi Minister of Defense seemed to recognize both the progress the Iraqi Army has made and the remaining challenges when he

[35] White House, "Initial Benchmark Assessment Report," July 12, 2007, p. 21.
[36] Meeting with senior U.S. commanders in Iraq, July 2007.

predicted to Commissioners that the Army would be 60 percent capable of independently protecting Iraq from external threats by 2012 and entirely independent in this regard by 2018. He also insisted that the Iraqi Army will be able to accept more responsibility for direct combat against internal threats in 2008.

Figure 9: Casualties in Iraq by Month and Year



Source: MNF-I

The Iraqi Special Forces are a success story. The most capable units within the Iraqi military, they have trained extensively with U.S. Special Forces and developed a strong set of junior officers and a noncommissioned officer corps. Special operations involving both Coalition and Iraqi Special Forces are led by Iraqi commanders; their brigade provides 70 percent of the forces for these operations. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces still rely extensively on Coalition forces for fire and counterfire, close air support, fixed-wing and rotary wing mobility, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The Iraqi Air Force and Navy are still too underdeveloped to contribute significantly to maintaining Iraq's territorial sovereignty. The Iraqi Air Force is organized for counterinsurgency operations and is flying operational missions over Baghdad and key critical infrastructure sites to provide Iraqi and Coalition forces with actionable intelligence, but these contributions represent a fraction of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability needed to combat the threats facing Iraq. Despite plans to triple its personnel by the end of 2007, the Air Force remains very small and is unlikely to be able to control Iraqi air space without outside assistance before 2010. Its ability to conduct aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions is improving, however, and with the planned acquisition of additional C-130 cargo aircraft for transport, UH-II helicopters for mobility and medical evacuation, and Russian Mi-17 helicopters for counterinsurgency operations, the Iraqi Air Force will grow more capable over time.

Like the Air Force, the Iraqi Navy is very small and faces significant challenges. Most of Iraq's oil for export is pumped through two offshore oil terminals located just off Iraq's very small coastline in Basra province, a region of Iraq plagued by Jaysh al-Mahdi presence. While the Iraqi Navy's area of responsibility is of strategic importance given the volume of oil for export that is pumped from these oil terminals, the "fleet" is extremely small; some of its vessels are not seaworthy and are useful only as a source of spare parts. The Navy is in the process of acquiring a range of newer vessels that will provide it some capability to patrol continuously, protect the offshore terminals, and sustain maritime operations, but these capabilities will not be fully operational for at least another two to three years.[37]

Deny Terrorists Safe Haven

To deny international terrorists a safe haven in Iraq, Iraqi Security Forces need to be able to project force on behalf of the central government throughout the country and must have access to sufficient and actionable intelligence to ensure strategic situational awareness, secure the nation's borders, and conduct significant counterterrorism operations. Cooperation between Iraq's armed forces and its civil security forces—that is, the National Police, Iraqi Police Service, and the Department of Border Enforcement—is critical to achieving these missions.

> ***Finding:*** *Although the Iraqi Army and Special Forces have demonstrated significant progress in counterterrorism capabilities at the operational level, the Iraqi Police Service and National Police have many challenges to overcome and cannot yet effectively contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Iraq. The border security forces are assessed as being ineffective.*[38]

Iraq's central government in Baghdad does not have national reach in terms of security, nor does it have a monopoly on the use of force—a defining characteristic of a functioning nation-state. Militias continue to play a prominent role and are seen by American and Iraqi officials alike as posing almost as significant a threat to Iraqi stability and security as al Qaeda in Iraq. Despite the heavy concentration of forces brought to the capital as part of Fardh al-Qanoon, the central government does not yet fully control security in Baghdad or its surrounding "ring cities."

The central government also lacks a clear view of activities in the provinces, although this absence of information does not necessarily mean that terrorists are establishing safe havens within them. Seven of Iraq's 18 provinces are now under "provincial Iraqi control" (PIC), meaning that in theory the Iraqi central government and provincial authorities are largely responsible for security in those areas (see Figure 10). Three of these seven provinces are in the Kurdish region of Iraq, which

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[37] The Commission surveyed the Coalition's senior field commanders to obtain their on-the-ground assessment of the status and progress of the Iraqi Security Forces. Asked to rate the progress that has been made by the MOD forces toward attaining the capabilities required to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq, 6 of the 8 rated the progress "satisfactory," and 2 "unsatisfactory." None rated progress as "excellent." With regard to MOI forces, 2 rated progress as satisfactory, 2 unsatisfactory, and none excellent.

[38] The Commission's survey of the Coalition's senior field commanders regarding the ISF asked to rate the progress made by the MOD forces toward attaining the capabilities required to deny international terrorists safe haven, 7 rated the progress as satisfactory, 1 as unsatisfactory, and 1 as excellent; with regard to MOI forces, 4 rated progress as satisfactory, none unsatisfactory, and none excellent.

essentially has a separate regional government and its own security forces. The remaining four provinces under provincial Iraqi control are in the southern part of Iraq. Despite the transition to this status, security in the four southern provinces is deteriorating because of a rise in intra-Shi'a violence. Increasing violence is particularly notable in Basra, Diyala, and Dhi Qar.[39] Unlike Diyala and Dhi Qar, Basra has not yet been transferred to provincial Iraqi control, but this transfer is expected to occur in the near future.

Figure 10: Governor and MNC-I Assessments and Projections for Provinces (1-31 Jul 2007)



Source: MNF-I

Already Transitioned | Ready For Transition | Partially Ready For Transition | Not Ready For Transition

Note: Provinces transfer security responsibility 30-45 days after being assessed ready

As of 9 AUG 2007

Although the central government cannot yet control security inside the country, Iraq's ground forces, particularly its Special Forces, have demonstrated strong counterterrorism capability. Iraqi Special Forces, which have conducted many counterterrorism operations with and without Coalition forces, have achieved significant operational success in 2007.

[39] See Anthony H. Cordesman, "Success or Failure? Iraq's Insurgency and Civil Violence and US Strategy: Developments through June 2007," CSIS working draft, updated July 9, 2007; available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070709_iraqinsurgupdate.pdf.

Concurrent with improvements to the counterterrorism capabilities of the Iraqi Army and Special Forces has been the somewhat unexpected alliance of local tribes in Anbar province with Coalition and Iraqi forces. After meeting with American and Iraqi leaders in Anbar, the Commission assesses that progress in Anbar against al Qaeda in Iraq is both real and encouraging. "Provincial security forces"—local police, vetted by the tribal sheikhs, who will eventually go through formal police training—are helping to drive terrorists out of western Iraq and ensure that it is no longer a safe haven for al Qaeda in Iraq. It is not yet clear whether these new security arrangements can be exported successfully to other parts of Iraq, though there are promising signs that other provinces are experiencing a similar rejection of al Qaeda. Whether confined to Anbar province or more widely established, these alliances will have to be managed very carefully in order for them to contribute to Iraq's long-term security.

In areas where local tribes have allied themselves with Coalition and Iraqi security forces, tips against al Qaeda in Iraq and apprehensions of suspected al Qaeda in Iraq members or militiamen have increased dramatically. Coalition and ISF personnel are finding caches of weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) more frequently, and the number of murders and other violent attacks is going down. Local populations and leaders in Anbar province will no longer tolerate al Qaeda in Iraq's violent attacks or attempts to inflict religious law on their more secular societies, and this rejection of the group has been a boon to Coalition forces. It is not clear whether these tribal alliances can always be trusted or will persist once al Qaeda in Iraq is largely driven from the province.[40]

To effectively eliminate terrorist activity inside Iraq, strong cooperation between the military forces and the police forces in Iraq will need to be institutionalized. Thus far the police are at a lower level of development. Most National Police units are not yet sufficiently operationally effective, and the organization as a whole is viewed as highly sectarian, given its almost exclusively Shi'a composition and its history of involvement in sectarian activities. Although Iraqi police working closely with Coalition forces have been able to establish a degree of presence in their respective communities, in many areas of Iraq, members the of the Iraqi Police Service rarely venture outside their stations. The very limited existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the Iraqi Police Service police leave them unable to contribute substantially to counterterrorism operations. Perhaps of greatest concern is that in many areas the Iraqi Police Service has been infiltrated by insurgents and militias.

Many of the shortcomings that prevent the Iraqi armed forces and civil security forces from independently maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq are also weaknesses that prevent them from independently ensuring that Iraq does not become a safe haven for international terrorists. Although the Iraqi armed forces have made progress in developing greater combat proficiency, they lack the combat support and combat support services outlined previously.[41]

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[40] Sudarsan Raghavan, "In Iraq, a Perilous Alliance with Former Enemies," *Washington Post*, August 4, 2007.

[41] Anthony Cordesman, *Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War*, August 8, 2007, pp. 14–15, p. 335; Multi- see also National Security Transition Command-Iraq, "In Stride Assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces for the FY08 ISFF Budget Review, 30 May 2007," pp. 2, 10 (hereafter cited as "In-Stride Assessment").

Across the entire ISF, Iraqi supply chain management, maintenance, and logistics systems are substandard. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq is working closely with the Ministry of Defense to develop support and sustainment systems at the strategic and operational levels, and the Military Transition Teams reporting to Multi-National Corps–Iraq are working with tactical Iraqi units in the field to improve these capabilities, but the Commission foresees that the Iraqi military will rely on Coalition forces for at least another two to three years.

In a similar vein, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq is working closely with the Ministry of Interior to develop support and sustainment systems for Iraq's police and border forces; but because the MOI is not as well developed as the MOD, this process will likely take more time.

Bring Security to the Provinces

In order to bring better security to Iraq's 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, the Iraqi Security Forces will need to be able to better protect Iraqi citizens from ethnic, religious, terrorist, and insurgent-based violence; protect vital public and private infrastructure and transportation arteries; and project credible, effective, and sustainable military and police power throughout the entire country.

> ***Finding:*** *The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to bring greater security to Iraq's provinces varies by region and by organization within the ISF owing to many factors, including political leadership, security environment, sectarianism, and available resources.*

While security in some parts of Iraq appears to be increasing, the country continues to be plagued by internal violence. Security gains overall have different attributes depending on the threat in the region. Relatively homogenous areas such as Anbar and the Kurdish provinces seem to be moving rapidly toward establishing provincial security by bringing together tribal leaders, Coalition forces, and Iraqi Security Forces. These developments are encouraging, but their durability is unknown and they are viewed with extreme skepticism by the predominantly Shi'a central government.

The three Kurdish provinces under Iraqi control are relatively secure, and the Iraqi Security Forces in those provinces are quite capable. There are three Iraqi Army brigades in the Kurdish region and a range of police and civil security forces, including the Asayesh, the Peshmerga, the Zeravani, and the Iraqi Police Service.[42] The Kurdish police were by far the most capable police the Commission observed during its visits to Iraq.

While some areas in Iraq seem to be stabilizing, ethnically or religiously mixed areas such as Baghdad and its ring cities continue to experience violence and intense sectarian activity. As noted above, even some of Iraq's most homogeneous Shi'a areas in the southern part of the country are seeing rising levels of intra-Shi'a militia violence.

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[42] D. J. Elliott, "Brigade Order of Battle—Iraq, 31 July 2007," *The Fourth Rail: History, Politics, and the War on Terror*, http://billroggio.com/multimedia/IraqBdeOOB4.php.

The shift in the past year toward a greater focus on local recruiting for the Iraqi Security Forces has contributed to the ability of some ISF organizations to provide heightened security in the provinces. The Army and the Iraqi Police Service are most effective in areas where they reflect the ethnic and sectarian composition of the public they are responsible for protecting. Though it is important for the Iraqi Security Forces at the national level to be ethnically and religiously diverse and broadly representative of Iraq's national composition, there is value in using forces that resemble local populations. In areas like western Iraq, the police force is largely Sunni, reflecting the local makeup. The "neighborhood watches" or "provincial security forces" that local sheikhs have organized in partnership with Coalition forces are representative of this kind of successful localized provision of security. In the Kurdish provinces, security forces are largely composed of Kurds. In the Shi'a south, the Iraqi Army and police are almost exclusively Shi'a.[43] Over time, if security and stability can be more broadly established in Iraq, the goal should be to field more ethnically and religiously mixed security forces—particularly in the Iraqi Army, which is intended to deploy nationally.

The Iraqi National Police, a force that reports to the Ministry of Interior, illustrates the peril of attempting to provide security with forces that are not representative of the population. There are nine brigades of National Police, and more than 85 percent of the force is Shi'a. Its members have been implicated in sectarian activities, including death squads and covert prisoner torture. When deployed to exclusively Shi'a areas, the National Police has been accepted by local communities, and its units have helped provide security under Operation Fardh al-Qanoon. At the same time, the National Police is widely rejected by Sunni communities, and efforts to recruit more Sunnis into the force have failed. Despite efforts to transform and retrain the National Police by October 2007, the organization is mistrusted by much of Iraqi society and some fear it could become a new Republican Guard.

> ***Finding:*** *The "clear, hold, build" strategy being implemented by Iraqi Security Forces is on the right track and shows potential, but neither the Iraqi armed forces nor the police forces can execute these types of operations independently.*

Reflecting the Coalition's much stronger grasp of counterinsurgency operations, the "clear, hold, build" strategy launched in March 2006 appears to be generating results in enhancing security in the provinces. The Iraqi Army's ability to conduct "clearing" operations has improved significantly; units such as the 2nd Iraqi Army Division based in Ninewa province are conducting effective intelligence and counterinsurgency operations that seem to be noticeably reducing violence levels. New cooperative relationships with local forces in Anbar and Diyala provinces exemplify how local Iraqi forces are able to "hold" Iraqi territory after it has been cleared by Coalition and Iraqi Army troops.

The "surge" of Coalition forces has made the presence of the Coalition and ISF much more visible in cities and neighborhoods all over Iraq. The morale of ISF units paired with Coalition forces appears relatively high, and trainers all over Iraq report that the ISF, particularly the Iraqi Army, seem to have the will to fight. An ISF casualty rate three times that of Coalition forces would seem to

[43] The Iraqi Army as a whole is 75–80 percent Shi'a. Shi'a predominate in 6 of the existing 11 battalions, but Iraqi Army units in the northern regions are 50 percent Kurdish, and a small number of battalions are almost 90 percent Sunni.

reflect this determination, albeit also the reality that neither the Iraqi Army nor the Iraqi Police Service are adequately armed or protected against the threats that they face.[44] The Joint Security Stations established in Baghdad partner Coalition forces with the Iraqi Army, National Police, and Iraqi Police Service, and they appear to be reducing levels of violence in their immediate areas.[45] The Joint Security Stations also are increasing the level of cooperation between local Iraqis, the ISF, and Coalition forces, as well as providing opportunities for in-depth mentoring and advising by Coalition forces.[46]

End Sectarian Violence

The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to end sectarian violence in Iraq and contribute to setting the conditions for national reconciliation is limited in the absence of a strong central government and an active political reconciliation process. From a military perspective, to help end sectarian violence, the Iraqi Security Forces should represent the diversity of Iraq's population at the national level and not be a participant—actual or perceived—in sectarian violence.

> ***Finding:*** *The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but ultimately the ISF will reflect the society from which they are drawn. Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq.*

Sectarian militias are a fact of life in Iraq. They may pose as much danger as al Qaeda in Iraq and may be an even greater threat to Iraq's long-term stability. Particularly in Baghdad and the southern provinces of Iraq, militias terrorize the population and continue to drive Iraqis out of the country.

At the ministerial level, while the Ministry of Defense has made considerable strides in developing its ability to plan, program, and budget for the Iraqi armed forces and to recruit and retain high-quality, vetted forces, the Ministry of Interior is not administratively effective and may be fueling sectarian tensions. It leans heavily toward protecting Shi'a interests, as evidenced by its recent decision to reject a religiously balanced list of new police for the city of Tal Afar in Ninewa province in favor of assigning 300 Shi'a policemen.[47] Sectarian tensions are so high that a number of MOI officials having been assassinated on their way to and from their offices, and as a result many MOI officials live permanently in the ministry.

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[44] In most meetings with Americans working with the ISF and Iraqi leaders of the ISF, the Commission heard that the ISF is not adequately armed against the threat, nor do they have sufficient armor protection. See also "In-Stride Assessment," p. 11.

[45] For example, there was a 26 percent decline in the number of murders and executions in Baghdad between the month of February and March, and a 60 percent reduction during the last week of March and the first week of April. See Melinda L. Larson, "Baghdad Security Plan Seeing Many Successes," American Forces Press Service, April 8, 2007.

[46] In the Commission's survey of the Coalition's senior field commanders regarding the ISF, among those asked to rate the progress made by the MOD forces toward attaining the capabilities required to bring greater security to the provinces in the respondent's area of operations 7 rated the progress as satisfactory, none as unsatisfactory, and none as excellent. With regard to MOI forces, four rated progress as satisfactory, none as unsatisfactory and none as excellent.

[47] Meeting with Multinational Division–North officials, July 2007.

The Iraqi Army, while not free of sectarianism, is in fact increasingly representative of the makeup of Iraqi society. About 75–80 percent of Iraqi Army soldiers are Shi'a, and 2 of the 11 divisions are 50 percent Kurdish. Sunnis are the least represented group within the Iraqi Army. Encouragingly, the Iraqi Army's leadership is relatively balanced: of the 11 divisions currently in operation, 3 are led by Kurdish commanders, 4 by Shi'a commanders, and 4 by Sunni commanders. After extensive interaction with Iraqi Army units, Coalition forces assess the majority of Iraqi Army units as operationally reliable and free from blatant sectarianism.

As noted above, the members of the National Police—in contrast to the Iraqi Army—are widely seen as sectarian and are not trusted by most Iraqis. Despite Coalition efforts to retrain the National Police and emphasize human rights and the rule of law, it is not clear that this element of the Iraqi Security Forces, in its current form, can contribute to Iraqi security and stability in a meaningful way.

Local recruiting for the ISF, at least in the short term, is critical in many parts of Iraq where, as already mentioned, developing security forces that reflect local populations will help reduce sectarianism and bring greater security to Iraq's provinces. Ethnically and religiously mixed areas such as Baghdad, the central provinces in Iraq, and areas around Kirkuk and Mosul are more challenging, because they do not lend themselves to this relatively simple model. Coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces are already working together, neighborhood by neighborhood, to establish security in mixed areas. As a result of the robust and intense partnerships established under the leadership of General David Petraeus, Coalition forces today are already functioning as brakes on sectarian activity by the ISF. In mixed locations, Coalition forces may be the guarantors of security until sufficient stability can be achieved, but the Coalition cannot serve indefinitely in this capacity.

If recruited in a balanced fashion, vetted appropriately, and properly trained, the Iraqi Security Forces have the potential to reduce sectarian violence. At the same time, because they are drawn from the Iraqi population, the ISF will represent the society from which they come. If Iraq's national government exhibits sectarian behavior and if sectarianism is rampant in Iraqi society at large, it is unlikely that the Iraqi Security Forces will be immune to the same dynamics, regardless of their military readiness.

Since the beginning of Fardh al-Qanoon in February 2007, the Coalition and the Iraqi Security Forces have managed to create some level of security and some breathing space for Iraqi politicians. If the Coalition continues to provide key enabling support and training to the ISF over the next few years, with the expected increases in security that such support will likely bring, a more durable security environment will continue to develop and perhaps broaden. The reverse is certainly true should the government be unable to find the required political solution.[48]

[48] In the Commission's survey of the Coalition's senior field commanders regarding the ISF, among those asked to rate the progress made by the MOD forces toward ending sectarian violence and achieving national reconciliation, 6 rated the progress as satisfactory, 2 as unsatisfactory, and none as excellent. With regard to MOI forces, four rated progress as unsatisfactory, none as satisfactory, and none as excellent.

Conclusion: The Iraqi armed forces—Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability. Evidence indicates that the ISF will not be able to progress enough in the near term to secure Iraq borders against conventional military and external threats.

CHAPTER 3: THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) is a relatively new organization, coping with the challenges of managing its own development while supporting the current combat operations of the Iraqi armed forces. The MOD is strengthening its administrative capacity in several areas—notably in budget development, strategic and operational planning, and personnel management. It has a vision and strategic plan for Iraq's armed forces and is beginning to implement that vision. It has put functioning systems in place to recruit soldiers, sailors, and airmen; has developed an adequate training base in cooperation with the Coalition; and is working to improve its ability to acquire the systems its armed forces need to accomplish their missions effectively. At the same time, the ministry still struggles to ensure that its armed forces are combat ready. Iraqi commanders today rely on sometimes substantial Coalition assistance to overcome the deficiencies caused by shortfalls in budget execution, contracting, intelligence, and logistics within the MOD.

Overview of the Ministry of Defense

Under Saddam Hussein, the Ministry of Defense was controlled directly by the regime and staffed only by trusted military commanders. The Ba'athist MOD's primary mission was to protect Saddam and his immediate circle—not the Iraqi people. At the outset of the 2003 invasion, the Coalition planned to de-Ba'athify and then reform the MOD. After discovering firsthand the MOD's deep roots in the previous regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority chose to dismantle the MOD entirely at the same time that it disbanded the Iraqi Army and other military institutions, under CPA Order Number 2.[49]

Today, the MOD is led by Minister of Defense Lieutenant General (Ret.) Abdul Qadir Mohammed Jassim Obeidi, a Sunni career military officer and political independent.[50] The ministry comprises a Joint Headquarters, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (which commands the Army), the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and the Iraqi Army, Navy (including Marines), and Air Force.[51] The ministry's core mission and functions are organizing, training, equipping, sustaining, and employing the Iraqi Joint Forces in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution, government direction, and the law.[52]

Coalition assistance to the Ministry of Defense is provided largely through the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and the two national-level transition teams assigned to the MOD. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team advises both the MOD and the Joint Headquarters on manning, training, equipping, basing, and sustainment for ISF units throughout Iraq as they work toward operational readiness. The Ministry of Defense Transition Team (MOD-TT) advises civilian leadership at the MOD and is composed of a team of about 50 U.S. civilian

[49] Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2, May 23, 2003.

[50] Most senior staff in the MOD are retired military officers, some of whom still wear their uniforms. The large numbers of retired military officers may be fueling resistance to greater civilian control within the MOD.

[51] Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress, June 2007, p. 37.

[52] All background information comes from MOD-TT/JHQ-TT/CMATT overview briefings received by the Commission in Iraq in July 2007.

advisors, 12 civilian advisors from other Coalition countries, and six U.S. military personnel, led by a Senior Executive Service–level U.K. civil servant. Most of the U.S. civilian advisors are contractors from private companies; as of July 2007, only two were U.S. civil servants. The Joint Headquarters Transition Team is led by an Australian general officer and a staff of 50 Coalition military personnel and contractors. All three organizations—the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, the MOD Transition Team, and the Joint Headquarters Transition Team—report to Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq.

The Coalition transition teams working with the Iraqi MOD have separate but related missions, each with specific challenges. The MOD Transition Team is charged both with mentoring the Iraqi MOD civilian leadership as it carries out the ministry's mission and functions and with helping the ministry build its institutional capacity. The MOD Transition Team is also working to build a professional core of civil servants within the MOD. The Joint Headquarters Transition Team supports the Iraqi Joint Headquarters in its efforts to build and implement a command and control capability to train, sustain, and develop the Iraqi Joint Force's ability to address threats as directed by the Government of Iraq. The Joint Headquarters is based on a NATO standard staffing model.

During its assessment, the Commission held numerous meetings with Coalition advisors and Iraqi MOD officials, including two with the Iraqi Minister of Defense. The Commission found that the MOD has made significant strides since 2004 and is one of the more effective ministries in the Government of Iraq. As mentioned, the MOD still faces challenges in budgeting functions, contracting, personnel, intelligence, command and control, and logistics.[53]

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
Definition of Success

Success is:

If they can recruit themselves, train themselves, sustain themselves, equip themselves, pay themselves, trust each other and acquire their future force requirements, then they are truly mission ready.

Budgeting

Finding: *Inefficiencies and overcentralization within the Ministry of Defense and its inability to fully execute its budget impede the combat readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces.*

The MOD has a functioning financial management system, complete with budgets that are tied to a requirements process at broad levels. MOD officials characterized their budget as having three primary dimensions: activating the armed forces and deepening their capabilities,

[53] In a survey conducted of senior Coalition commanders in Iraq, the majority told the Commission that progress being made by the MOD in the essential combat functions of command and control, intelligence, mobility, logistics, and fire support is unsatisfactory. Logistics is the greatest near term priority.

modernizing the ground forces, and continuing expansion in manning levels. The Joint Headquarters commander drives the process to determine budgetary priorities by soliciting inputs from the four services—Iraqi Army and Special Forces, Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Navy—as well as from functional commanders such as those directing logistics and communications.

The ability to build a budget is an important first step, but it may be the least complex element of a financial management system; it is not the same as the ability to execute the budget, a task that the MOD finds far more problematic. As of November 2006, MOD had spent 76 percent of its calendar year budget for salaries, 25 percent of its budget for goods and services, 1 percent of its budget for capital goods and projects, but only 32 percent of its overall budget of $3.4 billion.[54] The MOD's ability to execute its budget may be improving; when the Commission met with ministry officials in July 2007, they stated that they had already expended 46 percent of their calendar year budget for 2007.

The Iraqis have a complex internal control system that divides the entire budgeting process between multiple ministries. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) controls all funds and there are serious bureaucratic difficulties in securing the release of moneys. MOD officials shared their frustrations over this situation with the Commission, noting that Ministry of Finance control over their funding makes it difficult, if not impossible, to increase their budget.

Even when the MOD builds a budget and secures the release of funds from the Ministry of Finance, its ability to execute that budget is hindered by insufficient delegation of authority in the MOD to disburse money. The Minister of Defense is allowed to give partial expenditure authority to some staff, but overall the Commission found that budget execution remains burdensome. The specter of corruption has added another layer of internal controls to an already cumbersome budgeting and expenditure process (and as discussed in the next section, MOD's use of the Foreign Military Sales system to thwart corruption has often compounded its difficulties).

The MOD Transition Team should remain engaged and work closely with MOD officials on the crucial issue of budget execution. Continued mentoring is of particular importance, as many of the financial and administrative systems being put in place by Coalition advisors are new to their Iraqi MOD counterparts; grasping them will require significant time and training. The new financial systems may also be an example of the Coalition tendency to focus on solutions that mirror Western methods rather than on developing approaches that are more consistent with Iraqi norms, standards, and experience. Addressing the larger issue of cultural resistance to delegation of authority is more difficult but may be more critical to ensuring that the MOD can execute its budgets consistently. Changing this aspect of the MOD's corporate culture will require institutional changes at the highest levels of ministerial leadership, together with a commitment to prioritize budget execution at the same level as budget development.

[54] House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., *Stand Up and be Counted*, July 2007, p. 105.

Contracting

Finding: *The ability to contract efficiently is important to the MOD's mission to sustain the Iraqi armed forces. The MOD currently lacks effective processes to execute contracting requirements.*

In order to recruit, retain, train, operate, and sustain an authorized military force of more than 195,000,[55] the MOD must be able to contract for a wide range of goods and services. This vital capability continues to be a major problem for both organizational and cultural reasons. During the 30 years of Saddam Hussein's rule, Iraqi bureaucrats learned that mistakes were punished with a severity that curbed any impulse toward initiative. This ingrained fear, coupled with a cultural bias toward centralized control at senior levels, led to an onerous process for awarding MOD contracts. For example, a minimum of three bids are required for any contract above 25 million dinars (about $20,000). MOD officials told the Commission that if fewer than three bids are received, the MOD must reissue the request for proposal. In a similar vein, the Minister of Finance apparently insists on personally reviewing all contracts over $50,000.

Because of these extensive controls and limitations, the Iraqi procurement process was accomplishing little. It also was seriously distorted by corruption. To correct both problems, U.S. advisors persuaded the Iraqi government to utilize the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, an elaborate arrangement developed over the past 40 years to coordinate the sales of military hardware and services to foreign governments. The United States government acts as the integrating office for a relatively small commission.

The Foreign Military Sales system is free of corruption, but it is not speedy under even the best of circumstances—and in this specific instance, its functioning has been weak and frankly embarrassing. The Commission was told by Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq that of $1.7 billion in sales in 2006, only $300 million of the services and equipment had been received by the Iraqis as of July 2007. They have deposited another $600 million for the Ministry of Defense in 2007, but no orders have been placed pending delivery of 2006 orders. Moreover, it appears that the New Equipment Training (NET) bought and paid for through Foreign Military Sales did not enable the Iraqis to actually learn to maintain the equipment they had received. When confronted with this record, senior U.S. commanders in Iraq lamented that the performance of the Foreign Military Sales system is "a national embarrassment." The Coalition talked the Iraqi government into using the system to avoid corruption and ensure delivery of critical goods and services, yet the United States is not delivering on the commitments it made. This failure is hurting the United States as sorely as the Iraqis. The Coalition depends on the improved capabilities of Iraqi forces to replace Coalition troops. U.S. failure to make the foreign military system function is directly hindering plans to transfer warfighting responsibilities to the Iraqis. The U.S. Secretary of Defense should appoint a single senior official responsible for ensuring timely and efficient processing of Iraqi material and support contracts through the Foreign Military Sales system on an expedited basis.

MOD officials expressed frustrations about contracting processes at the MOD and also acknowledged that although the Foreign Military Sales system is the best option at present, the

[55] Figure from MNSTC-I overview briefing received in Baghdad, July 2007.

Iraqis must develop their own system.[56] The contracting issue is a long-term problem that requires more than a near-term work-around. Coalition personnel consistently noted to the Commission that Iraqis are more likely to address important issues when they are spending Iraqi government money. If this is true, the current practice of financially supplementing Iraqi operations may be enabling the Iraqis to avoid making needed changes to their administrative systems and processes: in this case, to their contracting system.

There also are indications that the Iraqi MOD may be improving its ability to contract effectively. In June 2007, the MOD Joint Contracting Command awarded $64.2 million in contracts, of which more than 70 percent—for items such as batteries, uniforms, undergarments, boots, and armored buses—were awarded to Iraqi-owned companies. This contracting effort is extremely important, as it demonstrates that there is an emerging capability within Iraq to provide material in support of ISF requirements.

Personnel

Finding: *The MOD consistently compensates the members of the Iraqi military, but it has difficulty accounting for personnel.*

In general, the MOD is able to make payroll for its growing forces—despite relying on methods that are out of date by U.S. standards. Currently, unit commanders must certify who is on the rolls, and then compare those rolls to a master list. At that point, designated fiduciary agents in the units distribute moneys to the commanders, who pay military personnel in cash. Though highly cumbersome, this administrative system appears to work effectively.

The MOD also continues to develop a new banking facility that is already providing roughly 2,800 employees with direct deposit services. The MOD is working to add another 1,500 personnel to the bank's rolls. The new MOD bank will facilitate payment while also reducing the risks of corruption in the payroll system.[57] Although at present only a fraction of MOD personnel are part of the new direct deposit system, it is an important step in the right direction.

Another positive development in the MOD's administrative capacity is the rolling implementation of the Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS),[58] which links personnel and pay functions into a single automated system and database. The purpose of HRIMS is to provide its customers, in a single format, a clear snapshot of information, tracking pay and personnel from initial recruitment to separation. The system should also be able to facilitate accurate reporting and analysis, enabling reliable auditing functions and minimizing opportunities for corruption. At present, the Commission was informed that HRIMS is in use at the MOD and division levels, and should be available for use at the brigade level by September 2007.[59]

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[56] Commissioner interviews at Camp Phoenix, Baghdad, July 10, 2007.
[57] Interview with senior Iraqi MOD officials, Baghdad, July 10, 2007.
[58] Interview with MOD Logistics and Personnel Transition Team, Baghdad, July 10, 2007
[59] *Ibid.*

Intelligence

Finding: *The level of information sharing and cooperation between the Iraqi intelligence community and the Iraqi Security Forces is not satisfactory—a problem exacerbated by bureaucratic competition and distrust among duplicative intelligence organizations.*

There are four significant, known intelligence organizations that support the Iraqi Security Forces. The Directorate General of Intelligence and Security (DGIS) is within the MOD; the National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA), is under the Ministry of the Interior; and the Iraqi National Intelligence System (INIS) is considered Iraq's primary intelligence agency. An independent intelligence organization has been established by the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA).

Most Iraqi officials that met with the Commission noted that there is relatively little information sharing between these organizations—or, in some cases, even between operational units of the same organization in the field. The reluctance to share information seems particularly apparent at the intersection point of the military and police forces. There is very little understanding in the Iraqi armed forces or in the Ministry of Interior—where many senior officials are former military officers—of how to use intelligence effectively to support operations. The Commission was concerned by the apparent lack of access by the Iraqi Army and police to the Iraqi National Intelligence System.

Information-sharing challenges between intelligence organizations and security forces are not unique to Iraq, but the active competition among Iraq's intelligence organizations is making the typical problems much more difficult. For example, the MSNSA is organized along the lines of the former regime state security apparatus and is operating in direct competition with INIS, the more established national-level intelligence agency. Commissioners believe that MSNSA was created in part as a reaction to perceptions that INIS was too closely linked to the Coalition. These internal turf battles detract from the critical task of building greater intelligence capacity. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq has a new intelligence transition team function that is working closely with members of the Iraqi intelligence community to facilitate coordination among these agencies.

Iraq is principally a human intelligence (HUMINT) theater of operations and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The challenge for all of Iraq's security forces is how to share information gathered at the local level without compromising sources, and how to convince information holders to trust and communicate with one another. From a fusion center would come "actionable intelligence"—which then would have to be converted into "immediate-use" intelligence for operations. At that point, certain technologies and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) would be applied to continually monitor the target.

The Commission believes that the U.S. military intelligence model, which is heavily based on technology, is unlikely to work well in the Iraqi environment. Iraqi officials stressed repeatedly that what they need is mentoring and time to develop and adjust their own approaches rather than to adopt the complicated doctrine, structures, and technological solutions that are the hallmark of the U.S. system. Examples of low-technology techniques described to the Commission that have worked well in Iraq include the "National Tips Hotline," which enables the public to provide information to

the police and military via cellular telephone, and the working relationships that are being developed through partnership arrangements such as the Joint Security Stations and brigade-level Military Transition Teams.

Command and Control

> ***Finding:*** *Parallel lines of direct communication to military units have been established under the control of the Prime Minister. He is perceived by many as having created a second, and politically motivated chain of command, effectively communicating orders directly to field commanders. Such a practice bypasses national command lines, which should flow through the Minister of Defense and the Commanding General of Iraqi Armed Forces.*

In creating the Office of the Commander in Chief, the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, and in claiming command and control over Iraq's highly capable Special Forces, the Prime Minister is perceived to have established a separate chain of command. At the very least, there now exists the appearance that a senior elected official can bypass existing military command structures for sectarian reasons. In Iraq's developing military culture, this has a potentially divisive effect reminiscent of the previous era. The two organizations most associated with this perception are the Office of the Commander in Chief and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, both of which report directly to the Prime Minister. Any perception that elements of the ISF are influenced along sectarian and political lines is not in the best interest of Iraq's newly formed Armed Forces. The Commission believes that the Office of the Commander in Chief should be abolished and that the Prime Minister should immediately emphasize that command and control of Iraqi Special forces is to be executed through the national chain of command. The existence of any other parallel or additional structures fosters mistrust, creates confusion, impedes military effectiveness, and perpetuates sectarian tension in the Armed Forces.

Logistics

> ***Finding:*** *The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and hampers their readiness and capability. Renewed emphasis on Coalition mentoring and technical support will be required to remedy this condition.*

The Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq 2007 Campaign Action Plan for the "Year of Leaders and Logistics" called for the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to assume responsibility for providing logistical support to the Iraqi Army by November 2007. Although steps have been made in contracting and procurement strategies, information technology systems rollout, infrastructure improvement, logistics force structure design, and leadership development, the progress to date has been slow by Coalition standards, and Iraqi logistics is unlikely to be ready for this transition by the end of 2007.

The MOD has a plan to roll out an information system designed to support the command and control of the logistics enterprise. This is a vital requirement, as the MOD currently relies on an unresponsive, paper-driven process. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq advisors to

the MOD informed Commissioners that they are planning to field a new software system within the next 6 to 10 months, but before that can happen the software needs to be translated into Arabic, soldiers will need to gain the skills to operate it, and solutions are needed to the problems of connectivity that the regular electricity shortages will inevitably cause. In light of these challenges, fielding a workable logistics information technology system in support of the Iraqi Armed Forces is very unlikely in the near term.

There has been progress in providing the infrastructure required to logistically support the Iraqi armed forces. The comprehensive plan is centered around the Taji National Depot, which, when completed, will provide the national hub for training, supply support, and intermediate maintenance. Construction of warehouses, small arms and ammunition storage, and generator facilities are under way. Much work remains before this plan will be realized, however. The Commission was informed that the end point of the phased timeline is early 2008, but funding and construction delays will most likely push actual completion to between 2010 and 2012. Only $55 million has been funded, just one-tenth of the total required.

Another challenge for the MOD is logistics force structure design. The Iraqi Army remains heavily dependent on contracted support to satisfy day-to-day requirements, and it appears that contracted logistics support (CLS) in some form will be necessary for two to three years. The MOD has developed a detailed plan that will, when in place, adequately provide all required support. This plan is well understood by all key stakeholders, and the structure will provide not only ministerial oversight but also operating components down to the tactical level. Manning the logistics force structure will be a major undertaking, as the Iraqi Army has concentrated on its combat units and has only recently begun the process of manning and training logistics organizations. The Commission was informed that arriving at the final force structure design will likely take two to four years.

The final element needed for logistics development at the MOD level is critical: leadership. At present, there is little logistics expertise at the national level, and both uniformed and civilian leaders require one-on-one mentoring. At the operational and tactical level, transition teams are embedded with operational units. These teams provide technical support and mentoring to the battalion, brigade, and division headquarters and appear to be working very well.

Conclusion: The Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for policy development and implementation as well as resource allocation for the Iraqi military, is building the necessary institutions and processes to fulfill its mission. However, its capacity is hampered by bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization. These flaws reduce the operational readiness, capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military. As the MOD continues to mature, it should assume the ministerial-level functions that currently fall to the Coalition.

CHAPTER 4: THE IRAQI ARMY AND IRAQI SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The Iraqi Army (IA) is a newly forming light infantry army already fighting a difficult counterinsurgency as it comes into being. Though the Iraqi Army is enjoying increasing success at the tactical level, significant challenges remain. Most units can muster only 60–75 percent of their assigned strength on any given day, owing to the need for soldiers to travel home to give their families their pay, the lack of enforcement of the Iraqi Code of Military Discipline, the counting of wounded soldiers who remain on the personnel rolls but cannot fight, and the number of soldiers on scheduled leave.[60] Although many units in the Iraqi Army can now fight well at the small unit level and appear to have a greater will to fight than was present in 2005 and 2006, Iraqi Army units are often outgunned because they lack crew-served and indirect fire weapons, possess limited capacity to handle medical evacuation and combat casualty, and have few "soldier support" systems. Reflecting these capability gaps, the Iraqi Army is at present highly dependent on the Coalition for combat enablers such as fires and counterfires, close air support, fixed wing and rotary wing mobility, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), reinforcing capability, partnered presence with Multi-National Corps–Iraq units on the battlefield, supplemental logistics, and maintenance support.

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) is a small, elite group that has trained very closely with Coalition Special Forces and has developed into one of the most capable special forces in the Middle East. Like the Iraqi Army, however, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces remain dependent on Coalition combat enablers. The fact that the chain of command to the Special Forces is outside the established Ministry of Defense chain of command, reporting directly to the Prime Minister's office, raises concerns about the politicization of these units.

Overview of the Iraqi Army and Special Forces

From 1980 to 1988, the Iraqi Army fought a corps-level war against Iran over a terrain larger than the entire Western front of World War II. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iraq's army was the world's fourth-largest, composed of seven corps and five armored divisions and having mobilized 1.7 million Iraqis.[61] During the Gulf War in 1991, the Coalition destroyed this force—significantly weakening the armed forces of Iraq.

Prewar planning for the invasion of Iraq in the 2002–2003 time frame "called for the dismantlement of the Special Republican Guard, the Republican Guard, and paramilitary structures and for the creation of a core of a new force, consisting of three to five divisions and geared to self-defense."[62] As the United States advanced into the country, the Iraqi forces put up very little

[60] This figure is derived from conversations with current and former MiTT team members and MNSTC-I officials throughout Iraq and in Washington. It accords with estimates of outside sources such as Dr. Anthony Cordesman and the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

[61] "Iraqi Army," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/army.htm.

[62] Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, *Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience*, MG-365-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), p. 10; available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG365.pdf.

resistance—but instead of surrendering, they shed their uniforms and melted back into the civilian population.[63] Along with other top Ba'athist leadership, the 400,000 regular troops and 10,000 generals of the Iraqi Army simply went home. The rampant looting that followed destroyed what was left of the Iraqi Army facilities, including many hardware and ammunition depots.

On May 23, 2003, Order 2 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) formally disbanded the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of State for Military Affairs, National Security Bureau, Iraqi Army, Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, Directorate of Military Intelligence, and Saddam's many irregular units.[64] CPA Order 1 concerning de-Ba'athification had already essentially liquidated and sent into hiding or resistance the top cadre of military leadership.[65] CPA Order 2 also initiated the extensive task of reconstructing Iraq's security forces and establishing the New Iraqi Corps, which became the New Iraqi Army (NIA) in August 2003. Under civilian control, the army's mission was to provide "defense of the nation, including defense of the national territory and the military protection of the security of critical installations, facilities, infrastructure, lines of communication and supply, and population."[66] The objective was to create a force that could deter regional aggressors and unwanted foreign factions without threatening the regional balance of power. This force was to be 44,000-strong, "oriented toward external threats . . . with a clear focus on border security . . . [to] fill the growing need for a national military force, but with a measured equipping program and without any true logistical capacity."[67]

In September 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority increased end strength and added force structures: an air component, coastal defense, and an Iraqi counterterrorism force that became the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.[68] Also that month, CPA Order 28 recognized a need for more Iraqi forces to deal with the continued degradation of the security situation in the country, creating the internally oriented Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, later renamed the Iraqi National Guard.[69] The Iraqi National Guard worked alongside Coalition forces to address Iraq's internal security challenges, but it quickly developed a poor reputation and became a prime target of the insurgency.[70] In March 2004, the CPA redesignated the New Iraqi Army as a component of the Iraqi Armed Forces under the control of a newly constructed Ministry of Defense.[71] In April 2004, it transferred control of the Iraqi National Guard from the Ministry of Interior to the MOD.

In June 2004, Prime Minister Ayad Allawi of the Interim Iraqi Government announced the formation of another military service—the Iraqi Intervention Force, a branch of the Iraqi Army specializing in counterinsurgency warfare.[72] This was a force designed to surge to urban hot spots within the country. Because the missions of the Iraqi Intervention Force and the Iraqi Army were

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[63] Rathmell et al., *Developing Iraq's Security Sector*, p. 13.
[64] Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2, May 23, 2003.
[65] Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1, April 16, 2003.
[66] Coalition Provisional Authority Order 22, August 7, 2003.
[67] Col. Frederick Kienle, "Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch: Lessons for the Future," *National Security Outlook*, May 2007, p. 1; available at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26249/pub_detail.asp.
[68] Rathmell et al., *Developing Iraq's Security Sector*, p. 34.
[69] Coalition Provisional Authority Order 28, September 3, 2003.
[70] "Iraq to Dissolve National Guard," BBC, December 29, 2004; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4133039.stm.
[71] Coalition Provisional Authority Order 67, March 21, 2004.
[72] "Iraqi Intervention Force," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/iif.htm.

becoming difficult to distinguish, the CPA and MOD decided to merge the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi Intervention Force into the Iraqi Army.

The Iraqi Army, in all its various forms, has been an all-volunteer force since the fall of the Ba'athist regime and is the core of Prime Minister Maliki's "Objective Counterinsurgency Force" (for its growth since 2004, see Figure 11). It is composed of:

- Nine light infantry divisions (with one more division in development and two more planned)
- One mechanized infantry division
- Associated support/combat support units
- Nine motorized transportation regiments
- Four logistics battalions
- Two support battalions
- Five regional support units
- Eighty garrison support units[73]

Figure 11: Iraqi Army Size and Capability Growth



Source: MNSTC-I

[73] Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 37, and June 2007, pp. 40–41 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).

The Iraqis also formed the Strategic Infrastructure Brigade, dedicated to protecting key energy and other infrastructure. It comprises three brigade headquarters commanding 17 battalions. The Prime Minister has directed that the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions go through a retraining and equipping process to bring them to Iraqi Army battalion standards, but with additional training in infrastructure protection and consequence management.[74]

The Iraqi Army's training base is still developing. Currently there are three dedicated training battalions and six Regional Training Centers under the direction of the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command. Also under Training and Doctrine Command are the Defense Language Institute, the Tactical Doctrine Center, and the Lessons Learned Center. Within the training base are the nascent National Defense University, the Joint Staff College, and the Defense Strategic Studies Institute. Finally, the Iraqi Army has established a noncommissioned officer school, a counterinsurgency center, and the Iraqi Military Academy at Rustamiyah.

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces is the operational component of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Command. Iraqi Special Operations Forces is a brigade-size force composed of approximately 1,500 soldiers: a counterterrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit. A key component in developing an Iraqi counterterrorism capability is the ongoing effort to double the number of soldiers in the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.[75] This expansion will include an additional commando battalion with forward-based commando companies in Basra, Mosul, and Al Asad.

Like the other elements of the Iraqi military, the Iraqi Army today receives training and mentoring from both Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and Multi-National Corps–Iraq. As Iraqi Army units become capable of operating in combination with Coalition forces, their tactical control is transferred to the appropriate Multi-National Corps–Iraq unit, which embeds advisors and partners Coalition forces with Iraqi units. The Iraqi Assistance Group, which reports to the Multi-National Corps–Iraq commander, provides advisors in the form of Military Transition Teams. The Military Transition Teams are composed of 10–15 Coalition soldiers—along with marines, airmen, and sailors—ranking from staff sergeant to colonel (or equivalent service rank). There are currently 5,000 Coalition personnel serving in more than 500 Military Transition Teams throughout the country. Military Transition Teams advise, coach, teach, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces in infantry tactics, intelligence, communications, fire support, and logistics.[76] They seek to develop and improve Iraqi leaders, support Iraqi units' continued training, and assist with logistics and battlefield enablers such as medical evacuation and close air and artillery support. Military Transition Teams are linked to brigade combat teams deployed throughout Iraq. As Iraqi Army units sustain themselves more effectively, the goal is ultimately for them to operate without the Military Transition Teams. To gauge unit progress, the Military Transition Team leader and counterpart Iraqi Army commander prepare monthly classified Operational Readiness Assessments[77] (for the readiness level definitions and the Iraqi Army's progression to ORA levels 1

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[74] Several other battalions with this specialty skill set may be developed in the 3rd Iraqi Army Division.

[75] 9010 Report, June 2007, pp. 41–42.

[76] U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces*. 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 2007, pp. 127–41.

[77] These reports were formerly known as Transitional Readiness Assessments.

and 2, see Figures 12 and 13 below; for the disposition of Iraqi Army divisions and their respective ORA levels, see Figure 14).

Figure 12: Iraqi Army Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level Definitions

- A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.
- A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with ISF or coalition support.
- A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
- A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Source: MNSTC-I

Figure 13: Iraqi Army Progression to ORA Levels 1 and 2



Source: MNF-I

Figure 14: Iraqi Army Division Disposition (2007)



Source: MNF-I

Challenges for the Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces

During its assessment, the Commission held discussions with more than 50 American officials and 50 Iraqi officials directly involved in the development of the Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces, including meetings with a large number of Military Transition Teams and partnered Multi-National Corps–Iraq forces. The Commission also visited more than 30 Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces facilities throughout Iraq, including Army bases, training centers, logistics and maintenance centers, and units at the division, brigade, and battalion levels.

The Commission believes that the Iraqi ground forces have made considerable progress, particularly in the past two years. However, the Iraqi Army and Special Forces face significant challenges in several mission and functional areas, including border protection, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, leadership, personnel, equipment, and logistics and maintenance.

Border Protection

Finding: *In addition to protecting the nation against external military threats, the Iraqi Army can and should also play a role in preventing unconventional threats migrating from points outside of Iraq. The Army currently does not have sufficient forces to enhance border security and conduct counterinsurgency operations simultaneously.*

Iraqi and American officials noted to the Commission that the Iraqi insurgency is a "vehicle-borne insurgency." Controlling main routes to and from border areas and in other key regions is necessary to stop the inflow of foreign fighters and to control the spread of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and other deadly technologies that defeat up-armored vehicles and kill or injure Coalition and Iraqi forces in large numbers. More than 80 percent of suicide bombers in Iraq—including the drivers who deliver vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices to their targets—are foreigners.[78]

Senior officials at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense made clear to the Commission that they are aware of a serious problem with Iraq's border security. The MOI's Department of Border Enforcement forces, as the first line of defense, are failing to control the borders adequately (as discussed in Chapter 11). Coalition and Iraqi commanders who use Iraqi Army units to reinforce less capable border forces are finding success—apprehending foreign fighters and intercepting significant amounts of weapons.[79] Despite the Iraqi Army's achievements in assisting with border security in some areas, it relies deeply on the Coalition for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In addition, although the Army needs to play a role in thickening Iraq's border defenses, given its demanding internal security responsibilities, it does not yet have adequate forces to fill the gap.

Recommendation: *The Iraqi Army's size and capability should be developed as part of an Iraqi national security strategy that defines the roles and missions of the ISF to address both internal security and border security needs. The Army as well as the nation's police forces are currently emphasizing internal security; only ineffective border security forces are focused on controlling the borders. The Iraqi Army must contribute to both border and internal security. A national commitment to expand the Army's mission beyond counterinsurgency to include border security must be reflected in Army and MOD plans and policies.*

Given Iraq's evident border security challenges, the Iraqi Army should assist in "thickening" or "reinforcing" border enforcement as part of its broader mission to protect the country from external threats. In the near term, the Government of Iraq may need to consider expanding the size of the Iraqi Army to backstop less reliable border enforcement police without compromising the Iraqi Army's ability to combat internal threats. To be effective in this role in the near term, the Iraqi

[78] See Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida," CSIS working draft, July 16, 2007, p. 3; available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070716_sunni_insurgents.pdf. Also see Mohammed Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

[79] Iraqi Army and Coalition commanders in the areas of responsibility of Multi-National Forces Command–West and Multi-National Division–North noted the utility of this approach.

Army will require key enabling support from the Coalition, particularly in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Operations

The Iraqi Army

> ***Finding:*** *The Iraqi Army has become more effective in supporting Coalition-led counterinsurgency operations from the start of Iraqi and Coalition surge operations in early 2007. The reliability of Iraqi Army units continues to improve, and some units now are an integral part of the Coalition team for counterinsurgency operations. The overall rate of progress of the Army is uneven. Some units perform better than others; but there is rising confidence that progress is being made at a rate that will enable Iraqi Army tactical formations and units to gradually assume a greater leadership role in counterinsurgency operations in the next 12 to 18 months. However, they will continue to rely on Coalition support, including logistics, intelligence, fire support, equipment, training, and leadership development for the foreseeable future.*

Changes to U.S. counterinsurgency strategy since 2006 have significantly altered the dynamic between U.S. and Iraqi forces, and have led to noticeable improvements in the Iraqi Army's ability to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations (internal defense). The lessons learned and best practices resulting from the new approach to counterinsurgency operations are spreading to Iraqi Army units, in part because those units are working hand-in-glove with the Americans. The Iraqi Security Forces have developed their own counterinsurgency doctrine, and unit commanders are cycled through the Iraqi Counterinsurgency School at Taji.

The Commission observed Iraqi Army units operating alongside U.S. troops in joint security stations, patrol bases, and command outposts. The American and Iraqi field-grade officers indicated to the Commission that they trust one another unconditionally. Even when American units are absent, the Commission observed indications that Iraqis are taking the fight to the enemy. High-intensity operations such as Fardh al-Qanoon in Baghdad plainly demonstrate that the Iraqi units are willing to combat urban counterinsurgency with far more determination and efficacy than during the generally disorganized joint operations of 2004 to 2006.

At the same time, it is clear that the relatively large numbers of Coalition advisors and partner units are a key enabler of this improved performance, as they continually provide strong leadership and mentoring, as well as combat support during actual operations. Where American and Iraqi Army units have worked closely with local communities, established patrol bases and other forward sites, and operated extensively together, there are increasing signs that local populations enjoy a credible security alternative to the lawlessness of the past few years. These closer Coalition–Iraqi community partnerships are leading to the development of stronger human intelligence networks, which in turn lead to more combat successes.

Coalition forces advise and mentor Iraqi Army units learning to conduct operations that win hearts and minds, respect human rights, separate enemies from the civilian population, and facilitate

political solutions. These are complex operations for any military force, and Coalition support for the Iraqi Army has been critical to the progress made to date. Without continued training, mentoring, and key combat enablers from the Coalition, it would be difficult for the Iraqi Army to progress to a point where it can conduct effective, independent counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Further, it is likely that the hard-won progress made to date would atrophy.

Iraqi Special Operations Forces

> ***Finding:*** *Iraqi Special Operations Forces are the most capable element of the Iraqi armed forces and are well-trained in both individual and collective skills. They are currently capable of leading counterterrorism operations, but they continue to require Coalition support. They remain dependent on the Coalition for many combat enablers, especially airlift, close air support, and targeting intelligence.*

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces are a strong direct action and "snatch" force—specializing in operations to place high-value targets in custody in "nonpermissive" environments. Joint special operations involving the Iraqi Special Forces are led by Iraqi commanders; their brigade provides 70 percent of the forces. Coalition Special Operations Forces have been training their Iraqi counterparts since 2003, and many Coalition operators are in Iraq on repeated tours, bringing depth, continuity, and experience to the training effort. Coalition forces have helped develop a strong noncommissioned officer corps in the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, as well as a junior officer corps. Both display considerable promise for and confidence in the future of the Iraqi armed forces.

Despite their strong and consistent performance, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces rely heavily on Coalition combat enablers. A particularly important capability gap is the lack of independent rotary air support. Consequently, there are a variety of special operations missions and roles that the Iraqi Special Operations Forces cannot yet perform.

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces are the most capable force in the Iraqi Security Forces, but the diverse and challenging nature of the threats in Iraq leads to an extraordinarily difficult mission set. To ensure that the requirements of this mission set can be met, Special Operations in Iraq must remain a three-legged stool—Iraqi Special Forces and MOI special tactics units, Coalition Joint Special Operations Task Force units, and other U.S. Special Operations task forces.

Army Leadership

> ***Finding:*** *The Iraqi Army is short of seasoned leadership at all levels, and a lack of experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers hampers its readiness, capability, and effectiveness.*

De-Ba'athification initially banned almost all experienced Iraqi Army leadership from continued service. Over time, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq adjusted their policies and about 20,000 officers and noncommissioned officers have returned to the Army. The most severe leadership shortage is the lack of company-grade and junior field-grade officers. According to

Coalition estimates, the Iraqi Army needs at least an additional 30,000–40,000 leaders (officers and NCOs) to command units in the field. The demand for officers and NCOs in Iraq competes with the need for competent leaders throughout government bureaucracies and in the other security forces. The virtual shutdown of many Iraqi colleges and universities, and the interruption of primary and secondary schools by the events of the past few years, will likely make recruiting educated officers and noncommissioned officers a greater challenge, as has the continued emigration of many educated Iraqis.

Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq has many programs under way to develop an officer corps, with an emphasis on "train the trainers" approaches. The Coalition is attempting to increase the number of one-year military academies in the country, using a standardized curriculum based on that of the Royal British Military Academy at Sandhurst. The first military academy was opened in 2004 as the Iraqi Military Academy in Rustamiyah and is run by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Training Mission–Iraq.[80] The first class of 73 cadets graduated in June 2006. More than 2,500 Iraqi officers and civilians have received training in Iraq through NATO-led courses, and close to 1,000 Iraqi personnel have been trained outside the country through additional NATO Training Mission courses.[81] NATO also has provided the Iraqi Army with much-needed equipment and has provided additional training and educational activities outside of Iraq. The Commission wishes to underscore the immense potential that the efforts of NATO nations are unleashing in Iraq.

> ***Finding:*** *A noncommissioned officer corps is not part of Iraq's military tradition, but it will be invaluable to making the Army more combat-effective.*

The Iraqi Army needs a noncommissioned officer corps in order to become a truly cohesive fighting force capable of the type of small unit operations essential to success in combating an insurgency. However, the American concept of NCOs seems to present difficulties for many Iraqi officers, particularly when newly minted NCOs are seen to perform at levels approaching NATO standards. In addition, during the Saddam era, Iraqi officers operated in an environment that emphasized centralized power over delegation to subordinates. Coalition advisors should support and encourage NCO development and should foster in Iraqi officers an appreciation for their role. However, it may take time for the Iraqis to embrace this concept.

It appears the American concept of a noncommissioned officer is fundamentally threatening to many current Iraqi officers, particularly when newly minted noncommissioned officers are seen to perform at levels approaching NATO standards. As the Iraqi Army and Coalition forces continue to develop the noncommissioned officer corps, care should be taken at the same time to develop Iraqi officers' appreciation for their role.

> ***Recommendation:*** *Developing leadership in the Iraqi Army will require continued support from Coalition advisors and units. Ongoing employment of a "train the trainers" approach, and continued*

[80] The MNSTC-I commander is dual-hatted as the commander of NTM-I.

[81] NATO Training Mission–Iraq, "Facts and Figures," July 5, 2007; available at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/NTMI_Facts.htm.

emphasis on the development of a functioning noncommissioned officer corps, is essential, though developing leaders will take time to achieve.

Developing Iraqi Army leadership will be the work of a generation and will require long-term Coalition or NATO involvement—at least in an advisory capacity. Although it will take more than 12 to 18 months to develop a functioning noncommissioned officer corps, the strong and effective Iraqi Special Operations Forces noncommissioned officer corps is an encouraging example. The NATO experience in former Eastern bloc countries further demonstrates that long-term engagement can build a world-class noncommissioned officer corps in places it never existed before.

Personnel

Finding: *The Iraqi Army is currently structured for counterinsurgency operations with a goal of manning 13 divisions by the end of 2008. The current divisions are experiencing absenteeism, both authorized and unauthorized. MOD has established a standard of 85 percent "present-for-duty" at all times. To achieve this, units will be manned at 120 percent of authorized strength, and the abundance of volunteers for service in the new Iraqi Army should make the attainment of this goal possible. This higher manning requirement will place additional strain on equipping and combat training programs.*

In its most recent report to Congress, the Department of Defense estimated the Iraqi Army's strength to be around 135,000.[82] Outside analysts put the figure at closer to 100,000.[83] The Government of Iraq would like an end strength of 190,000, and it plans to add 24 battalions in 2007 for an increase of approximately 45,000 soldiers.[84] The force structure is planned to be 13 divisions.

At any given time, Iraqi units are at 60–75 percent of their manning strength, and annual attrition is 15–18 percent in the Iraqi Army.[85] Iraqi soldiers return home to bring their pay to their families and check on their safety, contributing to a lack of accountability. In addition, assassinations of Iraqi soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers further compound manning problems.

Not only does the Iraqi Army suffer from manning shortages, but many of the soldiers that do report for duty are at different standards of training, owing to the many different training programs in place since 2003. Standardization of the forces and of training is only a recent development. As a result, Iraqi Army divisions are uneven in ability.

The Commission visited a camp of fresh recruits going through five weeks of basic training. Beginning in spring 2007, the earlier thirteen-week basic training course was compressed into five weeks, largely to accelerate force generation efforts. The average Iraqi *jundi* (private or soldier) has a fourth-grade education. He has been familiar with "guns" his whole life but has probably not fought in the military. The minimum age for enlistment in this volunteer force is 18. In basic training,

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[82] 9010 Report, June 2007, p.30.

[83] E.g., see Anthony Cordesman, July 24, 2007, p. vii.

[84] Lieutenant General Martin E. Dempsey, statement before the House U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2007, p. 3.

[85] Jeremy Sharp, *The Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences*, Congressional Research Service, RS22093: January 18, 2007, p. 4.

soldiers are taught everything from hand washing before meals to proficiency with an M-16 or AK-47 rifle. Discipline is maintained by corporal punishment.

Further complicating basic training efforts is the need to identify those recruits with links to militias, who must either be converted or dismissed from the Iraqi Security Forces. Despite the risks associated with service in the ISF, military pay is high enough to make enlistment attractive, and recruiters are often simply overwhelmed by the sheer numbers in need of vetting.[86] Following basic training, Iraqi soldiers' collective skills and basic unit skills are frequently developed under combat conditions.

> ***Finding:*** *The implementation of an Iraqi code of military discipline, professional development programs, and benefits for members of the armed forces is key to improving readiness. The Commission finds that inadequate implementation of these initiatives adversely affects personnel retention and leadership development. Developing future leaders must be an important objective of personnel programs.*

Currently, mechanisms to prevent Iraqi soldiers from being absent without leave are not enforced. The Commission was repeatedly informed that no penalty is applied for desertion or being absent without leave in the Iraqi Army. Present-for-duty numbers are verified once a month by the Coalition Military Transition Team.[87] Despite Coalition confidence in these numbers, the military is still plagued by high rates of absenteeism, particularly in Iraqi Army units deployed for combat operations outside their usual area of operation. Such units have leave rates as high as 50 percent.[88]

Although the Iraqi Army is aware of the need to establish a personnel and professional development system that could create positive incentives for soldiers to remain in the military, problems remain. For example, there are currently few rewards for obedience and performance: promotions are slow, time-in-grade pay does not exist, and combat pay for deployments is just coming into being. Battlefield promotions do not occur. The number of captains in the Iraqi Army is very large, reflecting a preliminary rank inflation—captain is the de facto entry grade for officers on the promotion track. Lieutenants are often left without opportunity for promotion and perform the function of noncommissioned officers.

The Commission was struck by one outstanding young Iraqi captain who had been fighting in the Army for the past three years. His American counterparts at a forward operating base were a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and a major. The Iraqi remained a captain and was frustrated by the slow promotion process. In another case, the Commission discovered that the Sergeant Major of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command is still salaried as a private, despite decades of service to his country and his important position.

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[86] Commissioner interviews at Camp Taji, Iraq, July 10, 2007.

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, GAO, "Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces," testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 13, 2007, p. 11; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07612t.pdf.

Finally, there is no evidence in Iraq that any social compact has been established with the military. Formal support for wounded veterans and for the families of soldiers killed in action is almost nonexistent. As stated above, in Iraq's economy, the military's high pay is very attractive and likely remains the primary motivator for service in the all-volunteer force. Soldiers earn around $460 a month—an enormous sum compared with the $2 per month they were paid during the Saddam era as conscripts. But the risks are significant, and there is no system in place to mitigate them.[89] When injured, soldiers must endure Iraq's overcrowded, underequipped, and corrupt public hospitals.[90] They receive no compensation for long-term disabilities, though in a practice that skews unit strength numbers they are often kept on payrolls by commanders, who understand the importance of loyalty to their troops.

To develop a durable and combat-effective Army, the Government of Iraq and Ministry of Defense need to develop the legal framework to support the human capital of the military—the backbone of any armed force. Current deficiencies are presenting obstacles to the development, loyalty, and effectiveness of the military. The Coalition and Government of Iraq are investing far too much in the training and equipping of Iraqi soldiers to allow them to simply walk away. The application of the Iraqi Code of Military Discipline would address this problem, as would establishing a promotion process that recognized time-in-grade and rewards combat performance as incentives for personnel to remain in service.

To address these challenges, the MOD is considering and implementing a number of new policies and requirements. For example, it is weighing the benefits of waiving time-in-grade requirements to accelerate promotions for junior noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, and captains. The MOD is also working to overcome problems in manpower accountability.

Equipment

> ***Finding:*** *The Iraqi Army is adequately equipped for counterinsurgency. However, equipping the Army with more armor, artillery, and mobility is tactically advantageous and communicates a powerful message to the Iraqi people and to the enemy about the growing strength and capability of the Iraqi Army.*

Each Iraqi Army soldier is equipped with the standard Iraqi Army uniform, Kevlar helmet, interceptor bulletproof vest, boots, and an M-16 rifle or M-4 rifle for officers. Until May 2007, Iraqi soldiers were issued AK-47 rifles; a program now under way to replace those weapons with M-16 or M-4 rifles, tracked by serial number and biometric data recorded when they are issued, will have beneficial effects when completed.

The Iraqi Army's inventory of assets is limited in comparison to its neighbors'. In Iraq's existing forces are 77 T-72s, 250 Soviet-built BMP-1s, 6 Brazilian EE-9 Cascavels, 61 MT-LB Russian-

[89] Chilling anecdotes abound about the personal risk to Iraqi soldiers and the lack of support for wounded veterans. See, for example, Karin Brulliard, "For Iraqi Soldiers, A Medical Morass," *Washington Post*, May 6, 2007; Ben Gilbert, "An Army Where Wounded Soldiers Are on Their Own," *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 10, 2006.

[90] Coalition forces must follow strict guidelines in offering medical support to Iraqis to ensure that their own capabilities are not overwhelmed.

built tracked vehicles, 69 BTR-80 Russian-built six-wheel vehicles, 353 Polish DZIK four-wheel-drive vehicles, 291 Textron T-6 Badgers, 2,647 AM General Humvees, 600 Land Rover armored jeeps, and 60 small armored vehicles. Shortages of equipment include modern armor, heavy firepower, tactical mobility, air support, and proper medical capabilities. Orders have been placed for delivery by the end of 2007 of 110 BMPs and 29 Cascavels, 29 BTR-80s, 247 DZIKs, 149 Badgers, and 952 Humvees (for a July 2007 snapshot of Iraqi Army unit equipment levels, see Figure 15).

Iraqi units are regularly subjected to direct and indirect fire throughout the country. In almost all cases, Coalition forces must supply the counterfire, close air and artillery support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needed to target the enemy. The Iraqi Army is also significantly supported by Coalition airlift to quickly transport and surge forces to the fight.

As the Commission has stated, the Iraqi Army should continue to focus on its mission of internal defense while beginning to transform itself into a force capable of dealing with the longer-term challenge of external threats. Tactically advantageous to both missions are armor, artillery, and mobility (especially rotary airlift and aircraft capable of providing close air support). Acquiring and implementing these platforms, however, should not distract from the current counterinsurgency mission.

As a first step, existing platforms such as the T-72 tanks donated by NATO to the 9th Mechanized Division should be strategically arrayed around the country to leverage their psychological effect. Entering these platforms into the fight would send a powerful message to the Iraqi people and to the enemies of the Iraqi people, including neighboring states supporting terrorism and insurgents. Outward, visible indications of strength in the form of heavy armor—displayed in the capital and elsewhere—would demonstrate that the Iraqi Army has been reborn with the strength necessary to protect the nation and its people.

Figure 15: Iraqi Army Equipment by Unit



Source: MNF-I

DIV = Iraqi Army Division
MTR = Iraqi Army Motor Transport Regiment

Logistics

Finding: *Logistics remains the Achilles' heel of the Iraqi ground forces. Although progress is being made, achieving an adequate forcewide logistics capability is at least 24 months away.*

Although the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq's 2007 goal is to "transition equipment, sustainment and infrastructure expenditures to Iraqi responsibility," completing this transition poses a great challenge to the independent operation of the Iraqi Army. Iraqi commanders and officials are assigning priority to getting soldiers into the fight; sustaining combat power remains a secondary goal.

As many U.S. commanders and trainers noted, the Coalition's desire to keep Iraqi forces from failing sometimes has the effect of rewarding bad behavior. For example, although Iraqis ostensibly took over responsibility for fuel distribution months ago through the Ministry of Oil, the Coalition often has to intervene to ensure that Iraqis have enough diesel and benzene to operate generators and continue their daily operations. This is only one symptom of "phantom" Coalition logistics support—provision of off-the-books Coalition logistics—to prevent Iraqis from failing. Phantom logistics mask the true depths of the problems not only in fuel distribution but also in maintenance and repair, ammunition, and other basic support.

Even when Iraqi Army units have the necessary equipment, faulty maintenance of that equipment can be a critical weakness. U.S. commanders and soldiers in the field repeatedly informed the Commission that the Iraqis in general fail to maintain equipment. Iraqis are unfamiliar with many of the new systems and platforms they have purchased in the past few years.[91] When a vehicle becomes non-operational, there are no backup or reserve vehicles to replace it. Preventive maintenance is an alien concept to Iraqis, an attitude that exacerbates the lack of spare or backup vehicles. Where maintenance teams do exist and Iraqi commanders do make upkeep of equipment a priority, they face the further hurdle of acquiring spare parts from Taji National Depot, which appears unable to keep up with requirements.

As discussed in the previous chapter on the Ministry of Defense, the Commission found that the national logistics system cannot yet address the needs of Iraqi units fighting the war. The Taji National Depot is full of new vehicles, hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, boots, uniforms, and many other end items that should be made available quickly to Iraqi soldiers fighting the war. According to the Department of Defense, 100 percent of individual authorized items were distributed to the Iraqi Army by the end of 2006, though there were some admitted problems of "cross-leveling between and within units that . . . [led] to shortages in some subordinate units."[92] Despite reported distribution of all individual equipment, the Commission heard repeatedly of deployed Iraqi units encountering fundamental difficulties when trying to obtain needed war materials to remain combat-ready.

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[91] The Iraqi Army has, for instance, dozens of different types of light-transport trucks and lacks part and maintenance know-how for the different systems.

[92] 9010 Report, March 2007, p. 40.

Finding: *The current shortfall in logistics is emblematic of the urgent need to solve a major issue in terms that the Iraqi government and military can adopt. U.S. strategies and solutions rely heavily on outsourcing of logistics, an approach that has met resistance from the Iraqi leaders. In many cases, the "Iraqi way," though not always optimal, is sufficient. The solutions for the Iraqi armed forces must be developed with the goal of achieving an Iraqi standard that allows for Iraqi culture, traditions, and abilities.*

Logistics are a problem in large part because the MOD bureaucracy can be complex and cumbersome, and has very little expertise in logistics. Its weaknesses have an adverse trickle-down effect to the Iraqi armed forces. At lower levels of the logistics chain, it is also clear that the Iraqi Army's Headquarters and Service Companies are undermanned and not independently capable.

The absence of support from the MOD bureaucracy frequently leaves commanders to rely on their creativity, on their thrift, and on whatever resources are available. An Iraqi commander told the Commission of using confiscated weapons caches to make repairs and provide additional ammunition for ongoing operations. To acquire the ammunition through the existing Iraqi logistics system, this commander would have had to send an officer in person to the MOD in Baghdad with a requisition request. Upon receipt of this personally delivered request, the MOD might then take months to fill and distribute the requested ammunition—all this despite the ready availability of ammunition in the MOD system.

The Iraqi Army is not enthusiastic about a contractor-based logistics and maintenance system, which might be at least part of the solution to existing capability shortfalls. The Iraqi Army staff is unimpressed with the contracts they have seen executed, and they seek to foster independence in their operations across the board. While this is a laudable goal, it is not producing results. Every command post and headquarters the Commission visited had vehicles and equipment that were inoperable—and more often than not, the Commission found that Iraqis were waiting for the Coalition to take care of the problem for them. Coalition forces recognize this dependency but find it difficult to lessen while simultaneously maintaining the pace of current operations.

As critical as the development of a functioning logistics capability is for the Iraqi military, Coalition experts may be imposing on them a more complex and elaborate logistics system than is necessary. The logistics force structure plan developed by the Coalition for the Iraq Army appears to reflect the Coalition's preferences rather than the Iraqis' needs. Over time it is likely that the current plan will be modified and an "Iraqi solution" will emerge. The Iraqi solution is one that gets the job done to an adequate level, even if not with optimal efficiency and speed. Those innovations will come in time.

Recommendation: *To operate independently, the Iraqi Army must develop a functioning logistics and maintenance system. The Coalition should continue working with the MOD to develop a system that meets Iraqi needs.*

Although the lack of an adequate logistics and maintenance system is a critical shortfall, it is clear that solutions that are imposed on an unwilling organization will not work. A sustainable solution will require patient and consistent efforts to work with MOD officials and Iraqi Army commanders to develop systems that are consistent with the realities of Iraqi culture and

bureaucratic incentives. The Coalition should work with the MOD and Iraqi Army to simplify processes wherever possible and adjust them to an Iraqi standard, which may be more effective in the near term if not necessarily as efficient as we would like.

Conclusion: The Iraqi Army and Special Forces possess an adequate supply of willing and able manpower and a steadily improving basic training capability. The Army has a baseline supply of equipment for counterinsurgency, but much of this equipment is unavailable for operations owing to maintenance and supply chain management problems. They are making efforts to reduce sectarian influence within their ranks and are achieving some progress. Their operational effectiveness, particularly that of the Special Forces, is increasing, yet they will continue to rely on Coalition forces for key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. Despite progress, they will not be ready to independently fulfill their security role within the next 12 to 18 months. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that substantial progress can be achieved to that end.

CHAPTER 5: THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

In 2004, the Iraqi Air Force had 35 people and possessed no aircraft. This meager beginning and late start as compared to the new Iraqi Army help put in context the progress the Air Force has made since then. Its personnel now number approximately 1,100 airmen equipped with 45 aircraft that are capable of 130 to 150 sorties a week.[93] They are engaged in supporting the domestic counterinsurgency fight, and as the Iraqi Air Force's capacity improves, so too will its ability to be a force multiplier for Iraqi ground forces. However, the delayed start-up of the new Iraqi Air Force resulted in a considerable lag behind the Iraqi Army's current level of maturity. Moreover, the creation of effective operational, maintenance, and support systems for an air force, with its advanced technical requirements, demands a longer period of development. The net effect of this asymmetry is that Coalition support will likely be required for a longer period for the Iraqi Air Force than for the Army. Despite steady progress and its strong future potential, today's Iraqi Air Force is heavily reliant on Coalition forces for support and training; and though its capabilities are improving, it remains far from operational independence.

Overview of the Iraqi Air Force

The Iraqi Air Force was established in the early 1930s and originally consisted of five pilots and a supporting crew of less than three dozen. From 1931 until the arrival of Coalition forces in 2003, the Air Force took part in a number of armed conflicts, including the May 1941 war against British occupation and the 1948 and June 1967 wars against Israel. The Air Force contributed significantly at the end of the protracted Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s by quashing Iran's final offensive; during that war, it grew to roughly 950 aircraft. By the time of the first Gulf War, the Iraqi Air Force was the largest in the Middle East, though it suffered from uneven quality in both aircraft and aircrew.[94]

In general, Saddam Hussein preferred not to use his air force for combat, saving it instead as a reserve force to defend Baghdad. It proved most effective against fixed economic targets such as oil facilities, and Hussein structured his air defenses along the Soviet model.[95] During the Gulf War, U.S.-led coalition forces devastated the Iraqi Air Force, greatly degrading its overall capacity. Most of the aircraft that did survive the war are now in Iran, where they were moved before the Gulf War to save them from being destroyed. Although the Commander of the Iraqi Air Force has expressed a desire to retrieve some of those aircraft, this retrieval has not yet occurred.[96]

Lieutenant General Kamal al-Barzanji, who leads the new Iraqi Air Force, reports to the Iraqi Joint Headquarters.[97] The main objectives of the new Iraqi Air Force are to organize, train, and equip air operations; to conduct day/night/all-weather counterinsurgency operations; and to provide homeland capabilities to the Government of Iraq.[98] The Iraqi Air Force is focused mainly on

[93] Briefing from Iraqi Air Force officials, July 2007.
[94] "Iraqi Air Force [IQAF]," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/airforce.htm.
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] Ross Colvin, "Iraq Air Force Wants Iran to Give Back Its Planes," *Washington Post*, August 5, 2007.
[97] Briefing from Iraqi Air Force Officials, July 2007.
[98] Briefing from Coalition Air Force Transition Team, July 2007.

counterinsurgency missions, particularly aerial observation and surveillance and air transportation, and units perform daily operational missions that collect intelligence for Iraqi and Coalition forces.

The Iraqi Air Force operates with a small mix of platforms: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms; fixed wing transport; and rotary wing capabilities. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms are now eight SAMA CH-2000s, two Sea Bird Seekers, and three Cessna Caravans used by two squadrons.[99] By December 2007, this capability will include one more advanced platform, the King Air 350ER. In addition, a training squadron will receive its first intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms of four Cessna 172s and two Cessna 208Bs. The fixed wing transport capability is currently supported by three C-130 transport planes, and the Ministry of Defense has requested three more to bring the squadron size to six.[100] The three rotary wing platforms, used mostly for battlefield mobility and casualty evacuation by three Iraqi Air Force squadrons, are 10 Bell Huey II helicopters, 14 Mi-17 battlefield mobility helicopters, and 5 Jet Ranger training helicopters. By December 2007, the number of Huey IIs should reach 16 and the number of Mi-17s should be 28. The 5 Jet Rangers will provide the initial capability to another training squadron, which will also receive its own 8 Huey IIs.[101]

In short, if procurement proceeds as intended, the Iraqi Air Force platforms will increase in number from the current 45 to 80 by December 2007. By 2010, the Iraqi Air Force also has plans to bring on line a counterterrorism capability with both greater numbers of existing platforms and more sophisticated platforms. These would include 18 King Air 350s, 6 Caravans, and 8 CH2000s for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component; 6 C-130s and 4 King Air 350s for greater fixed wing airlift capacity; 41 Mi-17s and 40 Huey IIs for increased rotary wing capability; and 32 T6/Super Tucano/L-39 class aircraft for a new light attack capability.[102]

The Iraqi Air Force currently operates out of four air bases throughout Iraq. New Al Muthana Air Base handles the Iraqi Air Force's fixed wing transport functions. Because the 23 Squadron there features all-Iraqi flight crews with Iraqi Air Force maintenance technicians performing all basic maintenance, U.S. Air Force Military Training Team personnel have been able to reduce their presence. The Taji Air Base houses an interim Air Force Academy as well as most of the Iraqi Air Force's rotary wing platforms. The Basra and Kirkuk Air Bases are focused on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in support of the counterinsurgency mission.[103] To that end, units from these air bases run daily missions throughout Iraq to provide actionable intelligence back to Coalition and Iraqi ground forces.

The current capacity of the Iraqi Air Force includes a growing number of personnel. The force totals more than 1,100 at present, and aggressive recruitment efforts are seeking to raise the number of airmen above 3,000 by the end of 2007.[104] Most early manning has derived from the pre-

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[99] *Ibid.*

[100] Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress, June 2007, p. 43 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).

[101] Briefing from Coalition Air Force Transition Team, July 2007.

[102] Briefing from Iraqi Air Force officials, July 2007.

[103] Briefing from Coalition Air Force Transition Team, July 2007.

[104] 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 42.

2003 Iraqi Air Force, consisting mainly of older men who have done little flying since 1991. The current pilots are considered sufficient for the low-end counterinsurgency fight until younger, more highly trained pilots can be fielded. All current leadership is also drawn from the pre-2003 Air Force, and in general their survival skills exceed their capacity for leadership. Over time, they will need to be replaced so that the development of true quality can be fostered in the new service.

Training the growing numbers of Iraqi Air Force personnel is an ongoing challenge. The training, generally conducted in conjunction with Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, has been run largely by Coalition Air Force Transition Teams. Basic Iraqi Air Force training consists of pilot sustainment and conversion training and maintenance training. C-130 training has taken place in United States, while language training and flight training have been conducted in Iraq, currently at Al Muthana Air Base. Some additional crews previously received training in Jordan on UH-1Hs and Seekers.[105] Advisory Support Teams provide U.S.-based training for reconnaissance missions, including courses for pilots, navigators, maintenance officers, flight engineers, and loadmasters, and courses in Iraq for maintenance and aircrew personnel.[106] The Iraqi Air Force also has two training squadrons located at Kirkuk Air Base, where a flight school is scheduled to open in the fall of 2007.[107]

Challenges Facing the Air Force

During the course of this assessment, the Commission met with virtually all of the Iraqi Air Force general officers (including the Commander and Deputy Commander), numerous field and company grade officers, officer trainees, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel. The Commission visited all the Iraqi Air Force installations save one, plus numerous training and operational facilities. One member of the Commission flew four separate missions with Iraqi Air Force crews and aircraft. On the basis of these numerous meetings and site visits, the Commission developed a number of key findings that are outlined in the sections to follow.

Woven throughout these findings, the Commission notes three particular challenges:

- Identifying, recruiting, and training personnel who are technically capable and motivated to pursue a demanding military profession.
- Molding a leadership and management approach in the emerging officer corps that is consistent with Iraqi culture yet rejects the risk aversion and obsequiousness of the Saddam era.
- Inculcating the need for and developing the skills to synchronize air capabilities with joint (special operations and army) missions.

[105] 9010 Report, July 2005, p. 17.
[106] 9010 Report, February 2006, p. 46.
[107] Briefing from Coalition Air Force Transition Team, July 2007.

Recruiting and Training

Finding: *The long-term capability of the Iraqi Air Force will depend on its success in recruiting quality personnel, and will require greater emphasis on basic and technical training.*

The Commission found that although Air Force recruitment is proceeding at a numerically satisfactory rate, the quality of the available recruiting pool leaves much to be desired. Much of Iraq's middle class, from which technically inclined recruits are normally drawn, has left the country. For those Iraqis remaining in the country, military service, regardless of its personal appeal, carries with it significant risk of insurgent retaliation. The future of an effective Iraqi Air Force depends on recruiting quality candidates who can absorb high standards of training and also adapt to a new culture of responsibility and choice unknown during the Saddam era. Improved screening methods and recruiting tools that reach deeper into the available recruiting pool are required.

Filling the requirement for pilots is a twofold problem: near-term requirements can be filled only by Saddam-era pilots, most of whom had questionable original training and have not flown seriously since 1991. These men generally require significant retraining even at elementary levels, and often seem more interested in enjoying the status of being pilots than in undertaking the hard work of improving their skills. To their credit, they do seem willing, even eager, to engage in the counterinsurgency fight.

The Iraqi Air Force has developed an expansive training plan that, as mentioned, it is now being implemented. Basic enlisted and officer training began in spring 2007, and technical training is scheduled to grow incrementally to adequate capacity by the summer of 2008, when the output of undergraduate pilots should be 30 per year. According to Iraqi Air Force officials, going forward the training plan will have three main facets. First, they will run Air Force Officer training at the Iraqi Military Academy in Rustamiyah. Second, they will use an interim Air Force Academy in Taji for technical training in areas such as maintenance, intelligence, and fuels, as well as for basic enlisted and warrant officer training. Third, the air base in Kirkuk will host air wing training, with a focus on rotary wing training on Jet Rangers and Huey IIs, and fixed wing training on Cessna 172 and Cessna Caravan platforms.[108] At present, absenteeism, particularly among enlisted and warrant officers, is very high (35–40 percent), effectively lengthening the training time for new technicians.

The Iraqi Air Force has shown more enthusiasm for updating its platforms than for training qualified technicians and airmen and building the necessary infrastructure to support them. The latter are more difficult tasks, but they are critical to any successful air force.

Recommendation: *Together with its Coalition partners, the Iraqi Air Force must increase the quality of its recruits and the capacity of current and planned training programs, while also increasing the manpower authorizations to compensate for chronic absenteeism. Emphasis on the value of training must be relentless.*

[108] Briefing from Iraqi Air Force officials, July 2007.

Maintenance

Finding: *Although aircraft procurement has been adequate to date, maintenance and sustainment systems lag well behind the procurement program and thus impede overall Iraqi Air Force capability.*

At present, the Iraqi Air Force does not have an air force–wide maintenance or supply system, in part because of the low training output mentioned above, and in part because of its resourcing priorities. In general, the enthusiasm to buy more and better platforms far exceeds the desire to purchase spare parts or perform maintenance on existing platforms and equipment. Moreover, using contractor support as a stepping-stone to developing an organic maintenance capability is often viewed with suspicion by the Iraqi Air Force leadership, who see it as a ruse to get Iraqis to give their money to U.S. firms. In the absence of a sufficient capability within the Iraqi Air Force, much of the responsibility for maintenance currently rests with Coalition advisors.

The inherently technical nature of air force equipment makes the lack of a functioning maintenance and supply system a significant problem, in terms both of establishing operational independence for the Iraqi Air Force and of supporting its growth over time.

Recommendation: *Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq must redouble its efforts to inculcate the value of quality maintenance and support into the culture of the MOD in general, and of the Iraqi Air Force in particular.*

Training in proper maintenance, including preventive maintenance and the timely purchase of appropriate levels of spare parts, must become the very foundation on which a capable new Iraqi Air Force is built. Until the Iraqi Air Force can take responsibility for its own maintenance, it will continue to require significant Coalition assistance. The key, then, is determining at what point the Iraqi Air Force is ready to assume this critical responsibility. It is important to wait long enough to ensure that the capability to perform the tasks adequately is present, but not so long that the motivation to take responsibility never develops. Once the transition of responsibility for maintenance occurs and a sufficient emphasis on maintenance is embedded in the culture of the Iraqi Air Force, greater numbers of more sophisticated aircraft can be absorbed and managed effectively. However, the Commission believes that even with success in this area, the Iraqi Air Force will likely require Coalition assistance for the next two to three years.

Overall Air Force Direction and Progress

Finding: *Although the Iraqi Air Force has had a very late start compared to the Iraqi Army, the present design of the Iraqi Air Force is appropriate for its current mission and it is making significant progress.*

The current design of the new Iraqi Air Focus is focused on supporting the domestic counterinsurgency operations while using mainly low-tech aircraft. This design appears appropriate for its present stage of development, given its relatively limited lift capacity; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability; and rotary wing insert and retraction capabilities. The Iraqi Air Force's overall capacity is still very small compared with the size of the ground forces that

it is designed to support, and it has almost no lethal capability. The procurement process has begun to acquire low-tech, fixed wing close air support aircraft. When that capability is added to those above, a balanced air force will emerge capable of fully supporting the military's counterinsurgency mission. At that point, Coalition air forces may begin a prudent drawdown.

Current deficiencies in the Iraqi Air Force include the lack of fixed wing close air coverage to fully support the counterinsurgency capability of ground forces, a command and control program that is still largely in its infancy, and the lack of a demonstrable ability to operate jointly with other services. The Iraqi Air Force must develop operating techniques compatible with those of the ground forces that it is intended to support. Traditional independence and cultural habits among its personnel of thinking primarily of their own family or tribe may contribute to the challenge of fostering its seamless integration into joint operations. The Commission discerned some faint progress in this area, but a considerable distance remains to be traveled.

> ***Recommendation:*** *Given its good progress to date, the new Iraqi Air Force should stay its present course of developing a counterinsurgency air force with a view toward establishing quality operations and maintenance capability for integration into the joint fight. As these skills are refined, reliance on Coalition support can diminish.*

Conclusion: The Iraqi Air Force's relatively late establishment hampers its ability to provide much-needed air support to ground operations. It is well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable air force. Though limited by the availability of properly skilled personnel, and by an inclination to value force size and acquisition over operational effectiveness, it is nonetheless progressing at a promising rate during this formative period.

CHAPTER 6: THE IRAQI NAVY

The Iraqi Navy operates in an area of responsibility with significant strategic value, bordered by countries with which Iraq has difficult political relationships. The Navy is responsible for supporting ongoing counterinsurgency operations and for the security of the key Iraqi infrastructure that enables the shipping of nearly all Iraq's oil, which constitutes the majority of national revenue. In just a few years, the Iraqi Navy has made significant progress, has embarked on an ambitious training and acquisition program, and has implemented a sophisticated planning process. It continues to develop solid leadership as it works with its Coalition partners toward independent operation in its area of responsibility. This progress notwithstanding, the Iraqi Navy remains dependent on Coalition assistance and faces significant challenges in a number of areas.

Overview of the Iraqi Navy

Founded in 1937 with just four ships, the Iraqi Navy has generally remained a small part of Iraq's overall military capacity. The Iraqi Navy played almost no part in the Iran-Iraq War, but it did pose a threat to U.S. forces during the Gulf War, primarily through its large arsenal of naval mines. By the conclusion of Operations Desert Shield and Storm, more than 100 Iraqi naval vessels had been destroyed and the Navy was largely devastated. By 2002 the Iraqi Navy was in a meager state of readiness, with remaining units barely operational and crews largely untrained.[109]

The Coalition began working with Iraqis to rebuild the Navy in 2004. Challenges at that early stage included lack of personnel and appropriate vessels, the need to establish working relationships between the Iraqi Navy and Joint Headquarters, a legacy of no central planning or budgetary continuity, and poor relations with the Coast Guard.[110] In January 2004 the Coalition established the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force, whose volunteers attended eight weeks of basic training alongside Army trainees. They then pursued special maritime training in Umm Qasr, concentrating on more advanced seamanship, sea rescue, maritime law, first aid, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training.[111] The Iraqi Coastal Defense Force was later renamed the Iraqi Navy, and the new Iraqi Navy training pipeline began in January 2005.[112]

The Iraqi Navy area of responsibility is very small but strategically important, as it includes the al Basra and Khor al Amaya oil terminals and Iraq's only deep water port (Umm Qasr), all of which are vital to Iraq's economy. Thus despite the Iraqi Navy's small size, its mission is significant—protection of these crucial assets, Iraq's territorial seas, and its economic exclusion zone; protection of the shoreline and inland waterways from insurgent and criminal infiltration; force protection; surface surveillance; point defense of offshore oil loading facilities; and visit, board,

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[109] "Saddam's Navy," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/navy.htm.
[110] Interview with senior Iraqi Navy official, July 2007.
[111] The Coalition Provisional Authority, "Briefing on the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force," news release, April 19, 2004; available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/pressreleases/20040419_coastal_defense.html.
[112] "Iraqi Navy," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/cdf.htm.

search, and seizure interdiction operations.[113] However, the Navy's development has lagged behind that of the other services, perhaps two to three years behind that of the Iraqi Army.

The new Iraqi Navy is commanded by Rear Admiral Muhammad Jawad Kadhim at the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Baghdad and by an operational commander, Commander Ahmed Maarij, in Umm Qasr; its leadership reports to the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. Today the Iraqi Navy consists of almost 1,300 personnel, with plans to expand to 2,500.[114] It is organized into an operational headquarters, a patrol squadron, an assault squadron, and four marine battalions. As the Iraqi Navy's area of responsibility is in the country's south, the Navy's personnel are predominantly Shi'a; but most other ethnic and religious groups, including Kurds, Christians, and Sunnis, are represented. Furthermore, one of the Iraqi Navy's major successes has been in remaining nonsectarian; it has put significant emphasis on instilling a sense of overarching loyalty to the Navy and the central government—not to tribal and religious affiliations.[115]

The current naval fleet is not adequate to execute the Navy's mission. It consists of Predator class patrol boats, Italian river boats, Al Faw patrol boats, and fast assault boats. Some of these assets are of such poor quality that they can at best be cannibalized for spare parts, or perhaps used for basic ship handling and navigation training. In addition, the fleet as a whole is plagued by poor maintenance practices.[116] Accordingly, a large part of current planning is an extensive and ambitious acquisition program to build the fleet to contain 15 patrol boats, 4 patrol ships, 2 offshore vessels, and up to 50 fast assault boats. These vessels will provide security for the oil terminals; patrol the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Iraqi territorial waters and economic exclusion zone; and provide command and control and forward support.[117] The contracts for the offshore support vessels, patrol ships, and three of the patrol boats are completed—though they have been delayed over negotiations regarding exchange rates and taxes—and the purchases were made with Iraqi money.[118]

At present the Iraqi Navy is using a road map formulated in conjunction with Coalition forces. The Maritime Services Transition Team encompasses many different Coalition components, including U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Multi-National Forces–Iraq, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, the Joint Headquarters Transition Team, Combined Task Force 158 and Combined Task Group 158.1,[119] the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, and the Naval Transition Team. The Maritime Services Transition Team works closely with the Iraqi MOD, Joint

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[113] Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, February 2006, p. 44 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).

[114] 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 42.

[115] Briefing with Maritime Services Transition Team official, July 2007.

[116] Meeting with Naval Transition Team official, July 2007.

[117] Iraqi Navy Information Brief, July 2007.

[118] 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 42.

[119] Combined Task Force (CTF) 158 operates in the northern Persian Gulf, also known as the northern Arabian Gulf (NAG), under a separate chain of command from that of the Naval Transition Team. Task Force 158 is the maritime contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and is executed by Coalition forces of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom working alongside elements of the Iraqi Navy and the Iraqi Marines. Task Force 158's mission is to protect Iraq's vital oil infrastructure in the NAG, to conduct maritime security operations (MSO) in the NAG, and to contribute to the development of the operational capability of the Iraqi Navy and Marines so that Coalition forces may withdraw in due course.

Headquarters, the Iraqi Navy, and operational elements at Umm Qasr as it provides advice and training. It should be noted that a primary player in this process is the Royal Navy, which provides the bulk of personnel and the senior liaison officers, including the principal advisor to Rear Admiral Jawad. The commander of the Naval Transition Team in Umm Qasr, who also serves as the principal advisor to Commander Ahmed, the Iraqi operational commander, is a member of the Royal Navy as well.

Although this structure is complex, in general it functions as follows: Multi-National Force–Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq advise the MOD and Iraqi Joint Headquarters. The representative of the naval component of the Joint Headquarters Transition Team in turn advises the head of the Iraqi Navy. The commander of the Naval Transition Team at Umm Qasr provides force training and mentoring to the Iraqi operational commander at Umm Qasr, who also receives training feedback from the Combined Task Group 158.1. At the same time, the operational commander is the Iraqi force provider to the Combined Task Group 158.1.[120] Combined Task Group 158.1 and Combined Task Force 158 also provide operational assistance and on-scene training to the Iraqi Navy in protecting the oil terminals and in conducting visit, board, search, and seizure operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf.

Challenges Facing the Iraqi Navy

As a part of its assessment, the Commission interviewed five senior Coalition officials from the Maritime Services Transition Team structure, the Naval Transition Team, Combined Task Force 158, and the Combined Task Group 158.1, as well as two senior officials from the Iraqi Navy.[121] The Commission also traveled to the Umm Qasr Naval Base and, via Iraqi patrol boat, to the al Basra and Khor al Amaya oil terminals in the Iraqi Navy's area of responsibility. These meetings and site visits made clear that although the new Iraqi Navy is making progress, it faces challenges raised by its low profile within the MOD, the complexity of its mission, the highly restricted maritime battle space in its area of responsibility, poor logistics and maintenance, and poor relations with the Coast Guard.

Ministry of Defense

> ***Finding:*** *The low profile of the Iraqi Navy within the MOD, as well as the ministry's inadequate budget allocation and execution, significantly impede Iraqi naval operations and development.*

The Iraqi Navy has never enjoyed a high profile within the Ministry of Defense, although this situation is changing somewhat with increased recognition of the Navy's strategic importance, not only in the role it plays in Iraq's economic well-being but also in maintaining the country's territorial integrity by protecting Iraq's economic exclusion zone. Iraqi naval officers told the Commission that they confront two main types of challenges: external threats to the nation and a weak internal relationship with the Ministry of Defense. The Iraqi Navy frequently has problems

[120] Iraqi Navy Information Brief, July 2007.

[121] The Commission also spoke informally with many more Iraqi Navy and Coalition officers during extensive site visits.

working with the MOD on issues related to budget execution, contracting, and planning.[122] For example, because of the long lead time required to procure naval assets, the head of the Iraqi Navy recommended budgeting on a five-year cycle, but the MOD has not embraced this idea of planning further into the out years.

Like many other components of the Iraqi Security Forces, the Iraqi Navy fails to spend much of what has been appropriated for it (and what it greatly needs) because the MOD refuses to delegate budget execution authority and insists on complex bureaucratic procedures requiring multiple signatures. Senior Iraqi Navy officers also told the Commission that the Iraqi Navy does not receive sufficient funding to conduct daily operations. At present, the Iraqi Navy operational commander in Umm Qasr has a monthly operations and management budget of only $2,000. Although this figure does not include wages and fuel costs, it is insufficient to cover priorities such as routine maintenance and the purchase of spare parts, let alone such basics as buying office supplies and running the sick bay.[123] Maintenance remains drastically underfunded, largely because of budget execution problems.[124] This lack of delegation authority extends even to basic equipment and training. For example, MOD M-7 (the Training Directorate), rather than Navy operational commanders, determines how much training ammunition to allocate. Currently MOD M-7 allocates only 10 training rounds per year, per person—an amount considered wholly inadequate by both Iraqi Navy operational commanders and Naval Transition Team advisors.[125]

Some senior Iraqi Navy leaders believe that these challenges are due in part to what they see as the MOD's inability to fully understand or value the Navy's role. The MOD, which is focused more on ground forces given the current security environment, may not understand the nature of naval operations, the maintenance they involve, or their need for spare parts. Iraqi naval leaders feel that the MOD will always prioritize other components of the ISF over the Navy when facing budgetary pressures. Absent a reasonable operations and management budget, as well as sufficient access to spare parts, ammunition, and other necessities, no amount of Coalition training or support will enable the Iraqi Navy to operate independently.

> ***Recommendation:*** *Coalition advisors must assist the Iraqi Navy leadership in advocating budget priorities within the MOD. The strategic importance of the Iraqi Navy must be better articulated to the Government of Iraq, in terms both of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and of providing the security needed to ensure the efficient flow of exports. Larger issues of poor ministerial capacity and poor budget execution must also be addressed with Coalition support, as detailed more extensively in the discussion on MOD capacity (Chapter 4).*

Iraqi Navy Area of Responsibility

> ***Finding:*** *The Iraqi Navy area of responsibility is small, complicated, and of vital strategic importance. Relations among the nations bordering the area of responsibility and their respective navies and coast guards are fragile at best. Furthermore, the international maritime borders with Iran and Kuwait are*

[122] Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.
[123] *Ibid.*
[124] *Ibid.*
[125] Meeting with Naval Transition Team official, July 2007

contested and not clearly demarcated. These issues warrant greater attention from both the MOD and the Coalition.

The Iraqi Navy and its Coalition partners operate in an extraordinarily small and confined maritime battle space that is bordered by both Iranian and Kuwaiti waters and that includes two oil terminals. These terminals are among the most important infrastructure assets in Iraq. The al Basra oil terminal (ABOT) alone accounts for roughly 85 percent of the Government of Iraq's revenue, with more than $12,000 worth of oil running through it for export every second. This terminal can handle four tankers at a time and pump 1.2 million barrels per day, with the potential of pumping 2.2 million barrels daily. The Khor al Amaya oil terminal (KAAOT), which sits very close to the Iranian border, has only recently returned to limited operations after a serious explosion and fire; it is in a state of serious disrepair and has a much smaller capacity. It can handle about one tanker a week, pumps about 200,000 barrels per day, and brings in about 5 percent of Iraq's revenue.[126] Since it has no metering capability, many suspect that much of the oil shipped from this terminal ends up on the black market, with revenues going to local criminal elements. Together these two terminals not only are vital to Iraq's economy but are of strategic importance to the international oil market.[127]

Although the Iraqi Navy has completed some small-scale exercises with Coalition navies, including the Kuwaiti Navy, there are several challenges to overcome in Iraqi-Kuwaiti naval relations, mostly stemming from the lack of clear demarcation of international borders and territorial waters.[128] For example, the Kuwaiti government sometimes objects to dredging and maintenance work done on the channel near Umm Qasr that is critical to maintaining oceangoing access. It also stops fishing vessels, and when it judges them to be violating Kuwaiti waters it asks them to change their flags or detains the fishermen, often confiscating their boats and fishing gear. The Iraqi naval operational commander expressed a desire to meet with the Kuwaiti side to discuss and resolve political issues, but to date such a meeting has not occurred.[129] Combined Task Force 158 is also trying to encourage engagement with Kuwait on issues of mutual interest, including dredging, normalizing water space, infrastructure investments, and consequence management. [130] Consequence management in the face of a major oil spill or other such maritime disaster is a major concern, as neither the al Basra nor Khor al Amaya oil terminals have sufficient plans or assets in place for such an eventuality. For example, because of the currents, any oil spill would quickly reach the intakes of Kuwaiti and Saudi water desalinization plants.[131] It would also threaten their oil platforms and likely cause a significant boost in maritime insurance rates.

Even more is at stake in the relationship between the Iraqi Navy and its Iranian counterpart, yet apparently no strategic policy exists with respect to their maritime interactions. The Iraqi-Iranian

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[126] Naval Transition Team Briefing, July 2007.

[127] ABOT has been repaired with Coalition funding and is now a world-class facility. However, some Coalition officials told the Commission that they believe Iraq's Southern Oil Company would like to turn off ABOT's metering device to obscure from the Iraqi central government the amount of output from the platform. In theory, doing so would give Southern Oil Company the opportunity to take additional profits. KAAOT remains unmetered; it also lacks a surge dampener, and that absence increases operational risk.

[128] Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.

[129] Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.

[130] Briefing with CTF 158, July 2007.

[131] *Ibid.*

demarcation lines remain contested, and there is a significant Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy presence in the area.[132] Further complicating the battle space is an old sunken Iraqi barge crane, now claimed and occupied by Iran, that rests in the disputed waters about one nautical mile from the Khor al Amaya oil terminal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy uses it for surveillance. From the vantage point of the crane, it is possible to closely observe Iraqi Navy and Coalition naval activities as well as Combined Task Group 158.1 Headquarters, which is located on a barge attached to the Khor al Amaya oil terminal.[133] No action has been taken to remove the Iranians from their new perch.

> ***Recommendation:*** *Absent clearly defined territorial seas, the Iraqi Navy's battle space will be further complicated. Although the Commission realizes that resolving this issue is made more difficult by long-standing animosities between these nations and may not be feasible in the near term, it is important that the profile of this issue be raised within the Government of Iraq and the country team.*

Coast Guard

> ***Finding:*** *The Iraqi Navy does not have a collaborative relationship with the Iraqi Coast Guard, though the two services operate in close proximity and have complementary missions. This lack of coordination has the potential to create vulnerable seams in a critical strategic environment.*

The Iraqi Coast Guard patrols the river waterways along the Iraqi coast and focuses on smuggling interdiction.[134] The Coast Guard operates in a region heavily infiltrated with largely pro-Iranian Shi'a militia. For example, the port of Umm Qasr itself has fallen under strong Jaysh al-Mahdi influence. The Coast Guard has been trained to tactical proficiency by the Royal Navy, and is capable of taking on smugglers during encounters. Coast guardsmen tend to focus on commercial smuggling, particularly large-scale oil smuggling, though they have taken casualties.

Iraqi Naval officers appear wary of Coast Guard operations. Coalition advisors told the Commission that the coast guardsmen appeared rarely to capture smugglers they pursued or to confiscate seized weapons. It is not clear whether the Coast Guard would engage smugglers more effectively if its personnel were better armed or if its alleged poor performance indicates infiltration or cooperation with militias in the area.[135]

Because the Iraqi Navy and Coast Guard operate in such close proximity, they need to work well together. Today the relationship between the Iraqi Navy and the Iraqi Coast Guard is problematic. The Iraqi Navy and Coast Guard operate under separate chains of command, with the Coast Guard reporting to the Ministry of Interior and the Navy reporting to the Ministry of Defense. To date, there has been little formal contact between the two forces, though some Coalition advisors are pushing for more such interchanges. A further complication in the relationship is that many Coast Guard personnel are former Navy officers and petty officers who failed to pass through the

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[132] Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.
[133] Briefing with CTF 158, July 2007.
[134] Interview with CTF 158 official, July 2007.
[135] *Ibid.*

vetting process as the new Iraqi Navy was being formed, and old resentments obviously could create tensions between the two forces.[136]

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Coalition should work with the MOD, Iraqi Navy, and Coast Guard to examine the feasibility and potential advantages of merging the Navy and Coast Guard into a single service with responsibility for coastal maritime security. If unity of command cannot be attained by combining both forces under the MOD, then better cooperation and coordination has to be developed to prevent a serious gap in security.*

Overview of Current Status

> ***Finding:*** *The new Iraqi Navy has made significant progress over a very short time period, particularly in planning, but it remains heavily reliant on the Coalition for training, logistics, and maintenance support.*

Planning is one area of real progress in the Iraqi Navy. Not only does the Navy have a multiyear transition road map, but Rear Admiral Jawad has started inviting officers to semiannual naval planning days at which the road map is explained and discussed.[137] There is also a semiannual Navy board that convenes in August and December; the December 2007 board will likely approve the Navy plan for 2008. In addition, every four to five months—most recently in May 2007—U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the Coalition meet to take stock of the Iraqi Navy's progress. Rear Admiral Jawad himself is taking additional small but important steps, such as codifying, printing, and distributing standardized rules of engagement.[138]

The Iraqi Navy's road map includes an ambitious acquisition plan that necessitates an equally ambitious and effective technical and leadership training program.[139] Such efforts are well under way, under the auspices of the Coalition advisory structure outlined above. The Naval Transition Team works closely with the Iraqi Navy operational commander in Umm Qasr, and in general its representatives characterized the Iraqi Navy's progress toward identified milestones, its recruitment levels, and its attitude as very good. The basic Naval Transition Team mission is to mentor the Iraqi Navy in order to make possible a successful transition, and it focuses on operational capability and sustainability. The Naval Transition Team in Umm Qasr consists of 55 people from the United Kingdom and the United States. They are divided into six functional areas: operations, logistics, training, military training, engineering, and naval base construction. The Naval Transition Team, headed by a Royal Navy captain, is taking a "leading from behind" approach so that Iraqis gain a sense of ownership of their responsibilities, decision making, and progress. This captain also stressed that because of the high level of turnover (Royal Navy tours last only six months), establishing the personal relationships necessary to move forward can be challenging—particularly since building rapport before tackling daily operational issues is critical to success.[140]

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[136] *Ibid.*

[137] Rear Admiral Jawad is set to attend the International Sea Power Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, in October 2007. The event is hosted by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.

[138] Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.

[139] 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 42.

[140] Meeting with Naval Transition Team official, July 2007.

The Naval Transition Team commander identified several problem areas for the Iraqis undertaking the transition. For example, the Iraqis are having trouble with the command and control portion of the road map, which eventually calls for strategic command from the Joint Headquarters in Baghdad, operational control from the naval headquarters at Umm Qasr, and tactical command from commanders on vessels in the Northern Arabian Gulf. Naval Transition Team officials characterized leadership as variable, though they consider the operational commander in Umm Qasr to be highly competent. Training is progressing well (including a good program in visit, board, search, and seizure operations), and in general the Iraqi Navy is making progress in acquiring new ships. At the tactical level, the Naval Transition Team commander cited good spirit and morale and improved base security.

The issues of poor maintenance and a weak supply chain surfaced repeatedly as major impediments to the Iraqi Navy's development. In particular, a tendency toward fixing breakdowns rather than performing preventive maintenance is a significant problem, as is the difficulty of getting funding released that can be devoted expressly to maintenance and other support operations. In fact, the Naval Transition Team Commander informed the Commission that maintenance is one of the Iraqi Navy's pressing problems, In addition, lack of access to sufficient fuel stocks and reliance on generators are problematic.[141] These issues also strongly indicate the need for continued Coalition assistance.

> ***Recommendation:*** *An ongoing Naval Transition Team presence in Umm Qasr is essential and should be continued.*

It is vital that the Iraqi Navy retain the support of its Coalition partners, both to sustain current progress and to address new priorities. Among the Naval Transition Team's future priorities are creating an Umm Qasr naval base action plan with an operational focus (building command and control, improving communications, formalizing a planning process), developing consistent and competent leadership, and, ultimately, effecting the transition. The most difficult choice will likely be regarding the extent to which Naval Transition Team should step back and allow the Iraqis to take on greater responsibility, balancing their need to learn to take risks against the need to complete the transition. The central tension may be between attempting to achieve Coalition standards and encouraging the Iraqi Navy to find Iraqi solutions to its problems.[142] In the very near term, the focus may have to be placed more on the integration of Coalition forces with Iraqi naval forces than on transition.[143]

Conclusion: The Iraqi Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its mission. However, it is making substantive progress in this early stage of development: it has a well-thought-out growth plan, which it is successfully executing. Its maturation is hampered by the Ministry of Defense's understandable focus on ground forces and counterinsurgency operations, as well as by bureaucratic inefficiency. The Iraqi Navy will continue to rely on Coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the foreseeable future.

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[141] *Ibid.*

[142] *Ibid.*

[143] Briefing with CTF 158, July 2007.

CHAPTER 7: THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

A central challenge confronting the development of effective civil security forces in Iraq is the dysfunctional and sectarian Ministry of Interior (MOI) itself. In contrast to the Ministry of Defense, the MOI is rife with political and sectarian intrigues and is struggling to be even partially effective as a government institution. In most areas of administrative function, the MOI has some nascent capability, but progress is extremely slow. There is very little sense of momentum in transitioning greater responsibilities to the MOI. The ministry's physical presence—its multiple floors reportedly controlled by different factions, its location near Sadr City, and its multiple security checks and heavily armed occupants—is in itself a symbol of its dysfunction, sectarian character, and ineffectiveness. Whether the Iraq Police Service—which over time will be critical to Iraq's ability to maintain internal stability and deny terrorists safe haven—can ultimately become effective is heavily dependent on whether the MOI can become a far more functional ministry.

Overview of the Ministry of Interior

Under Saddam Hussein, the Ministry of Interior essentially was the intelligence arm of the Ba'ath Party, acting as the country's secret police. Despite the MOI's ignominious roots, the Coalition Provisional Authority did not dissolve it as it did the Ministry of Defense; instead, it sought to retain the MOI so that it could quickly transfer responsibility for policing and internal security to an Iraqi institution.[144] The Coalition Provisional Authority invested considerable effort into restructuring the MOI, but focused largely on the physical reconstruction of the ministry building itself. Although some attempts were also made at this time to develop the MOI's administrative capabilities, progress was slow because advisory staff and their Iraqi colleagues spent most of their time managing short-term crises and could devote little energy to longer-term developmental efforts.

The current Minister of Interior is Jawad al-Bolani, a Shi'a who served in the Iraqi Air Force for more than 15 years. The ministry has five deputy ministers who are responsible for running its five primary departments, eight independent directorates reporting directly to the Minister, and several senior supporting advisors. A plan has been developed to consolidate ministry functions into a more streamlined organization, but it is not clear when that restructuring process will be complete.

Coalition assistance to the Ministry of Interior and its civil security forces is provided largely by the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT), which was established in 2004. Recognizing the MOI's administrative weaknesses, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team established a 90-person Ministry Transition Team to work in various offices within the MOI to mentor senior officials, build internal capacity, and advise on policy and technical issues. A brigadier general from the United Kingdom leads this transition team and personally visits MOI offices several times each week. The transition team's overall goal is to develop the MOI's administrative capacity so that it can sustain Iraq's civil security forces, which number more than

[144] Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, *Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience*, MG-365-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), p. 42.

300,000 as of July 2007 and are composed primarily of the Iraqi Police Service, National Police, and border enforcement forces (see Figure 16).

Figure 16: MOI Force Growth



Challenges for the Ministry of Interior

During its assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Commission met with officials at the departments of Defense and State involved in efforts to further develop the Ministry of Interior. The Commission also met with the Honorable Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaida'ie, Iraq's Ambassador to the United States, who had served in 2004 as Minister of Interior. While in Iraq, the Commission held discussions with numerous Iraqi and American officials working for and with the MOI. In addition to meeting with senior officials working at the MOI level, the Commission also visited many Iraqi Police Service, National Police, and Department of Border Enforcement sites to gain a field-level perspective on the ministry.

It is clear from the Commission's extensive interviews and site visits that despite painstaking work, especially during the past year, the Ministry of Interior remains a highly sectarian organization that is partially effective at best and is in danger of losing ground in some administrative areas. If it is to continue to make progress, the MOI must deal more successfully with

sectarianism and corruption, administration, logistics, and budgeting, as well as the status of the Facilities Protection Service.

Sectarianism and Corruption

Finding: *Sectarianism and corruption are pervasive in the MOI and cripple the ministry's ability to accomplish its mission to provide internal security for Iraqi citizens.*

Under the previous Interior Minister, Bayan Jabr, who is now the powerful Minister of Finance, the Ministry of Interior became politicized. Jabr was a member of the Badr Organization and a member of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest Shi'a political party. He gave key ministry posts to members of the Badr Brigade, and Badr Brigade militia infiltrated Iraqi police units in many areas of the country. Although current Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani wants to reform and professionalize the ministry, this is his first senior government position; he reportedly has no political affiliation or natural political constituency, and he lacks personal experience in managing police units.

Many experts outside the U.S. government have decried the present state of the Ministry of Interior.[145] It has been described as an "11-story powder keg of factions" that is plagued by battles for influence among political parties, religious groups, the existing government, and tribes and families.[146] The security environment at the MOI is so dangerous that when Western officials visit the ministry they frequently wear body armor and move only under heavily armed escort.

Although Minister al-Bolani has attempted to address the sectarianism and corruption in the MOI—steps taken include removing the commanders of 7 of the 9 National Police brigades and 17 of the 27 National Police battalions—the fundamentally sectarian nature of the ministry endures. For example, a former National Police general continues to work at the MOI, despite his having been implicated in a covert detention center operation in 2006; the Interior Minister blocked his arrest warrant. MOI employees have been arrested for smuggling explosives into the ministry, and according to some reports may have been Sunni insurgents or followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. In the past year, three of the ministry's longest-serving Sunni generals have been killed.[147] The Commission surveyed the Coalition's senior field commanders to obtain their on-the-ground assessment of the status and progress of the Iraqi Security Forces. Asked to rate the progress made by MOI forces toward ending sectarian violence and achieving national reconciliation, all four respondents rated progress as unsatisfactory.

The Commission was struck by the refrain of negative statements it heard about the MOI when it visited civil security force facilities in the provinces. Iraqi Police Service officials in particular complained bitterly about the sectarian behavior of the ministry, noting instances when the MOI simply does not pay police because they are Sunni or Kurdish, as well as cases when the MOI

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[145] Robert M. Perito of the United States Institute of Peace, Dr. Olga Oliker of RAND Corporation, and Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies have all written in numerous publications about capacity problems and sectarianism within the Ministry of Interior.

[146] Ned Parker, "Interior Ministry Mirrors Chaos of a Fractured Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, July 30, 2007.

[147] *Ibid.*

allegedly rejected lists of police recruits because they were perceived as being from "the wrong sect."

The MOI Transition Team is also working closely with oversight directorates in the MOI, particularly the Internal Affairs Division, to combat the pervasive climate of corruption within the ministry; but in these areas, as in combating sectarianism more broadly, there are real limits to the progress the Coalition can make, especially in the short term.[148]

Administration and Logistics

Finding: *The MOI lacks sufficient administrative and logistics capability to support the civil security forces it controls.*

Put simply, the Ministry of Interior lacks administrative capability and capacity in most areas. As is true of other government ministries in Iraq, this deficiency stems in part from the de-Ba'athification process, which prevented many of Iraq's experienced bureaucrats from working in the government. The MOI is highly centralized and resistant to the delegation of authority, and it has very little ability to conduct long-term planning. The planning staff in the MOI is very small. The ministry also lacks systems—particularly those for tracking equipment and personnel—to enforce accountability in its administration.

The MOI has plans to streamline its organizational structure from five deputy ministers to three, though many "direct reports" to the Minister will remain even under the proposed new structure. While this restructuring may help Minister al-Bolani manage the MOI more strictly and oversee reforms, his effectiveness is limited by his physical distance from the ministry building. Because the MOI is located in the Red Zone near Sadr City, a dangerous neighborhood in Baghdad, Minister al-Bolani for the most part runs the ministry from a palace in the Green Zone.

Like the Ministry of Defense, the MOI lacks a layered bureaucracy with systems in place to get resources (e.g., uniforms, ammunition, and fuel) to the field in a timely fashion, but the logistics challenge in the MOI is much more pronounced. Without functioning systems to sustain Iraq's civil security forces in the provinces and major cities, the Iraqi Police Service, much less the National Police and other MOI civil security forces, cannot be effective.

Recommendation: *The MOI, with the support of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, must reform its organizational structure, develop a five-year strategic plan, and build sufficient administrative capacity to sustain Iraq's civil security forces in the field in a manner that is free of real or perceived sectarian favoritism.*

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[148] Interviews with senior international police advisers in Iraq, July 2007. See also the prepared statement of Robert M. Perito before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007. Perito specifically notes that the transition team provided the head of the Internal Affairs Division with a fingerprinting system that the division chief used to identify and remove police with criminal records.

There is no substitute for the slow and often frustrating work of reforming the MOI, and the MOI Transition Team is an important source of advice to guide this process. As part of the planned MOI restructuring, one of the deputy ministers should have a robust strategic planning capacity and take the lead in developing a five-year strategic plan for the ministry and its civil security forces. This plan needs to be tied to budgetary requirements and should be developed in partnership with the 18 provincial police chiefs and other provincial civil security force officials. Although the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team can play a critical role in advising the strategic planning effort, Iraqi officials in the MOI must lead the effort so that the ministry's leadership will have a vested interest in implementing the plan when it is complete.

It will be critical for the Deputy Minister for Administration and Finance to establish functioning systems for logistics and maintenance of the civil security forces and to facilitate effective, centralized tracking and accountability of the equipment that is issued to Iraqi forces. The Government Accountability Office recently published its finding that the United States did not begin to employ a centralized distribution system for the provision of Coalition-issued ISF equipment until December 2005.[149] Given the level of sectarian infiltration within the Ministry of Interior, as well as the decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service, the concerted efforts of ministry officials and Coalition advisors will be required not only to develop and implement a system that is able to accurately account for issued equipment but also to foster a culture of accountability within the MOI.

Budget

Finding: *The MOI cannot execute its budget, a failure that undermines the effectiveness of the civil security forces in the field.*

The ministry suffers from several problems in the area of budget and finance. The MOI cannot execute its annual budget because of rigid constraints in budget categories and requirements to approve all expenditures at multiple layers of the bureaucracy and because there are rigid constraints on budget categories. The MOI's budget in 2007, which exceeded $3 billion, was underspent by $1 billion.[150] In some cases this underspending is an expression of the power struggle between the central government in Baghdad and the provincial authorities. For example, a senior budget official in the MOI withheld 50 percent of the overall police budget in 2007 because of her concern about corruption in the police force and the MOI's lack of insight into how police funds are spent in the provinces.[151] A major component of the MOI Transition Team's capacity-building program is working with MOI officials to develop sufficient funding mechanisms to support the MOI's forces in the field.

Finding: *The Ministry of Interior and provincial authorities share responsibility for management and payment of the Iraqi Police Service. Serious deficiencies in these efforts have led to pay and morale problems and have heightened tensions between the central government and the provinces.*

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[149] Government Accountability Office, *Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces*, GAO-07-711: July 2007, p. 9.

[150] Briefing from MNSTC-I CPATT in Iraq, July 2007.

[151] Interviews with CPATT officials, July 2007.

The MOI's bifurcated system for administration and compensation of police creates particular problems in the budgeting and finance arena. Authority to hire police personnel is vested in the provincial police departments, but the payroll for the police is centralized with the MOI. The MOI also sets overall authorizations for the number of police each provincial government can hire, but provincial authorities feel they have a better understanding of local needs and in several cases have exceeded their authorized level of hires. Serious payroll problems and delays have resulted; police in some provinces claimed they have not been paid in months.[152]

MOI's inability to directly pay *shurtas* (new police recruits) and police officers is a major part of this problem. Under the existing system in Iraq, the Ministry of Finance (not the MOI) disburses funds to the provincial police chiefs, who in turn distribute salaries to line police. This indirect pay system provides little transparency for MOI officials attempting to monitor how funds are actually spent, and it creates many opportunities for corruption and the misuse of funds. Provincial police payrolls often include "shadow police"—individuals who are just names on the payroll but who do not report for duty, or former police who have been killed or who have deserted. It is not uncommon for police leadership at the provincial, district, and local level to use the "salaries" of shadow police for other purposes or to simply pocket the funds. These practices heighten budgetary tensions with the MOI in Baghdad.

> ***Recommendation:*** *The MOI Transition Team should continue to work with MOI officials to establish workable mechanisms to better manage and resolve pay problems affecting police forces. This should be done in coordination with provincial authorities.*

As part of the MOI reform effort, the ministry should establish a process to determine provincial police requirements in coordination with provincial authorities, effectively enforce the requirements that are set, and pay police directly. Direct pay for police would give the MOI greater insight into management of the police forces at the provincial level, reduce corruption, and strengthen the identification of police throughout Iraq with the national government.

Facilities Protection Service

> ***Finding:*** *The MOI has little control of the forces that make up the Facilities Protection Service (FPS). The allegiance of many Facilities Protection Service personnel has been to individual ministries, parties, tribes, and clans rather than to the central government, and such division of loyalties undermines their ability to provide security.*

The Facilities Protection Service is designed to provide protection for the personnel and facilities of the various ministries. Many of the individuals hired into this service are associated in one way or another with their respective minister and demonstrate loyalty to that minister, a political party, a tribe, or a clan. There has been no vetting or formal training of these forces at the national level. In response to this lack of control over the hiring or training of the approximately

[152] The relatively recent creation of provincial security forces in provinces like Anbar has complicated the issue: in many cases, Iraqis are forming neighborhood watches filled with individuals who view themselves as police and expect to be paid accordingly, even though they are not actually on the provincial police payroll.

140,000 people serving in the Facilities Protection Service, in December 2006 the Prime Minister directed that all FPS personnel be consolidated and come under the supervision of the MOI. Despite this new policy mandating consolidation, most ministries are resisting the change. Some ministries are reluctant to relinquish control of their FPS forces, and the Ministry of Finance has not transferred funding to the MOI to administer oversight of the Facilities Protection Service.

Until FPS personnel can be vetted, trained, and equipped under a central, national set of standards, the threat of sectarian violence delivered at the hands of FPS personnel will remain.

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Coalition should support consolidation of the Facilities Protection Service by encouraging the establishment of national implementing orders. As consolidation proceeds, the Coalition should assist the MOI to ensure that the Facilities Protection Service personnel can be properly vetted, trained, and equipped.*

Conclusion: The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.

CHAPTER 8: THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS), Iraq's local and provincial police force, is fragile throughout Iraq.[153] On the one hand, training for the Iraqi Police Service is improving, and in some areas the police are patrolling neighborhoods more regularly, manning security checkpoints, and working with the Iraqi Army and Coalition forces to combat insurgent groups. On the other hand, the Iraqi Police Service faces many challenges. The Ministry of Interior (MOI), which supports the Iraqi Police Service, is highly dysfunctional. Infiltration of the Iraqi Police Service by militia members, insurgents, and criminals is widespread in some parts of Iraq. The police are not sufficiently equipped to combat their enemies, nor do they have the support and sustainment systems to function effectively. The Iraqi Police Service lacks investigative capabilities and sufficient intelligence and information systems, and it operates in an environment without a strong foundation in the rule of law. The Iraqi Police Service is an important part of the long-term solution for stability in Iraq, but it will be at least a few more years before the police can contribute significantly to bringing real security to the provinces. In the interim, they will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Overview of the Iraqi Police Service

During the years of Saddam Hussein's rule, Iraqi police were at the bottom of the hierarchy of security forces. Although there were more than 60,000 police in the force, they were poorly trained and equipped. In addition, they were often brutal and corrupt, and as a result they were widely feared by the Iraqi public. Reflecting that public distrust, looters targeted and destroyed many police stations, vehicles, and pieces of equipment in the wake of the 2003 invasion.[154] In an effort to begin reestablishing security in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority called the Iraqi police back into service; and in May 2003, the Department of Justice determined that the Iraqi Police Service needed to be significantly reorganized, retrained, and reequipped in order to be effective.

Six months later the United States began a recruiting and training program for the police, relying on 500 police advisors reporting to the Department of State. By early 2004, however, it was clear that the State Department–led police training program was not sufficiently effective, primarily because of the challenging security situation. In March 2004, President Bush assigned responsibility for the police training effort to the Department of Defense. This was unprecedented; historically, the departments of Justice and State have taken the lead in training indigenous police forces. Placing the military in charge does ensure that police trainers are more secure, but it also has resulted in greater emphasis on counterinsurgency operations than on civil policing and more traditional law enforcement activities.

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[153] The most solid example of civil policing the Commission saw in Iraq was in the Kurdish province of Sulaymaniyah, but it must be noted the Kurdish provinces have benefited from years of being a virtually autonomous area in Iraq.

[154] Interviews with Iraqi police officials in Baghdad, July 2007. See also Robert M. Perito, "Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police and Facilities Protection Service," Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007.

Today there are more than 230,000 police in the Iraqi police force. The U.S. Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT), the military-led organization within the Coalition with responsibility for mentoring and advising the Iraqi Police Service, has trained approximately 164,000 police, but the Department of Defense estimates that only 40 to 70 percent of these Coalition-trained recruits are still serving in the police force.[155] However, the existence of ghost payrolls makes it difficult to generate reliable estimates of the precise number of personnel available for duty. It now is clear that tens of thousands of Iraqi police have entered the force without going through the Coalition training program; rather, they have been directly hired by provincial authorities, often at the urging of local sheikhs or other tribal elders.

The Iraqi Police Service falls under the Ministry of Interior, led by Minister Jawad al-Bolani. The police force is organized into provincial police departments with district chiefs, as well as into police departments in the major cities. The provincial directors of police (PDoPs) report to the provincial governors and are typically selected at the provincial government level from a pool of candidates validated by the Ministry of Interior, a process that is more art than science. Most provincial, district, and major city police forces include patrol police, station police, traffic police, and highway patrol police. There are some specialized units for forensics and criminal evidence, but in general the forensic and investigative capabilities of the Iraqi Police Service range from quite weak to nonexistent. The provinces also have Emergency Response Units (ERUs) that are similar to SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams in the United States.[156]

Training and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service have improved markedly in the past few years, but significant challenges remain in both areas. Today there are three police academies that train police officers (mainly front-line supervisors such as sergeants and lieutenants) and six regional training centers throughout Iraq that offer a 10-week training course for new police recruits, known as *shurtas*. This basic training for Iraqi shurtas includes courses on defensive tactics, patrolling, democratic policing, and firearms, as well as other subjects. Many classes are conducted by Iraqi instructors. Police who have not gone through the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team training pipeline do typically receive at least 80 hours of very basic training. Recognizing the need to standardize training, the Coalition has a long-term plan to put all police on the MOI payroll through the 10-week course as soon as possible. In addition to the 10-week basic training for shurtas, newly recruited police officers attend a 9-month training course at one of Iraq's training academies. The police colleges also offer a three-year advanced course for police officers. Training for the more specialized Emergency Response Units takes place at the Camp Dublin Specialized Training Center in Baghdad.

Although on average the Iraqi Police Service has received more than 80 percent of the basic equipment deemed essential for its mission, many police stations still lack uniforms, weapons, and

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[155] Coalition forces have trained just over 164,000 police as of August 2007, according to information from CPATT officials in MNSTC-I. See also Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, March 2007, p. 31 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).

[156] There is also a national-level Emergency Response Unit in the National Police, containing about 600 personnel.

vehicles, as well as spare parts and ammunition.[157] Iraqi police are authorized to be equipped with two uniforms, a pistol, an AK-47, sets of flexible handcuffs, and individual body armor. Police use high-frequency radios and typically patrol in unarmored Nissan pickup trucks or midsize sport utility vehicles.

Led by a two-star U.S. general, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team oversees about 900 senior police advisors and works closely with Coalition Police Transition Teams (PTTs). The Coalition began using Police Transition Teams in 2006 to develop closer partnerships with the Iraqi Police Service and to provide day-to-day advising and mentoring of the Iraqi Police Service. Today more than 220 Police Transition Teams throughout Iraq are working side by side with Iraqi police at the provincial, district, and police station levels.[158] Like the Military Transition Teams, the Police Transition Teams report to Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), led by Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno. Police Transition Teams are typically composed of 11 to 15 individuals and are led by military personnel who range in rank from staff sergeants to lieutenant colonels, depending on the level of the station that the team mentors. The deputy leaders are senior international police advisors, and the rest of the team is made up of a mix of military police and civilian police advisors. There are about 1,200 police stations in Iraq, and because the number of Police Transition Teams is not large enough to partner or monitor every station, the Coalition generally has insight into about 25–30 percent of them (for the Operational Readiness Assessment level definitions for the Iraqi Police Service, see Figure 17).[159]

Figure 17: Iraqi Police Operational Readiness Assessment Level Definitions



Source: MNSTC-I

[157] 9010 Report, March 2007, p. 31. See also CPATT, "Iraqi Police Service," briefing provided in July 2007. While the national average for basic equipment is 80 percent, some provinces in Iraq are still experiencing shortfalls in particular categories of equipment. These shortfalls vary from province to province in size and type.

[158] CPATT briefing, July 2007. Currently there are 10 provincial PTTs, 65 District PTTs and 148 station PTTs; see 9010 Report, March 2007, p.32.

[159] CPATT briefing, July 2007. Four hundred of the almost 1,200 police stations are in areas under Provincial Iraqi Control. Of the remaining 800 stations, 200 are too dangerous for PTTs to visit. There are sufficient PTTs to visit just over half of the remaining 600 stations in the country.

Challenges for the Iraqi Police Service

Though 2006 was to be "the Year of the Police," it is widely viewed as having been less than successful.[160] At the same time, it is clear that in the past year, the Iraqi Police Service has made some progress. The police in the Kurdish region are relatively solid and are providing basic security in the three Kurdish provinces. Not only are they policing their own neighborhoods, they also have opened the police training center in Sulaymaniyah to police recruits from across the country, and the region has accepted internally displaced persons from other parts of Iraq with relatively few ensuing security problems. In Habbaniyah in Anbar province, efforts to recruit police locally are thriving, and the training being conducted at the Habbaniyah regional training center is encouraging. Finally, while the sectarian influences on the police are far greater in ethnic and religiously mixed areas like Baghdad, even there the joint security stations have demonstrated that the police can begin to establish a more meaningful neighborhood presence if Coalition forces provide mentoring and oversight (for a snapshot of the transition plan for Joint Security Stations, see Figure 18).

Figure 18: Joint Security Station Evolution



Source: MNF-I

[160] Perito, "Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police and Facilities Protection Service."

During its assessment, the Commission met with officials at the departments of Defense and State involved in efforts to develop the Iraqi Police Service. While in Iraq, the Commission held discussions with more than 20 American officials and 25 Iraqi officials directly involved with the Iraqi Police Service. Commissioners visited 15 police-related facilities throughout Iraq, including police stations, joint security stations, and a number of police training centers and colleges.

It is clear from the Commission's extensive interviews and site visits that the Coalition and the Government of Iraq (GOI) have invested significant effort and resources into the development of the Iraqi Police Service, but considerable challenges remain in a number of areas—notably, in recruiting, training, equipment, information sharing, investigations and forensics, and the creation of a justice system.

Recruiting

Finding: *The emphasis on local recruiting and assignment in the Iraqi Police Service is showing promise in establishing security at the local level; strong personnel vetting processes will remain vital.*

The Commission was struck by the fact that there is no shortage of Iraqis who wish to volunteer for service.[161] Despite many bombings of police recruit queues, and a suicide bombing at the Baghdad Police College in 2005 that killed more than 27 recruits, Iraqis continue to sign up for the Iraqi Police Service. Their actions, in part, are undoubtedly driven by economic necessity, but it also seems to suggest that these Iraqis perceive a stake in bringing security to their communities.

Local recruiting for the police has emerged as a focal point in the overall development of the Iraqi Police Service, reflecting the professional law enforcement view that policing is most effective when performed at the neighborhood level by people with ties to the local community. The most visible example of this emphasis on local recruiting has been the "Anbar Awakening" movement in the western Sunni stronghold of Anbar province, but it was widespread in each province the Commission visited.

One benefit of local recruiting is that recruits know their communities and are known themselves in turn, but the need for robust vetting efforts to ensure that local police forces are not infiltrated by militia, terrorists, or criminals remains strong.[162] Though the vetting of police recruits is improving, it is still a challenge.[163] When an Iraqi seeks to join the Iraqi Police Service, as either a shurta or an officer, he now is required to provide a retinal scan and set of fingerprints. The biometric results are then provided to the MOI for a criminal history check. Candidates who have a previous criminal history are reviewed by the MOI Internal Affairs Division. Criminal history checks are more complicated in Iraq than in many other places because of the sizable number of Iraqis who were unfairly charged with crimes by Saddam's regime. If a criminal record appears to be largely a result of political activity or perceived crimes against the state, candidates are given the

[161] The large numbers of willing recruits are encouraging, but the Commission also notes that this abundance can contribute to problems in quality if recruits are not sufficiently vetted and trained, as discussed in more detail later this chapter.

[162] Vetting is also critical to ensure that local recruits meet physical fitness and literacy standards.

[163] Interviews with CPATT officials, July 2007.

opportunity to explain their backgrounds rather than being automatically barred from the police service. In addition to providing the biometric information, police recruits also fill out a questionnaire similar to that used for a basic background check in the United States. If recruits do not have a known criminal record and if they pass the literacy and physical fitness requirements, they must pass a vetting interview before entering the training center or police academy.

> ***Recommendation:*** *The MOI and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with provincial authorities to ensure that established vetting procedures are used consistently throughout the country to combat militia, criminal, and terrorist infiltration of the Iraqi Police Service.*

The MOI now has a process in place to vet police recruits, but many perceive this vetting process as selecting and rejecting candidates along sectarian lines. Infiltration of the police service by militia and other criminal elements is widespread in some areas, particularly in the south. Some but not all of this infiltration can be attributed to the relative immaturity of the Iraqi databases used for background checks and to police departments' having begun only recently to collect biometric data. Efforts by local tribal authorities to generate recruits for the police service are encouraging, but to ensure that this cooperation is beneficial for Iraqi security it is crucial that provincial police chiefs and local commanders be required to emphasize universal and consistent application of established vetting procedures.

Establishing provincial police selection boards with appropriate representation among ethnic and sectarian groups, as well as various aspects of the Iraqi Police Service community, could help formalize this localized vetting process. In particularly difficult cases, it may be appropriate to require candidates to submit to a polygraph test. Even if rarely used, the possibility of having to take such a test may prove a powerful incentive for recruits to be more transparent about their associations and allegiances.

Training

> ***Finding:*** *Police training in Iraq is improving, particularly in areas where training is led by Iraqi instructors partnered with civilian police advisors.*

Training for police in Iraq has improved considerably in the past two years, but the progress is fragile. The regional police training center in Habbaniyah appears to be a model for police training in Iraq, as was the training center the Commission visited in Sulaymaniyah. At the Habbaniyah center, the 10-week training class for Iraqi shurtas covered a wide range of basic policing subjects as well as specific challenges, such as the threat of suicide bombers. Iraqi instructors lead most of the training, and the students appear very eager to learn. Progress was less evident at the Baghdad Police College, where most if not all of the training courses are led by American instructors. Not surprisingly, Iraqi recruits appear more receptive and attentive in courses taught by fellow Iraqis, but it is not clear there are sufficient numbers of qualified Iraqi personnel to staff all six regional police training centers and three police academies.

The continuing instability of the security environment in many parts of Iraq creates problems for military and civilian Coalition trainers as they try to do their jobs. In some areas, trainers have difficulty getting to training sites safely, and in a few cases, they have actually come under attack while conducting training. Finally, though the basic training program for shurtas and police officers is now in place, there also is a need for police command staff training, including first-line and mid-level manager training, to develop the leadership cadre of the Iraqi Police Service over the long term.

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should continue transitioning the lead for training to the Iraqis wherever possible and should consider instituting a "train the trainers" program throughout the provinces to facilitate this process.*

Having Iraqi instructors direct police training courses is clearly the most effective and desirable way to train incoming recruits. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should accelerate its efforts to put Iraqi instructors in the lead at all training centers throughout the country. Establishing a robust "train the trainers" program would facilitate this effort and potentially free up civilian police advisors—who are already in scarce supply—to serve in larger numbers on Police Transition Teams.

> ***Finding****: U.S. military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this arrangement has inadvertently marginalized civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness of the training and advisory effort.*

Because security conditions in Iraq were becoming difficult by 2004, National Security Presidential Directive 36 placed the Department of Defense in charge of the Coalition effort to train the Iraqi police. While it was clear to the Commission that the military has not intentionally sought to minimize the role of civilian police advisors in Iraq, in practice the Coalition's efforts to help develop the Iraqi Police Service have not been fully effective. Military leaders in the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team do not have backgrounds in civilian law enforcement. In addition, the military leadership of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team changes about once a year; five different generals have commanded the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team since it was established, and none of them have been military policemen by military occupational specialty. Although the Coalition program to train the Iraqi police has been ongoing for four years, one advisor noted to the Commission that "we have not had four years to implement a training plan; we have implemented a one-year training plan four times in a row."

Civil policing is fundamentally different from military policing. In civil policing, the police depend on the "consent" of those they police; it therefore requires spending considerable time building relationships with the communities being served. Civil police are trained to use defensive techniques, and to use deadly physical force only as a last resort. In contrast, military police are focused on force protection, intelligence gathering, and support of combat soldiers and combat operations.

Civilian police advisors do not have the lead role in Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team programs. In many cases, the international police advisors working within the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team feel marginalized and unable to make contributions commensurate with

their experience. This perceived marginalization is even more frustrating for the police advisors because they are better positioned to have influence in the Iraqi culture, which favors age; while most of the international police advisors are either retired or very senior law enforcement professionals, most military officers leading Police Transition Teams are captains or majors who are too young to merit their Iraqi partners' respect.

> ***Recommendation:*** *Leadership of the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team and the Police Training Teams should be transferred to senior civilian law enforcement professionals.*

The departments of Defense, State, and Justice should move quickly to establish a revised division of labor for the Iraqi police training program that would enable a senior civilian law enforcement officer with professional experience comparable to that of a two-star general to lead the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team. The level of violence in Iraq dictates that the police training programs remain indivisible from the broader military Coalition effort in Iraq in the near term; at least initially, therefore, the civilian leader of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should continue to report to the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq.

The key reform needed at this time is to ensure that a senior civilian law enforcement official is providing the day-to-day leadership of Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team activities. A major responsibility for the civilian head of this organization should be to work in close partnership with the MOI on developing and approving a strategic plan for civilian policing that includes the phased transition of the police development process to full Iraqi control.

Consistent with shifting leadership of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team from the military to the civilian law enforcement community, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should also work with Multi-National Corps–Iraq to put international police advisors in charge of the Police Transition Teams in the field. Today the Police Transition Teams are led by military officers, with civilian international police advisors serving as deputies. In the future, Police Transition Teams should be led by civilian international police advisors, with military police officers serving as deputies. Because many areas of Iraq remain dangerous, Coalition forces should continue to provide force protection for the civilian police training effort and the Police Transition Teams.

As part of the recommendation above, and to assist the overall Coalition effort to train and mentor the Iraqi Police Service, the Commission recommends establishing an international advisory board to monitor the civilian police transition program, track its progress, and make recommendations to the Government of Iraq and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team. This advisory board would be composed of senior civilian law enforcement personnel with experience establishing and training indigenous police forces. Not only would this body provide an additional perspective on civil policing issues for the Iraqi government and the Coalition, it also could help ensure that lessons learned from past experiences are properly brought to bear as Iraq continues to develop its police force.

Over the longer term and if the security situation in Iraq improves sufficiently, it would be appropriate to transfer lead responsibility for police training in Iraq out of the Department of

Defense entirely. The departments of State and Justice both have extensive experience with civilian policing and the training of indigenous police forces. Ideally, the lead agency with responsibility for police training in Iraq would be determined after careful study of the utility of making a single agency in the U.S. government responsible for this task. During this study, consideration must be given to the ongoing and future tasks that address the rule of law, such as upgrading Iraqi courts, strengthening the Iraqi prison system, and training an Iraqi marshals system.[164]

Finding: *The number of civilian international police advisors is insufficient to the task of training the Iraqi Police Service.*

When Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq was initially established in 2004 and envisioned training a force of about 135,000 Iraqi police, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team requested funding for 6,000 police advisors for that training effort. Congress provided authority and funds to hire only 1,000 personnel. Today there are more than 230,000 police in the Iraqi Police Service, and it appears likely that the force will continue to grow in the foreseeable future. To assist the Ministry of Interior with development and training of this force, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team relies on just over 900 international police advisers and approximately 3,500 military personnel serving in Police Transition Teams.

The number of international police advisors currently working in Iraq is simply insufficient to the task. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team's emphasis on placing advisors out in the field wherever possible and on partnering advisors with police at police colleges and training centers is significantly improving the quality of the Iraqi Police Service and is facilitating the transition of responsibility to Iraqi police trainers. However, there are not enough police advisors to establish these partnerships in the depth and breadth that is needed to support the development of a 230,000-person force in a country as large as Iraq.

Recommendation: *The Coalition—not just the United States—should fund and recruit the requisite number of international police advisors.*

Fielding more international police advisors is essential to the police training effort. The White House and the Department of State should aggressively encourage Coalition partners to fund and recruit at least another 2,000 advisors as part of a broader effort to support reconstruction efforts. To create momentum, the U.S. Congress and Department of State should work closely to fund at least 1,000 of those 2,000 additional police advisors positions, drawing more extensively than in previous years on the very large pool of law enforcement officials in the United States.

Finding: *Training programs to date have emphasized quantity of police trained over quality of training, thereby undermining the long-term effectiveness of the force in favor of force generation efforts.*

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[164] The Iraq Study Group and well-known international policing experts such as Robert M. Perito have recommended that the Department of Justice be made the lead agency. See Iraq Study Group (James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, co-chairs), *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 81–82.

Since 2004, there has been considerable focus on building up the Iraqi Police Service as quickly as possible. Reporting by the Department of Defense on the Iraqi Police Service has emphasized the numbers of police trained by Coalition forces—even after it became clear that neither the Coalition nor the Ministry of Interior knew how many of those Coalition-trained police were remaining in the force. The Iraqi Police Service has grown dramatically as provincial chiefs of police have become more independent from the central government, hiring thousands of recruits directly into the force at the provincial and local levels. In discussions with Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team officials, it was clear that balancing the police force's goals for quantity and quality is a constant struggle. This balancing act is made more difficult by the significant shortage of police force leaders, a result of the passive police culture under Saddam and the more recent de-Ba'athification process. Meanwhile, there are too few international advisors to establish field training officer programs and other similar quality initiatives on a large scale.

> ***Recommendation:*** *Particularly in light of a significantly high number of personnel in the Iraqi Police Service who have not yet undergone Coalition training, the Ministry of Interior and Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should seek higher-quality police recruits and vet them more carefully as they continue to address the training backlog.*

Emphasizing quantity over quality of police recruited and trained is likely to result in a less effective Iraqi Police Service over the long term. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with the MOI and provincial authorities to establish a plan for putting the more than 65,000 direct-hire police through the 10-week shurta training course. In discussions with Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team officials, Commissioners noted several instances in the past two decades when major urban police departments in the United States responded to short-term security needs by deciding to emphasize quantity of police over quality. In each case cited, the short-term emphasis on numbers resulted in weak vetting and training of recruits, and those weaknesses in turn led directly to major police scandals years later that had lasting negative effects on those police departments and on their effectiveness in their communities. To ensure that quality is the focus in developing the Iraqi Police Service, the Coalition may want to consider a comprehensive audit of the police training program that will clearly establish its breadth, depth, and consistency.

> ***Finding:*** *The Iraqi Police Service lacks a formal police leadership academy, a deficiency that impedes leadership development.*

The Commission observed that most if not all Iraqi police leaders are former military officers and have no formal training or experience in civil policing. The absence of any leadership training for these senior officers is significantly slowing the development of a corps of strong, capable leaders in the Iraqi Police Service. This lack of senior leaders with training in civil policing is impeding the effectiveness of the service as a whole. A particular shortfall is the absence of a training program to develop first-line supervisors (generally officers at the sergeant level in the United States). First-line supervisors are invaluable to any police force and provide a vital bridge between senior police leadership and junior officers.

Recommendation: *The Iraqi Police Service should work with its Coalition advisors to establish a formal Iraqi Police Academy that is focused on developing civil policing skills in senior officers and includes a separate first-line supervisor training program.*

A leadership academy focused on providing training for senior Iraqi police officers would complement the existing police academies offering nine-month and three-year programs for entering police officers and would enable the more rapid development of a leadership corps across all levels of the Iraqi Police Service. A program aimed specifically at developing first-line supervisors would be an important part of the curriculum for such an academy and would ensure continuity of leadership from junior officers all the way up to senior police leaders. All such advanced courses should incorporate a clear set of standards that outline what the Iraqi people can expect from the Iraqi Police Service. This set of behaviors will become the foundation of a disciplinary code, based on a fundamental respect for human rights, and will help to promote confidence in the Iraqi Police Service overall.

Equipment

Finding: *The Iraqi Police Service is underequipped to combat the threats it faces and suffers persistent shortfalls in vital equipment.*

There is a stark contrast between the lightly outfitted Iraqi police and the Coalition patrols that move around cities like Baghdad in armored Humvees or Stryker vehicles manned with soldiers outfitted in 60–80 pounds of full body armor and bristling with weapons. Reflecting this contrast in equipment levels, members of the Iraqi Security Forces, including the Iraqi Police Service, are killed at three times the rate of Coalition forces in Iraq. The day the Commission met with the Baghdad chief of police, two policemen had already been killed; and the day before, police in five patrol vehicles were killed. This casualty rate, which would make national headlines in the United States, was clearly not unusual for Baghdad.

Not only are the Iraqi police ill-equipped in the face of heavily armed terrorist groups and sectarian militias—particularly in Iraq's urban areas—but in many areas they have not received all of their basic equipment and supplies and lack sufficient spare parts to keep equipment in working order. The Baghdad police chief told the Commission that more than 50 percent of his vehicles are non-operational at any given time. At the Habbaniyah police training center, the local police chief and international police advisors told the Commission that requests to the MOI for ammunition for marksmanship training had gone unanswered for months.[165] Because the Ministry of Oil routinely fails to provide required fuel to the Ministry of Interior, many police departments are not able to conduct vehicle patrols. Many of these shortfalls are linked to the lack of administrative capacity in the MOI—particularly the absence of systems to track personnel and their equipment—that was discussed in the preceding chapter. They could be resolved if the MOI established a more capable sustainment system.

[165] Interestingly, one day before the Commission's visit to the training center, 200,000 rounds of ammunition arrived.

Recommendation: *Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should work with the Iraqi government to provide adequately armored vehicles and heavier weaponry to the Iraqi Police Service, particularly to police stations in urban areas or other areas where improvised explosive device (IED) and explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks are prevalent.*

Culturally, Iraqi police are far more tied to the station house than are American police. To establish security in Iraqi neighborhoods, the shurtas will have to leave the stations and go on patrol. Iraqi police will be more inclined to conduct patrols if they feel protected, and they will be far better protected in armored vehicles than in Nissan trucks. Many mid-level Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team officials and Police Transition Team leaders told the Commission that they had recommended the provision of armored vehicles for the police and expressed uncertainty as to why these recommendations had not yet been acted on. Similarly, as long as Iraqi police are confronting rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and other forms of indirect fire, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should move quickly to find a mechanism to get far more armored vehicles and at least some quantity of heavier weapons to the Iraqi Police Service.

Information Sharing

Finding: *Quality intelligence is central to the ability of the Iraqi Police Service to take the lead for security, but intelligence supporting police operations is limited and information sharing with other security agencies is weak.*

The Iraqi Police Service has its own intelligence system, but it is largely confined to the tactical level. There is very little understanding in the Iraqi armed forces or in the Ministry of Interior (where many senior officials are former military officers) of how to use intelligence effectively to support policing operations. Information sharing between the Iraqi Police Service and other elements of the security forces in Iraq—primarily the Iraqi Army and the National Police—is spotty due to security concerns (fueled by deep and long-standing mistrust) and the absence of a solid information technology infrastructure to enable secure communications.

Establishing Police Transition Teams and Military Transition Teams to work with the Iraqi Army has helped the flow of information from Coalition forces to the Iraqi Police Service, but this information flow is largely internal within each province. There is very little communication between police forces in different provinces, a lack that is particularly troublesome in light of the need to conduct effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations and to track organized and other criminal activity.

The joint security stations in Baghdad and the partnering of Coalition forces with security forces in the provinces have significantly strengthened intelligence operations, but in many areas the general public remain reluctant to cooperate with the Coalition or Iraqi security forces. Tips hotlines are now widely advertised throughout the country, but they are not always widely used. At one joint security station in Baghdad, police and local community leaders highlighted the distribution of tips hotline cards; however, U.S. military police noted privately that most people in the neighborhood were far too fearful of retribution from Jaysh al-Madhi (often referred to as JAM or the Madhi Army) to use the hotline.

Recommendation: *All Iraqi security agencies and the Iraqi Police Service must work together to establish information-sharing systems, practices, and protocols that meet their requirements. The MOI should work with the provinces to establish mechanisms to share information from the national level down.*

The ministries of Interior and Defense, with assistance from the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team and the Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team, need to work together to develop the means to share intelligence with the Iraqi police in a way that protects operational security but retains information that will be useful to local police. This is not an easy problem to solve, as the United States itself has recently been reminded—the events of September 11 have spurred a renewed focus on the best ways to share information between the military, national intelligence services, and the police. That said, information sharing in Iraq between the military, the intelligence services, the police, and Coalition forces is rudimentary at best. It needs to be significantly developed and strengthened if the Iraqi police are ever to be the main providers of internal security for Iraq.

The MOI and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team also need to work with the provinces to establish mechanisms to share information among the provincial police departments. Today it is almost impossible to track criminal activities from one province to another, or to verify trans-province patterns of activity. Iraq will not be able to establish a mature policing system in the absence of mechanisms to share information between provincial departments of police. Creating these mechanisms would also contribute to a sense of a national policing effort in Iraq.

Investigations and Forensics

Finding: *The Iraqi Police Service has extremely weak investigative and forensic capabilities that greatly limit its effectiveness.*

The Commission was struck in its interviews and site visits by the weakness of the Iraqi Police Service's investigative and forensic capabilities. The day before the Commission arrived in Iraq for its first visit, a suicide vehicle bombing in Irbil killed more than 150 people—yet it was not clear in interviews what organization within the Iraqi Security Forces had the responsibility to investigate the crime, or even whether the crime would be investigated at all.

When Iraqi police are on patrol, or are called to a crime scene, they have very little ability or legal authority to secure a crime scene; collect, secure, and analyze evidence; and question witnesses or suspects. A partial explanation for their relative powerlessness is that in the Iraqi criminal justice system, unlike the American criminal justice system, the lead role in criminal investigations is held by the judiciary rather than by the law enforcement community. Moreover, the Iraqi criminal justice system traditionally puts tremendous emphasis on securing a confession in order to convict an individual of a crime, which in turn encourages the use of torture to avoid acquittals. Because confessions are seen as all-important, there is almost no appreciation for the value of physical evidence or corroborating witness statements.

The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team is working with the MOI to change this cultural bias, but it is a slow process and the need for enhanced investigative training is urgent. The Baghdad Crime Lab was devastated in the wake of the invasion in 2003, but it has rebuilt some of its explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), ballistics, and fingerprint database capabilities with support from the British. In addition, the Baghdad Police College now offers courses in criminal investigation that cover subjects ranging from the basics of securing a crime scene to analyzing physical evidence such as footprints. The criminal investigation training facilities that the Commission visited at the Baghdad Police College and police training center at Sulaymaniyah in the north were comparable to many facilities in the United States. The challenge for the future is clearly going to be putting sufficient numbers of police through these training courses so that the Iraqi Police Service can quickly and dramatically improve its ability to investigate and analyze crime scenes.

An impressive example of the Coalition's efforts to enhance the investigative capabilities of Iraq's civil security forces is the Major Crimes Task Force in Baghdad. Following a wave of high-profile murders in 2004 and early 2005 that essentially went uninvestigated, the U.S. Department of Justice approached the MOI and proposed a joint U.S.–Government of Iraq task force to build an indigenous capacity to investigate and prosecute these types of high-profile assassinations. The task force is composed of 12 American law enforcement agents and 11 vetted Iraqi officers, as well as five translators. One Iraqi investigative judge is assigned to the task force full-time. The Task Force has successfully investigated a number of very high profile murder cases and has broken up a number of covert, unsanctioned interrogation centers. It is highly professional, but it does not have the capacity to handle the volume of cases generated in Baghdad, much less the entire country. Moreover, the high visibility of the task force's investigations has forced all of its Iraqi personnel to live inside the International Zone, and it has become apparent that they cannot safely resettle in Baghdad when their tenure ends.

> ***Recommendation:*** *As the Iraqi Police Service continue to develop, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should work with the MOI to increase the investigative and forensic capabilities of the police service by expanding the Major Crimes Task Force, increasing the number of crime lab facilities in major cities, increasing training courses for criminal investigators, and establishing an investigator rank within the police service.*

No police force can be effective if it cannot secure and investigate crime scenes. The Ministry of Interior, with support from the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, needs to make development of investigative and forensic skills within the Iraqi Police Service a major area of emphasis and must give the police greater authority to conduct investigations. The Major Crimes Task Force should be expanded significantly so that it can at least begin to handle the large volume of cases in Baghdad. Ideally, each province would have its own Major Crimes Task Force, equipped with an automated database to track criminal activity and facilitate information sharing. In light of the substantial history of terrorists using criminal activity to fund acts of terror, the Major Crimes Task Force should also expand its efforts into investigating significant criminal financial activities, as well as murders and other violent crime. Finally, the Iraqi Police Service should create an investigator rank so that it can begin training police to specialize in investigative and forensics skills.

Creation of a Justice System

Finding: *The Iraqi Police Service is but one element of a broader justice system that is not yet well established in Iraq.*

The Commission did not conduct a detailed assessment of the overall judicial system in Iraq as such an investigation was beyond the scope of its mandate, but interviews made clear that a major challenge to effective policing is the absence of a well-developed judicial system. To establish lasting security in Iraq, the police must be linked to a functioning court and prison system. Police must be able to put suspects in jail while they await trial; sufficient numbers of investigative judges need to be able to conduct investigations thoroughly and without fearing for their lives; and when the legal system succeeds in convicting a suspect, criminals need to be able to serve out their sentences in well-run prisons. Iraq currently lacks this kind of coherent judicial framework. Fundamentally, the rule of law does not yet exist in Iraq. Police and judicial officials often view each other with mutual suspicion, jails are woefully overcrowded, investigative judges and their families are often targets of intimidation and violence, and courthouses are run down and poorly secured.

Recommendation: *The Government of Iraq, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, should collaborate to create and implement a framework to enable the rule of law in Iraq. The Coalition should continue to strongly support these efforts.*

Like the Iraq Study Group, the Commission strongly recommends that the Government of Iraq launch a major initiative to establish a functioning judicial system in Iraq, and that the Coalition strongly support that program.[166] A new focus on developing the rule of law in Iraq could build on ongoing Coalition initiatives, such as the relatively new rule of law compound that establishes a "safe zone" for members of the judiciary and their families, as well as the European Union rule of law mission in Iraq (EUJUST LEX) that has trained almost 1,500 senior Iraqi criminal justice officials. Establishing the rule of law will require expanding the number and improving the quality of detention centers, rebuilding courthouses and improving their physical security, training many more prosecutors and judges, providing for the safety of judicial system officials and their families, and establishing mechanisms to root out corruption and political influence in the judicial system.

A Long-Term Vision for Policing in Iraq

Finding: *The police are central to the long-term establishment of security and stability in Iraq. Today, the Iraqi Police Service is incapable of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence.*

Although today the Iraqi Army has a considerable role in providing internal security in Iraq, ultimately the Army will focus on external defense of the country and it will be the Iraqi police who will safeguard the country's internal security. The Iraqi police today are operating in what is essentially a battlefield environment while trying to prepare for the day when more traditional civil

[166] See Iraq Study Group, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, p. 83.

policing is possible. Given this challenge, the Iraqi policing strategy will likely need to follow an evolutionary process, much like the police experience in Northern Ireland.

At the height of The Troubles, the police in certain parts of Belfast were restricted to responding to calls from the public and conducting limited patrols. As many as 16 British Army soldiers were required to support just two police officers on patrol, when under normal conditions these police would patrol alone. Over time, as the security situation began to improve, police officers conducted patrols in groups of two armored vehicles with three officers in each. Later, police could patrol in armored SUVs, and today police officers are starting to patrol on bicycles in what used to be the most dangerous neighborhoods. This transformation did not happen quickly; the British Army only recently ended its support to police activities in Northern Ireland after 38 years of military operations. Reductions in the military presence supporting police activities in Northern Ireland were linked to increased security on the ground, which in turn was the result of increasing political stability over time.

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to develop a detailed strategic plan to transition primary responsibility for internal security in Iraq from the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Police Service.*

Working closely with the ministries of Interior and Defense, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should help the Government of Iraq develop a detailed plan to shift primacy for Iraq's internal security from the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Police Service. This plan should outline core policing principles as well as milestones for the evolution of the policing process. One core principle should be the requirement that an Iraqi police officer is always the face of a patrol for the public, and is in charge of the patrol, regardless of the size of the military escort. Another core principle should be that the military provides a secure platform to enable police to execute their primary function of upholding the rule of law until that secure platform is no longer necessary. This kind of strategic plan would include benchmarks to assess the evolution of policing away from the Army and toward the Iraqi Police Service. Such benchmarks might include the ability to replace Army units with police personnel without loss of control over an area, or the ability to rely on military capabilities only for specialized functions such as helicopter support. Whatever the milestones, a central concept in the policing plan needs to be the establishment of civil policing as the standard. Even if for many years this civil police force can function only with substantial military support, as was the case in Northern Ireland, the concept of a civil police force responsible for public security must be instituted from the outset as a societal norm.

> ***Conclusion:*** The Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combating the threats that officers face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.

CHAPTER 9: THE NATIONAL POLICE

Despite efforts to reform the Iraqi National Police, the organization remains a highly sectarian element of the Iraqi Security Forces and one that for the most part is unable to contribute to security and stability in Iraq. The Iraqi National Police is almost exclusively Shi'a. Trained for counterinsurgency operations, the force is constituted largely of former soldiers. The National Police suffers from significant quality problems and a lack of clarity about whether it should be a paramilitary or a police organization.

Overview of the Iraqi National Police

In addition to the Iraqi Police Service, Iraq also has just over 25,000 National Police, organized into two divisions. Intended to serve as a bridging force between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army, the National Police is widely viewed as highly sectarian and is mistrusted by the Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi public.

The roots of the National Police are varied. As the insurgency in Iraq grew more violent toward the end of 2003, the Coalition decided to create what it called "heavy police units" using former Iraqi soldiers. These public order battalions and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) were composed largely of Sunnis and reported to the Ministry of Interior (MOI). In September 2004, under the leadership of Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, the MOI created Special Police Commandos that were largely Shi'a units; then in January 2005, the MOI created the 1st Special Police Mechanized Brigade.[167] In April 2006, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq persuaded the MOI to combine all of these different units into a single organization, the National Police. The Shi'a-dominated Special Police Commandos became the 1st National Police Division, and the public order battalions became the 2nd National Police Division.

Like the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police is part of the Ministry of Interior. The National Police Commander is Major General Hussein al-Awadi, who reports to Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani. The National Police today comprises eight brigades organized into two divisions, a single mechanized brigade, a quick reaction force battalion, and a national-level Emergency Response Unit containing about 600 personnel. The Coalition has trained more than 31,000 National Police, but it appears that only about 25,000 are still serving. National Police missions include counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, military assistance for civil disturbances, and protection of high-level dignitaries. The original concept for the National Police was to use it as a reinforcement force for the Iraqi Police Service. If an incident in a province could not be adequately addressed by local police, the MOI could deploy a National Police brigade to assist and bring the situation under control. If the National Police and the police combined still could not bring the situation under control, the MOI could request deployment of Iraqi Army forces. In this way the National Police was conceived as being employed domestically in a fashion somewhat similar to

[167] Some experts assert that the various units created by Minister Jabr were made up of fighters from Shi'a militia organizations. See Robert M. Perito, "Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007.

how the National Guard can be used in the United States, but it is not clear whether the National Police in its current form can execute this kind of mission effectively (for its operational readiness, see Figure 19).

Figure 19: MOI National Police Forces' Operational Readiness



Source: MNF-I

The National Police achieved 100 percent of its authorized equipment levels at the end of 2006. National Police personnel are outfitted with small arms, medium machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and body armor. National Police units have light, medium, and heavy pickup trucks, as well as sport utility vehicles. In recognition of the need for heavier equipment, given National Police involvement in counterinsurgency operations, plans have been made to up-armor more than 1,300 of the SUVs and trucks.[168] The 1st Mechanized National Police Brigade has approximately 60 M-1117 armored security vehicles, 50 Ukrainian armored personnel carriers derived from the Soviet BTR-80, and 115 South African–made Reva armored personnel carriers. In the future, the National Police aspires to have rotary wing aircraft, cargo planes, more armored vehicles, mortars, mine detectors, and unmanned aerial vehicles, but it is not clear when or whether this equipment will be acquired.

[168] Walter Pincus, "US to Armor Plate Iraqi Police Vehicles," *Washington Post*, December 16, 2006.

Until late 2006, training for the National Police was not standardized, and it focused largely on counterinsurgency and paramilitary operations. In October 2006, the Coalition removed the entire 8th Brigade of the 2nd National Police Division from operations and arrested its officers, who were implicated in the kidnapping of 26 Sunnis and the death of 7 of those individuals. This incident made clear the need for standardized training and reorientation of the National Police. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq launched the National Police Transformation Program, which in its initial stages included limited vetting and three weeks of traditional police training—the first police training that any members of the National Police had received.

The National Police Headquarters, in cooperation with the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, now operates three major training facilities. New recruits undergo six weeks of basic training at the National Police Academy in Numiniyah. Basic, officer, and noncommissioned officer training is offered at Camp Solidarity, located in northern Baghdad. Finally, more specialized training, such as SWAT (special weapons and tactics) training and Emergency Response Unit training, is offered at Camp Dublin, just south of Baghdad. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team started a mandatory four-week training course to address concerns about National Police activities after the 8th Brigade was taken out of operations. This process, sometimes referred to as "re-bluing," is a month-long basic training program in policing skills, such as human rights training and policing in a democracy, as well as tactical training, such as patrolling and checkpoint operation.[169] All nine National Police brigades will have completed the re-bluing training by early October 2007.

Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and Multi-National Corps–Iraq provide important technical advice, training, and mentoring to the National Police. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team plays a key role in National Police training and capacity building within the MOI to support the National Police. Multi-National Corps–Iraq is responsible for 41 National Police Transition Teams, 38 of which are partnered with National Police battalions, as well as 2 teams that are partnered with the division headquarters, and 1 team assisting National Police Headquarters. Fourteen international police advisors work with the National Police. The National Police Transition Teams work with National Police units on a daily basis, providing mentoring and assistance in the field. A major recent focus for the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team and the National Police Transition Teams has been implementing the first two phases of the four-phase National Police Transformation Program. Under Phase 1, the National Police Transition Teams conducted technical inspections of each of the National Police battalions to identify deficiencies in areas such as personnel accountability, uniforms, fuel supplies, spare parts, and maintenance capabilities. The teams also conducted quick-look inspections and command climate surveys to get a more qualitative assessment of the National Police units.

Challenges for the National Police

The National Police is the subject of considerable concern both inside and outside Iraq. The Commission was struck by the almost universally negative descriptions of the National Police

[169] "Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Colonel Mark R. French," http://www.defenselink.mil/home/blog/docs/20070730_French_Transcript.pdf.

voiced by Iraqi police, Army officers, and members of the general public. The National Police has been regularly accused of sectarian abuse and illegal activities. Reports of Iraqi security forces' involvement in death squad activities have most frequently been traced to this organization, particularly its former commando units.[170] Members of the National Police were also heavily implicated in the 2005 prisoner torture scandal, and the most recent former Commanding General of Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, remarked in late 2006 that "the National Police is the biggest worry, about 20 to 25 percent of them probably need to be weeded out."[171] The Commission also observed that the Coalition's sheer need for large numbers of security forces to bring the fight to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the militias may be hindering its ability to consider, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, what makes the most sense for the future of the National Police.

> ***Finding:*** *In its current form, the National Police is not a viable organization. Its ability to be effective is crippled by significant challenges, including public distrust, sectarianism (both real and perceived), and a lack of clarity about its identity—specifically, whether it is a military or a police force.*

Sectarianism

National Police members are largely recruited from Baghdad and the largely Shi'a southern provinces of Iraq. Efforts to recruit Sunni men into the National Police have generally been unsuccessful. As a result, the National Police force is 85 percent Shi'a, 13 percent Sunni, and 2 percent other affiliations; given its composition and past activities, it is widely perceived as highly sectarian.

In an effort to curb sectarian behavior, the National Police Commander has recently replaced 8 of 9 brigade commanders and 17 of 27 battalion commanders—but serious perception problems remain. As part of the Baghdad Security Plan that began in February 2007, two National Police battalions were supposed to deploy to Baghdad, one from the northern part of Iraq and another from the Tikrit/Samarra region, but ultimately political resistance prevented their transfer.[172]

The Commission heard police chiefs and senior police officials describe the National Police as "very sectarian," "making daily mistakes with the Iraqi people," "a burden on the MOI," and "not a national force at all." Even with the re-bluing training largely completed, sectarianism in the National Police may still be more than just a perception problem. The MOI is seeking to establish an additional National Police brigade in Samarra; but while the National Police leadership has proposed that its composition be 45 percent Sunni and 55 percent Shi'a, the Office of the

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[170] Olga Oliker, "Iraqi Security Forces: Defining Challenges and Assessing Progress," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007, p. 5; available at www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT277.pdf.

[171] U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 2007, pp. 87–88.

[172] CPATT briefing, July 2007.

Commander in Chief (which reports directly to the Prime Minister) has proposed that the personnel be 1 percent Sunni and 99 percent Shi'a.[173]

Quality

The National Police faces many of the same challenges in maintaining quality forces as do the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service. For example, the National Police struggles to ensure that sufficient personnel are present for duty; the existence of ghost payrolling also complicates determinations of present-for-duty numbers at any given time. And like the other forces, the National Police faces a shrinking pool of quality recruits, it lacks sufficient leaders and noncommissioned officers, and it does not have an effective logistics system.

Of the approximately 25,000 National Police authorized by the MOI, on average only about 65 percent are actually present for duty on a given day. While a handful of National Police units are assigned a full complement of personnel, only two of these units have more than 80 percent of their assigned personnel present for duty.

Meetings with Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team officials highlighted additional quality concerns regarding the National Police. The pool of sufficiently high quality recruits is shrinking; identifying literate recruits has become a big challenge. In 2007 the replenishment goal for the National Police is 14,000 recruits—more than half of the entire standing National Police force. Unless this replenishment goal is an aberration, the high percentage of new recruits annually will make it hard to maintain the quality of the National Police over time. The absence of sufficient leaders is another serious concern for the National Police, where officer strength is less than 45 percent of what is authorized by the MOI. Like the Iraqi military, the National Police does not have noncommissioned officers, who could assume some of the leadership responsibilities in the organization. Finally, like the Iraqi military and Iraqi Police Service, the National Police lacks a functioning logistics or supply chain management system. As a result, the National Police struggles to maintain and repair equipment, and its operational readiness is degraded.

Future Missions and Command and Control Arrangements

There is considerable debate within the Coalition and in the broader defense community about the future of the National Police. Should it be a light infantry, a counterinsurgency force, or a civil police force? The National Police has largely been trained as a counterinsurgency force, although the Phase 2 re-bluing training places much greater emphasis on traditional police activities and includes a focus on human rights and the rule of law. At the same time, Phase 3 training under the National Police Transformation Plan is centered on a 90-day course with an emphasis on counterinsurgency operations. Presentations from Iraqis on the future of the National Police tended to emphasize "preventing rebellions," undertaking counterterrorism operations, and preventing the movement and activities of militias.[174] The lack of clarity surrounding the National Police mission is

[173] CPATT briefing, July 2007.

[174] Meetings with Iraqi National Police officials, July 2007.

further reflected in how the National Police is equipped. An American general noted that "we ask the National Police to fight as Iraqi Army, but they are equipped like regular police."

Command and control arrangements for the National Police are part of the broader debate about this organization's future. Some argue that the MOI needs a set of security forces under its control that can deploy nationwide, but the National Police is not well-embedded in the ministry. There are five deputy ministers in the MOI, one of whom is responsible for security, including the provincial police—but this deputy minister is not responsible for the National Police. The National Police commander reports directly to the Minister, an arrangement that may, whether fairly or unfairly, fuel perceptions of sectarianism. Others argue that the National Police is essentially composed of soldiers, not police, and should be brought under the Ministry of Defense. Senior police officials noted that under the Baghdad Security Plan, the National Police in Baghdad are already under the operational control of the Ministry of Defense.

> ***Recommendation:*** *The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized under the MOI. It should become a much smaller organization under a different name with responsibility for highly specialized police tasks such as explosive ordnance disposal, urban search and rescue, special threat action, and other similar functions.*

Although the National Police cannot be effective in their current form, there is a need for the Ministry of Interior to have a security force under its control that can augment provincial police forces when necessary. The MOI, with support from the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, should dissolve the National Police and draw on a portion of its former personnel to establish a network of National Emergency Support Teams (NESTs), with one team in each province. To avoid many of the problems with the current National Police, NEST units should be ethnically and religiously diverse and should reflect the population makeup of their provinces.

These NEST teams would focus on providing capabilities to the police forces in each province that are necessary but too specialized in most instances to be maintained at the local level—for example, explosive ordnance disposal; consequence management for chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological events; urban search and rescue; air support; marine/riverine patrol; and civil disturbance response. To sustain the high level of capabilities associated with these specialized missions, NEST teams would require specialized training and equipment similar to that available to the existing national-level Emergency Response Unit.

The NEST teams, while provincially based, could be deployed nationally if an area of the country needed substantial infusions of specialized capability. If deploying to assist the Iraqi Police Service, provincial NEST teams should come under the authority of the local police commander.

The existing national-level Emergency Response Unit in the National Police contains 600 personnel. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team personnel spoke highly of the ERU and indicated that it was a very competent organization. If each province were to have a NEST team of about 300 people, the overall size of the NEST network would be about 6,000 personnel—only 25 percent of the existing National Police force. Former National Police personnel that did not remain as part of the NEST forces could be readily absorbed into the Iraqi Army or the Iraqi Police Service. In light of the sectarian problems that have plagued the National Police, it would be important to

ensure that all former National Police members seeking to transfer to the Iraqi Army or Iraqi Police Service are sufficiently vetted prior to being accepted into either of those organizations.

Conclusion: The National Police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the force is not viable in its current form. The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized.

CHAPTER 10: THE DEPARTMENT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT

The Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate are showing uneven but improved capabilities in some locations in Iraq. Although both entities have some effective top-level leadership and have improved Iraqi border security since 2003, considerable challenges remain. For example, the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which oversees the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), does not have authority over the nation's sea and air ports of entry. In addition, border forts, border fort annexes, and land ports of entry have only modest levels of the basic equipment they need for their personnel and daily operations, and they lack the larger pieces of equipment necessary for inspecting and monitoring the people and cargo crossing the nation's borders. Border enforcement personnel often work in conditions lacking adequate life support services and are without sufficient logistical support to meet requirements. The importance of effective border enforcement to Iraq's overall security necessitates substantial improvements in these areas and a significantly greater sense of urgency on the part of the Iraqi central government and Ministry of Interior, as well as the continued assistance of Coalition Border Transition Teams for the foreseeable future.

Overview of the Department of Border Enforcement

Iraq has 2,268 miles of land border in addition to 36 miles of coastline. Although the Department of Border Enforcement existed during the Saddam era, border security functions at that time were performed mainly by the Iraqi military and the comprehensive network of secret police. At present, the Department of Border Enforcement has a force of only 37,710 personnel to secure the border.[175]

In the wake of the 2003 invasion, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq built the new Department of Border Enforcement from scratch.[176] The Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement, which was created under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 26 on August 24, 2003, is part of the Ministry of Interior.[177] Although the MOI is responsible for all border forts, annexes, and land ports of entry, the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) maintains control over sea and air ports of entry. On several occasions, both Coalition and Iraqi officials told the Commission that the reasons for this division of responsibilities have more to do with ministries consolidating power than with advancing the overall mission of border security. Eventually, they agreed, all ports of entry should be under the MOI's domain.[178] Accordingly, in 2008 the responsibility for air and sea ports of entry will shift to the MOI.

The Director of the Department of Border Enforcement is Major General Moshen, whom Coalition officials view as resourceful, effective, and an excellent administrator. Brigadier General Farhoud, who was acting director for the Ports of Entry Directorate when the Commission first

[175] CPATT Support Forces briefing, July 2007.
[176] Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate overview briefing, July 2007.
[177] CPA Order 26, "Creation of the Department of Border Enforcement"; available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030824_CPAORD_26_Creation_of_the_Dept_of_Border_Enforcement.pdf.
[178] Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate overview briefing, July 2007.

visited, is also very highly regarded. He had been replaced by Brigadier General Ali by the time of a subsequent visit. Despite the current strength of its top-level leadership, the department has experienced a high level of turnover. For example, as of July 2007, the Ports of Entry Directorate had functioned under 10 different directors in a 15-month period.[179]

The Department of Border Enforcement is organized into five divisions, one for each of Iraq's five geographic regions (as determined by the department). Each division has two to three brigades.[180] Today, there are a total of 12 brigades and 42 battalions, 38 of which are dependent on Coalition support.[181] At present, there are 258 Coalition-constructed and supported border forts, 112 department-constructed annexes, and another 47 annexes under departmental construction. The Department of Border Enforcement and its Coalition partners have a five-year plan to bring the total number of constructed border forts and annexes to 723,[182] and to reduce the distance between forts to an average of 6 to 9 miles.

The Department of Border Enforcement generally recruits from local populations near its facilities to man land border crossings. Some current border enforcement agents are former Ba'athist-era military, and most joined the Department of Border Enforcement because its jobs are considered easier and safer than those in the Iraqi Army. The Department of Border Enforcement addressed chronic personnel shortages in 2006 by cross-leveling manpower from existing Department of Border Enforcement facilities and by increasing hires. As a result, staffing levels are now at 98 percent across the department and its facilities, though its personnel are not necessarily equally trained. The Department of Border Enforcement did not establish a comprehensive training program until August 2004, and its training capacity remains modest.[183]

While the Department of Border Enforcement has overall authority for Iraqi border security, the Ports of Entry Directorate is the component within the Department of Border Enforcement that has responsibility for the land ports of entry into the country. The Ports of Entry Directorate was only recently moved under the jurisdiction of the Department of Border Enforcement, but it was transferred without a budget—an oversight that presents a significant problem. Currently, the Department of Border Enforcement is able to provide for some but not all of the Ports of Entry Directorate's needs. There are 17 land ports of entry in Iraq, 12 of which are currently functioning; 4 were closed in February 2007 as part of the enhanced security measures then put into place in an effort to focus border resources on the Iranian and Syrian crossings where they are most urgently needed.[184] One additional crossing at Al Qa'im will open in November 2007. Although some have been closed, other land ports of entry are receiving significant investments. For example, the Ports of Entry Directorate intends to make Al Qa'im on the Syrian border a model border crossing and has invested $21 million into a construction project to make the facility state-of-the-art.[185]

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[179] CPATT Support Forces briefing, July 2007.

[180] Interviews with DOD officials, July 2007.

[181] Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, June 2007, p. 35 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).

[182] MNSTC-I Border Forces briefing, July 2007.

[183] CPATT briefing, July 2007 (staffing levels); MNSTC-I Border Forces briefing, July 2007 (training).

[184] 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 35.

[185] MNSTC-I Border Forces briefing, July 2007.

Today the Department of Border Enforcement has about 87 percent of the basic equipment it requires. In some areas, such as firearms and radios, the department appears to have 100 percent of its needed equipment. At the same time, some required equipment has never been issued at all. Equipping rates for the Ports of Entry Directorate are lower—about 68 percent on average, with particular shortages in patrol vehicles, flatbed trucks, uniforms, generators, and body armor.[186] In addition, major items of equipment, including technology-based systems used to track people and cargo coming across the borders, are insufficient in both quantity and quality, as will be detailed later in this chapter.

Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq works with the MOI and the Department of Border Enforcement to provide training and advice, primarily through advisors from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Border Transition Teams working in the field. Most Border Transition Teams are composed of about 13 personnel—a mix of military personnel, contractors, and DHS employees. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq has identified a total requirement for 70 Border Transition Teams amounting to more than 900 people, but the Coalition has not been able to fill this requirement.[187] Today there are just 28 Border Transition Teams distributed across the Department of Border Enforcement's five geographic regions.

Although Border Transition Teams are stationed throughout Iraq, the Coalition has chosen to focus its 28 existing teams on difficult border crossings and rely on decent relations with countries such as Turkey and Kuwait to ensure sufficient border security in more stable areas.[188] The more successful land ports of entry have Border Transition Teams (also called Ports of Entry Transition Teams) that live and work with their Iraqi counterparts. For example, the port of entry director at Trebil indicated that the Border Transition Team assigned there was critical to their mission, a sentiment echoed by Iraqi officials at the Zurbatiya Port of Entry.

Challenges for the Department of Border Enforcement

The Commission met with several officials in the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate, held discussions with many Coalition Border Transition Team advisors, and visited multiple land ports of entry, including Zurbatiya, Trebil, and Walid. Though it is clear that border security is better today than it was in the wake of the invasion, when people and goods flowed unchecked across borders, the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate face significant challenges and are not yet providing adequate border security for Iraq.

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[186] *Ibid.*

[187] *Ibid.*

[188] Interview with DOD officials, July 2007.

Ministry of Interior

Finding: *The overall capacity of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate is undermined by weak MOI capacity. Further, border security commanders have little confidence that the MOI will address their needs and concerns.*

The MOI is often not in control of the land ports of entry under the Ports of Entry Directorate's jurisdiction. The Deputy Minister of Interior for Support Forces, Major General Admed al-Khafaji, told Commissioners that the Kurds, not the MOI, administer the land ports of entry in the Kurdish autonomous region. Even more troubling, in separate meetings with the Director of the Ports of Entry Directorate and Deputy Minister al-Khafaji, it was made clear to the Commission that four land ports of entry in the south are run by militia and are not under MOI control. Furthermore, efforts to install department-assigned directors at those land ports of entry were thwarted by the militia in place. The sea port of entry at Umm Qasr as well as other, smaller sea ports of entry are also reportedly controlled by militia. None of the tariffs collected at these militia-run ports of entry end up in the national coffers, and the Department of Border Enforcement has little insight as to how these ports are administered.

Both the Deputy Director of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Director also expressed immense frustration with their inability to obtain funding from the MOI for infrastructure development, fuel, ammunition, and personal equipment. Border forts and annexes often experience difficulty getting required fuel and lack reliable access to electrical power. Some border fort commanders pay for fuel out of their own pockets to enable their forces to patrol. In extreme cases, Border Transition Teams have facilitated fuel delivery from Coalition resources. It is common for requests to languish for months at the MOI without explanation, and local commanders are sometimes ignored by the MOI for secular reasons.

Finding: *The divided responsibility for land, sea, and air ports of entry between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Transportation, together with the lack of unity of effort between these ministries, undermines the effectiveness of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate.*

The systemic weakness of the MOI is exacerbated by the lack of MOI jurisdiction over Iraq's sea and air ports of entry, which are currently controlled by the Ministry of Transportation. It is the Commission's assessment, based on numerous observations and discussions, that the Ministry of Transportation is equally as corrupt and dysfunctional as the Ministry of Interior. As a result, there are no MOI personnel present to even monitor activities at the sea and air ports of entry, which are likely the entry points for foreign fighters as well as equipment for improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and are the staging grounds for smuggling operations.[189]

Even at those land ports of entry where the MOI is responsible for border security, the lack of definition regarding ministerial responsibilities continues to undermine border security. Land ports of entry, though under MOI authority, involve up to 15 other ministries with border security–

[189] Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate overview briefing, July 2007.

related functions. When the MOI appoints a port director, for example, that individual typically has no control over the non-MOI ministries and agencies (Finance, Transportation, Customs, Justice, etc.) that also operate at the border crossing. Without unity of command, or even unity of effort between the MOI, MOT, and other ministries, the Ports of Entry Directorate personnel have no choice but to compete for authority with representatives of other ministries.

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Government of Iraq should establish clear guidelines to facilitate unity of effort between the MOI and MOT for border security and move quickly to consolidate overall responsibility for border security under the MOI.*

Bringing unity of effort and centralized authority to all Iraqi ports of entry—land, sea, and air—will likely require the direct involvement of the Deputy Minister of Interior for Support Forces, the Minister of Interior, and possibly the attention of the Prime Minister as well. Because the current division of responsibility between the MOI and the MOT regarding land, sea, and air ports of entry has more to do with politics than with a logical, functional division of labor, a solution will not come overnight. In the near term, a good start would be allowing MOI personnel to work with MOT personnel at sea and air ports of entry and to participate in some aspects of inspection and administration.

> ***Finding:*** *The MOI has not created standardized concepts of operations, operating procedures, or processes for the Ports of Entry Directorate to apply at Iraq's land ports of entry; each appears to be run according to the initiative—or lack thereof—of the local commander.*

Policies and procedures at land ports of entry often defy logic. For example, at land ports of entry with Iran and Jordan, the contents of trucks from those nations are loaded into Iraqi-licensed vehicles and driven by Iraqi drivers through the land port of entry. Since the invasion in 2003, this downloading at the Iranian border has been conducted on the Iranian side of the border behind berms and fencing that block the view of Iraqi security forces. When the Iraqi trucks subsequently arrive at the Iraqi border, the inspections are cursory at best. Commissioners witnessed officials looking at the documentation provided by the driver and occasionally opening the door of a tractor-trailer, looking inside a van, or climbing over the loaded cargo. However, there was no evidence of cranes or forklifts to off-load and inspect cargo. Although the coordination now occurring between Iraqi and Jordanian land ports of entry will likely result in some improved efficiency, steady gains in effectiveness nationwide are unlikely absent standardized procedures and processes across all land ports of entry.

Equipment

> ***Finding:*** *Many land ports of entry have neither the quantity nor the quality of monitoring and detection systems required for border security operations to function effectively.*

The distribution of major security equipment to track people and goods crossing the borders at land ports of entry throughout the five regions is uneven and inadequate. Most land ports of

entry use outdated, inefficient systems to monitor cargo and track people.[190] At many border crossings, even this substandard equipment is either broken or nonexistent, as the Commission observed during visits to Zurbatiya, Trebil, and Walid. Backscatter radars, if assigned, are often inoperable, and there is a dire lack of the forklifts or cranes required to access cargo for inspection. The Commission saw no logical method for apportioning even this outdated equipment. Further, even if adequate and functioning systems were in place to screen cargo and track people, loopholes would remain. For example, there are limited mechanisms in place for the personnel working at the border crossings to share intelligence with local police, so that even a functioning watch list might prove somewhat ineffectual.

Lack of adequate security equipment has an immediate impact on the Ports of Entry Directorate's capacity to function. The Deputy Director of the Department of Border Enforcement estimated that 95 percent of all traffic entering or leaving Iraq by land passes through the land ports of entry. However, only a small amount of all traffic entering these ports of entry is inspected. Port directors do not have adequate technical or mechanical means to inspect a higher volume, and the lack of technological solutions and equipment causes huge backups at the land ports of entry—waiting lines of vehicles from neighboring countries sometimes exceed 10 miles. When commissioners visited the crossing at Walid, the backup from Iraq to Syria was estimated at 15 miles, and Border Transition Team members at Trebil on the Jordanian border estimated the wait to enter Iraq at three weeks.

> ***Recommendation:*** *The Coalition should continue to emphasize to the MOI that the territorial integrity of the country relies heavily on the Department of Border Enforcement's ability to secure the borders and that funding for detection and monitoring equipment for those forces should be accorded a very high priority to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of ports of entry security forces.*

The Ports of Entry Directorate requires facilities, infrastructure, and equipment that can better check incoming personnel and cargo at the land ports of entry; its needs include concrete ramps, tarmacs, and space to conduct inspections as well as equipment such as forklifts, cranes, backscatter radar, lighting systems, and metal detectors that will enable personnel to inspect cargo. Indeed, current backscatter systems may not be sufficiently rugged or powerful enough to make an impact at Iraqi border crossings. Gamma-ray scanners such as the VACIS machine—often used in the United States—would be more useful, but also far more costly for the MOI. A senior Ports of Entry Directorate official told the Commission that if Iraqi land ports of entry were equipped with even 10 percent of the equipment used by neighboring countries, the ports of entry would function adequately.[191] In addition to direct inspection equipment, the Department of Border Enforcement needs technical solutions such as electronic surveillance to monitor sections of the borders not covered by the department's current forts and annexes. In short, infiltration of foreign fighters, contraband, and weapons through the land ports of entry will likely continue until the necessary equipment, technology, and personnel to screen and inspect a greater percentage of incoming traffic and people are provided.

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[190] MNSTC-I Border Forces briefing, July 2007.

[191] Meeting with senior Ports of Entry Directorate official, July 2007.

Support Systems

Finding: *The Department of Border Enforcement lacks sufficient logistics, support systems, and infrastructure to sustain many of its forces in the field.*

Many of the logistics and support system challenges that plague the Army and other elements of the Iraqi security forces are also major problems for the Department of Border Enforcement. Maintaining equipment can be difficult, particularly because in some areas it is simply too dangerous to move vehicles and other large pieces of equipment to repair facilities. Centralization of distribution in the MOI can mean that access to appropriate quantities and types of arms and ammunition is impeded. Weapons are obtained by submitting a request memo to the director general of logistics, and units must pick up the requested goods at the MOI in Baghdad. Obtaining fuel is similarly complex, time-consuming, and bureaucratic. Logistics support exists at the local level with little assistance from the MOI. Port directors and Department of Border Enforcement commanders are generally left to their own devices to support their forces with what little money they receive from the central government.

Finally, living conditions and capacity appear problematic in some border stations. In some regions, there are significant challenges related to poor life support services and lack of area Forward Operating Bases, particularly in the southeast. There is also significant unevenness in quality among the installations at different ports of entry—ranging from adequate infrastructure and staffing at some to a lack of even basic buildings at others.[192]

Recommendation: *Coalition forces should strongly encourage the Department of Border Enforcement to implement its national Headquarters Distribution Plan while continuing to provide logistical and maintenance support in the near term so that Department of Border Enforcement and ports of entry personnel can accomplish their mission.*

The Department of Border Enforcement needs to establish a logistics system that is driven from the top down, satisfies the requirements of provincial and local commands, and accounts fully for all personal and unit equipment. Central to this system is a mechanism that reduces the need to travel great distances from the Department of Border Enforcement forts and annexes for vehicle maintenance. Another important element of a functioning distribution and support system would be a communications network that links Department of Border Enforcement locations with one another and with the nearest land ports of entry, providing a means to pass intelligence between port directors, Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate personnel, and the MOI. This system should also be centrally linked to the Iraqi Army and police.

[192] Meeting with senior Ministry of the Interior official, July 2007.

Corruption

Finding: *Corruption is a serious problem at many land ports of entry. This fact has not yet been adequately addressed.*

Corruption continues to erode the territorial integrity of Iraq by reducing the ability of the central government to legitimately collect import tariffs, by enabling contraband to pass undetected, and by undermining the efforts of the Department of Border Enforcement. The Commission found that even points of entry under Iraqi and Coalition control suffer from pervasive corruption. In addition, the presence of several ministries at a single land port of entry fosters corruption because multiple parties at each land port of entry can maneuver for a cut of a particular type of good (e.g., agricultural commodities). Moreover, it is likely that at least some ministries view border crossings permissively once they receive their own share of kickbacks. In addition, Iraqi and Coalition officials told the Commission that personnel at the border crossings are often discouraged from doing their jobs "too well," lest they disrupt lucrative smuggling operations that benefit senior-level officers in the MOI. To address these issues, the central government has changed leadership in some areas, taken punitive action in some instances, and at times has even sent delegations to try to address corruption at the border crossings, but these efforts have not been particularly successful.[193] Coalition forces are trying to stem existing corruption by training all border crossing personnel to a common standard and by using a "train the trainers" approach.

Two additional areas that provide ample opportunity for corruption are the taxation of people and goods entering the country and the transportation of fuel across the border. [194] Border Transition Team members told the Commission that large amounts of tax revenues never make it to the MOI, and in some cases tax revenues that arrive at the MOI are not ultimately deposited in the national treasury.[195] Transport of refined fuel into Iraq is another major source of corruption. The movement of fuel back and forth across borders for refinement and distribution provides ample opportunities for payoffs and fuel "skimming." Efforts to reduce opportunities for tampering with fuel distribution have been rejected as too expensive, but such dismissals may simply reflect an unwillingness to build new systems that reduce opportunities for corruption.

Recommendation: *Eliminating corruption will most likely be a generational undertaking in Iraq, but Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, and civilian agencies should work together to try to increase Border Transition Team oversight of Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate facilities, as well as to develop a standardized training program emphasizing leadership and professional ethics.*

Some short-term solutions can be put in place, such as an increased Border Transition Team presence at land ports of entry and more consistent punitive actions for those involved in corrupt practices at the border. However, corruption cannot be eliminated with a single training course or

[193] Corruption was so prevalent in Region 2 that the central government sent members of the Commission for Public Integrity to the port of entry; but because the investigators were Shi'a in a Sunni region, little was accomplished.
[194] Interviews with former Coalition Brigade Transition Team leads, June 2007.
[195] For example, one port of entry in May 2006 recorded collecting $2.3 million in taxes on the basis of a specific amount of traffic across the border. Seven months later, in December 2006, the same port of entry processed the same amount of traffic and collected only $300,000, with no explanation given for the discrepancy.

the implementation of an isolated new policy. It is a pervasive problem that will require real change within the Department of Border Enforcement and increased capacity—and, more importantly, will—in the MOI to exert central government authority over Iraqi border security.

Conclusion: Iraq's borders are porous. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor ministerial support from the MOI. Border forces often lack the equipment, infrastructure, and basic supplies to conduct their mission. Overall border security is further undermined by the division of responsibilities between the MOI and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external influence and infiltration are widespread. Absent major improvements in all these areas, Iraq's borders will remain porous and poorly defended.

CHAPTER 11. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Having responded to our Congressional tasking, the Commission would like to offer some additional thoughts relative to the findings and conclusions of our work. Though we were not asked specifically to comment on such related subjects as Iraqi governance, or the general trends associated with our ongoing national efforts, the three weeks the Commission spent on the ground in Iraq, coupled with the extraordinary access it was provided, enabled Commissioners to arrive at informed opinions with regard to the overall trends on Iraq. This final chapter offers a compendium of our thinking on the subject and provides some answers to the unasked question: "What does this all mean in terms of the future in Iraq?"

Assessment Recap. Though the overwhelming conclusion of the Commission is that the Iraqi government holds the key to the most pressing problem of sectarian violence, the progress of the Iraqi Army is certainly real. It is, however, limited to an increased capability to combat the internal security threats in Iraq. While still lacking in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces (most especially the Army) show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability.

The Ministry of Defense is assessed as being one of the better functioning agencies of the Iraqi government. There is evidence to show that the emerging Iraqi soldier is willing to fight against the declared enemies of the state, with some exceptions remaining along ethnic lines. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from Coalition forces. While a more advanced ability to function independently remains in the future, there is currently great focus on the requirements and capabilities necessary to achieve this long-term goal.

As the pace of development continues, we wish to underscore that the standard for acceptable Iraqi military readiness should not be "mirror imaged" to the U.S. standard. "Good enough" in terms of Iraqi military capabilities will indeed be "good enough." This is particularly true with regard to the development of logistics capacities.

The difference between the new Iraqi Army's ability to meet and overcome internal threats vice being capable of defending Iraq against external aggression is significant and must be well understood. While Iraq's Army, in particular, is moving toward greater capacity to achieve the former capability, the latter remains a future goal. This is to be expected, given the relatively short timeframe and the enormous task of rebuilding the Iraqi armed forces, which were defeated in 2003 and dismantled by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) policy directive.

The Commission noted the adverse effects of duplicate chains of command and intelligence structures within the government and concludes that they are redundant and unnecessary. They also fuel the perceptions of mistrust and sectarianism throughout the national defense community.

Offsetting the positive direction of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense is the less positive trend of Iraqi police development, and the distinctly negative trend found in the Ministry of

Interior. Sectarian partisanship, bureaucratic inefficiency, the Ministry of Interior's reputation for corruption, a near universal rejection of the National Police as currently formed and administered, and a weak and ineffective Department of Border Enforcement continue to impede Iraq's overall progress towards security and stability.

Bureaucratic bungling and ministerial incapacity are often perceived as intentional acts of sectarian bias. Achieving competence and transparency in ministerial operations and decision-making can ease this problem. While there have been some recent efforts by the Minister of Interior to reshape his ministry, much remains to be done.

The most visible sign of police success remains at the local level, where police units are organized along ethnic lines representative of their communities. The Commission believes that it should be acceptable for local police to reflect the ethno-sectarian makeup of the communities they serve. This pragmatic accommodation may be necessary until such time that national reconciliation efforts have succeeded in making sectarian and ethnic associations secondary to a prevailing sense of Iraqi national identity. The makeup of Iraq's police forces is key to bringing stability to the neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the Commission cannot report favorably on the current situation. This is due in large part to the government's failure to achieve consensus in establishing policies and practices that promote national reconciliation.

There are still too few indications that police units, the armed forces, and their respective ministries, work well together in the aggregate. National reconciliation efforts must recognize and seek to address perceptions, whether fact or fiction, that fuel sectarian animosity by improving ministerial capacity, increasing governmental transparency, and establishing more effective lines of communication between the government and all constituencies.

The Commission wishes to underscore the problems and delays associated with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system, as other official visitors to Iraq have recently reported. Any prolonged delays in providing equipment for which the Iraqi government has already paid directly hampers progress in developing Iraq's military capabilities. The Commission was surprised by the magnitude of the Foreign Military Sales problem in Iraq, and noted the extreme frustration it has caused our military commanders and the Iraqi government. The Department of Defense and the Department of State have been made aware of this problem. Commissioners who have significant career experience with the Foreign Military Sales system believe it is in need of major reform if it is to support our global policies. Foreign Military Sales as a national program is in need of overall reform, a fact well known to those of us who have served previously in senior positions.

The Surge. Much has been said about "the surge" in operations in the Baghdad region. Though not fully recognized, there have always been two principal participants in the implementation of this tactic; the Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition forces. The Iraqi component of the surge began in January 2007, and the U.S. surge contribution became operational in May of this year. The Commission wishes to underscore that the surge should not be viewed as the introduction of a new strategy. It is more accurate to describe it as a tactic supporting our overall national strategy in Iraq.

The surge, if successful, will play an important role in enabling the evolution of our strategy. There are signs of encouraging tactical successes in the Baghdad capital region, which remains the epicenter of enemy focus and of their competing strategy. Unable to achieve conventional military victory, the opposing forces must rely on spectacular bombing attacks on innocent Iraqi citizens, as well as ISF and Coalition forces. As the international media is mostly Baghdad-based, successful attacks receive disproportionate coverage relative to some very real progress achieved in other areas of the country, such as Anbar province. The result, unfortunately, is enemy momentum in the battle of strategic messaging despite the growing popular rejection of terrorist ideology in that region. The people's outrage at al Qaeda's savagery and their realization that it is a movement not of liberation but of occupation, has helped transform this province from being the most violent to being one of the least violent in Iraq. Coupled with the emerging capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces and the promise of the Coalition's "clear, hold, and build" tactic, there are some encouraging indications of a positive trend in this region.

Strategic Shift. The strategic implications of such continuing successes are encouraging. Coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, realigned, and re-tasked as the Iraqi Army is able to take on more responsibility for daily combat operations. The Commission finds it reasonable to believe that such adjustments could begin in early 2008, depending on the continuing rate of progress of the Iraqi Security Forces.

The circumstances of the moment may continue to present the opportunity for considering a shift in the disposition and employment of our forces. This could be characterized as a transition to a "strategic overwatch" posture. Such a strategy would include placing increasing responsibilities for the internal security of the nation on the ISF, especially in the urban areas. Coalition forces could be re-tasked to better ensure the territorial defense of the state by increasingly concentrating on the eastern and western borders and the active defense of the critical infrastructures essential to Iraq. Existing threats from Syria, coupled with the alarming increase in Iranian presence, and their combined threats to Iraq's stability, more than justify new strategic thinking. Though Iraq's armed forces are currently incapable of countering both internal security missions and the nation's external threats simultaneously, the Commission believes that the Iraqi Army has taken an important first step in proving its increasing competence in combating the nation's internal threats. The next step will come in time.

The Commission concludes that the evidence of Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. Left unaddressed, this escalating threat will most certainly have the effect of delaying efforts to resolve sectarian difficulties, provide security and stability in the nation, stimulate economic reform, enhance the rule of law, and fight corruption. The current rise of the Jaysh al-Mahdi in the region is evident, and the Iranian influence over the militant arm of this militia is increasing. It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used to "defeat" our armor protection comes across the border from Iran with relative impunity.

The Syrian border is more generally associated with the flow of foreign fighters, who are entering Iraq at an estimated rate of 75–80 per month. There are allegations that training camps for these fighters exist in Syria. Any increased Coalition presence capable of bringing focus to the border regions will help reduce the external threats facing Iraq and, the Commission believes, will

cause the two nations in question to reassess their current destabilizing policies and practices. The Commission believes that an "overwatch" strategy, focusing on the border regions, will more comprehensively address the most serious threats facing Iraq. A key to implementing any future plans to assist Iraqi Security Forces lies in maintaining the presence and the critical contributions of the various transition teams assigned by the Coalition to work with, train, and help develop Iraqi Security Force units; they represent indispensable links in our overall effort to transform the ISF.

Perceptions and reality are frequently at odds with each other when trying to understand Iraq's problems and progress. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the impressions drawn from seeing our massive logistics "footprint," our many installations, and the number of personnel (military and civilian), especially in and around the Baghdad region. The unintended message conveyed is one of "permanence", an occupying force, as it were. What is needed is the opposite impression, one that is lighter, less massive, and more expeditionary. The decision to occupy Saddam Hussein's former palace complex with our military headquarters, while expedient in 2003, has most likely given the wrong impression to the Iraqi population. We recommend that careful consideration of the size of our national footprint in Iraq be reconsidered with regard to its efficiency, necessity, and its cost. Significant reductions, consolidations, and realignments would appear to be possible and prudent.

The Commission believes that it would be important to establish an Iraqi-Coalition Transition Headquarters designed to shape, coordinate, and monitor all aspects of transition efforts. Such a headquarters should be composed of Iraqi and Coalition civilian and military personnel, and should be jointly led by senior civilian authorities. In this manner, momentum of transition could be carefully monitored, recorded, and future plans could be more visible than they are at present. For all of its great work, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq is not designed to be such a headquarters, though it would certainly play a critical role were one to be established. Visible and consistent progress toward transition ought to be one of the most important efforts of our presence in Iraq.

Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). To further reinforce the image that we are not "occupiers" in Iraq, the Commission recommends that consideration be given to implementing two additional efforts. The first is to reform the system by which we transfer authority to the Iraqi government. The current process seeks to apply standard criteria to each of Iraq's 18 provinces in order to determine when total responsibility should be transferred to regional authorities.

To date, 7 out of 18 provinces have been transferred under this system. Upon close inspection however, the Commission was unable to conclude that current metrics for transfer of control were being uniformly applied to each province. Further, the Commission became convinced that the conditions in many of Iraq's 18 provinces are so diverse that a uniform standard cannot be achieved, to include those pertaining to security and stability. Disparities are most visible when conditions in northern Iraq (Kurdish region) and southern Iraq (Shi'a region) are compared. In the north, three provinces have been transferred to Provisional Iraqi Control and one finds evidence of good governance, stability, security, a functioning police force, a developing economy, and public order. In the south, where four provinces have been transferred to Provisional Iraqi Control, conditions are completely different as evidenced by the rise of the Iranian-influenced Jaysh al-Mahdi, Shi'a-on-Shi'a violence, and excessive militia influence. Recently, as if to underscore the

point, two southern governors have been assassinated. Nonetheless, considerations are under way to transfer Basra to Provincial Iraqi Control. Such a decision would be enthusiastically supported by the British Regional Coalition commander (Multi-National Force–South) who considers his forces to be an impediment to progress in the region.

The Commission believes that each of Iraq's provinces should be transferred to Iraqi control as a matter of policy. The existing PIC system is not an effective vehicle; it is difficult to understand, impossible to apply uniformly, and actually impedes momentum and progress toward goals which should be to cede to Iraqi governmental institutions at the local, regional and national levels as much authority and responsibility as possible.

Such transfer of authority should be supplemented by the necessary levels of mentoring and assistance to ensure success. The Commission has discovered that the Government of Iraq wishes to be given control and responsibility for all of its provinces. Our current policy of determining when a province may or may not be controlled by its own government reinforces the popular perception of the Coalition as an occupation force. This may contribute to increased violence and instability. Granting Iraq full control of its provinces is symbolically important and vests the Iraqi government with the responsibility it needs in order to mature and develop. The workload of the Coalition resulting from such a policy would be unchanged.

The Commission wishes to emphasize that there is a fine line between assistance and dependence. Identifying those areas in which Iraqis can do things on their own, even if in ways different from those we prefer, should be acceptable wherever possible. Additional focus and help in improving the infrastructure of the country, and an increasing capability to ensure general access to basic needs such as water, power, fuel, schools, and public sanitation, will have a large impact in gaining popular support for the central, regional, and local governments.

Status of Forces Agreement. The second recommendation the Commission wishes to offer is that consideration be given to pursuing an agreement akin to a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Government of Iraq. Appropriately drawn, it would have the effect of codifying our relationship with the host nation, reinforcing its sovereignty and independence, and would be consistent with other such agreements we enjoy with many nations where we have a military presence. Ancillary to such an agreement, we believe that all our bases in Iraq should demonstrate evidence of Iraqi national sovereignty (Iraqi headquarters and national flag). Placing Iraqi units close to Coalition forces, when and where possible, will have a positive effect on the development of national security forces.

Goals and Benchmarks. Before closing, the Commission emphasizes the vital importance of setting strategic goals, benchmarks, and metrics designed to serve the needs of all "stakeholders", including commanders, public policymakers, and the public. Such goals must be part of all planning and implementation efforts and must be among the most visible aspects of our mission to restore Iraq to its rightful and respectable place among nations.

Concluding Thoughts. The Commission wishes to thank Congress for the opportunity to conduct an independent review of the capabilities of the security forces of Iraq. While much remains to be done before success can be confidently declared, the strategic consequences of failure, or even

perceived failure, for the United States and the Coalition are enormous. We approach a truly strategic moment in this still young century. Iraq's regional geo-strategic position, the balance of power in the Middle East, the economic stability made possible by the flow of energy to many parts of the world, and the ability to defeat and contain terrorism where it is most manifest are issues that do not lend themselves to easy or quick solutions. How we respond to them, however, could well define our nation in the eyes of the world for years to come.

At the end of the day, however, the future of Iraq and the prospects for establishing a professional, effective, and loyal military and police service, hinges on the ability of the Iraqi people and the government to begin the process of achieving national reconciliation and to ending sectarian violence. For the time being, all progress seems to flow from this most pressing requirement.

APPENDIX A: MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.)

General James L. Jones (Ret.) is currently president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for 21st Century Energy. On February 1, 2007, General Jones completed 40 years of active duty service in the Marine Corps. His most senior assignments in uniform included duties as Commandant of the Marine Corps (1999-2003), Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (2003-2006), and Commander, U.S. European Command (2003-2006). During a period of great transformation of the Alliance's expeditionary capabilities and seeking to increase better agility and mobility in the forward presence of U.S. forces in Europe and Africa, General Jones advocated for greater strategic focus and understanding of the 21st century threats to our nation and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

General John Abrams, USA (Ret.)

General John Abrams, U.S. Army (Ret.), currently serves on the Board of Directors of the Virginia National Defense Industrial Authority. He retired from the U.S. Army in 2003. General Abrams commanded the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and was one of the primary architects of the "Army of the 21st Century." He began his military career as a tank crewman in 1966 and, over the next 36 years, rose from private to four-star general. He is also President of Abrams Learning and Information Systems, Inc.

Lieutenant General Martin R. Berndt, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Martin R. Berndt (Ret.) retired from the Marine Corps in October 2005, having served for 36 years. He was privileged to serve as an infantry officer in a variety of service and joint billets, completing his career as Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Europe, and South. He currently serves as a senior mentor to the Marine Corps and U.S. Joint Forces Command. Additionally, he serves on the North Carolina Military Foundation and as a director with several private and public businesses.

General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.)

General Charles G. Boyd, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), became president and CEO of Business Executives for National Security (BENS) in May of 2002. Before joining BENS, he served as Senior Vice President and Washington Program Director of the Council on Foreign Relations. General Boyd was commissioned through the aviation cadet program in July 1960 and retired in 1995 after 35 years of service. General Boyd was the only Vietnam POW to achieve four-star rank, and his final military

assignment was as Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command. Following his retirement from active duty, he served as the director of the 21st Century International Legislators Project for the Congressional Institute, Inc., and strategy consultant to then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. He currently serves as a member of the Board of Directors of the Nixon Center; DRS Technologies, Inc.; Forterra Systems, Inc.; and In-Q-Tel.

Command Sergeant Major Dwight J. Brown, USA (Ret.)

Command Sergeant Major Dwight J. Brown, a native of Lexington, Kentucky, enlisted in the Army in January 1973. He is a graduate of the United States Army Sergeant Major Academy, First Sergeants Course, Army Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, Drill Sergeant School, Operations and Intelligence (Battle Staff) Course, and the Joint Fire Power Air Ground Operations Course. His assignments have included five tours in the Federal Republic of Germany: the 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment, Fulda/Bad Hersfeld; three tours in 1st Armored Division, Katterback/Ansbach, Erlangen, and Bad Kreuznach; and the 8th Infantry Division, Mainz. His deployments include Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia; Operation Restore/Continue Hope, Somalia; Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti; Hurricane Andrew Relief, Florida; Operations Joint Guard/Forge, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Operation Enduring Freedom; and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Command Sergeant Major Brown served as the Command Sergeant Major, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, from August 4, 2000, to August 1, 2004. He retired from the military on August 1, 2004, after more than 31 years of military service and went on to found D. Brown and Associates, a small, service-disabled veteran-owned business.

The Honorable Terrance Gainer

Terrance Gainer is a decorated veteran who served in the Vietnam War and as a captain in the United States Naval Reserve until 2000. During his law enforcement career, Gainer served as Deputy Inspector General of Illinois, Deputy Director of the Illinois State Police, and in the United States Department of Transportation before he was appointed as Director of the Illinois State Police in March 1991. Chief Gainer spent 20 years as a homicide detective with the Chicago Police Department. Ultimately his superior legal skills were put to use as the department's Chief Legal Counsel. Gainer went on to serve as Executive Assistant Police Chief, second in command of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, beginning in March 1998, and as Chief of the United States Capitol Police from June 2, 2002, to March 3, 2006. On November 14, 2006, Gainer was appointed by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) as the Sergeant-at-Arms of the U.S. Senate for the 110th United States Congress.

The Honorable John J. Hamre

John Hamre was elected CSIS president and chief executive officer in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). As comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for 10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During that time he was primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research, and development programs; defense budget issues; and relations with the Senate Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. Hamre served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became its Deputy Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs. In that position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Colonel Michael Heidingsfield, USAF (Ret.)

Colonel Michael Heidingsfield served from 1991 to 1998 as the Chief of Police and Director of Public Safety for the City of Scottsdale, Arizona. Following his first three years of law enforcement service with the University of Texas System Police, Colonel Heidingsfield served with the Arlington (TX) Police Department from 1978 to 1991, leaving there as the Senior Deputy Police Chief after having been selected through a nationwide recruitment process to lead the Scottsdale Police Department. At the time of his retirement from the City of Scottsdale, he was accorded the title of Chief of Police Emeritus. Prior to the start of his law enforcement career, Colonel Heidingsfield served as an active duty Air Force officer and retired in 2004 as a full colonel in the U.S. Air Force Reserve assigned to the Security Forces Directorate at the Pentagon. Following his retirement from the military, he served from 2004 to 2006 as the State Department's first Contingent Commander for the Police Advisory Mission in Iraq. Colonel Heidingsfield is currently the president and CEO of the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission in Memphis, Tennessee.

Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, USN (Ret.)

Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, U.S. Navy (Ret.), served as former Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe. Since retiring in December 2004, Admiral Johnson has founded Snow Ridge Associates, which provides strategic advice and counsel. While in the U.S. Navy, he oversaw the successful implementation of NATO's Operation Active Endeavor, assumed command of the NATO Response Force at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, and was responsible for the establishment of NATO's training support mission in Iraq. He was also assigned to several senior policy positions in Washington, most notably serving as the executive assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff (1992 to 1993) and military assistant to the Secretary of Defense (1999 to 2000). Admiral Johnson also is also chairman of Snow Ridge Associates, which provides strategic advice and counsel; is active in community and civic affairs; and serves on several for-profit and nonprofit boards.

General George Joulwan, USA (Ret.)

General George A. Joulwan, U.S. Army (Ret.), is currently President of One Team, Inc., a strategic consulting firm. He retired from the Army in 1997 after 40 years of service in war and peace, including two combat tours of Vietnam. From 1990 to 1997, he was the Commander in Chief of both U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command, as well as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In 1992 he helped facilitate a peace agreement with the FMLN insurgents and the government of El Salvador. He also developed a successful strategic counternarcotics plan linking more than 40 U.S. agencies and several Central and South American nations. In 1995, as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Joulwan was the architect of NATO's Bosnian Operation, which ended the vicious atrocities in that country without one NATO hostile fatal casualty in over ten years of engagement. General Joulwan was also instrumental in developing the U.S. State Partnership Program and NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, which included former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine among them.

Lieutenant General James C. King, USA (Ret.)

Lieutenant General King is the President and CEO of Athena Innovative Solutions, Inc. During his 33 years in the U.S. Army, he was involved in foreign and national security policy formulation and implementation, intelligence operations, and leadership of large organizations. He led the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, a Department of Defense and National Intelligence Agency composed of 13,000 employees and contractors, created as a result of the merger of eight distinct organizations. He served as the principal architect for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance input for information superiority and information operations planning and implementation for the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was responsible for implementing one of the largest digital information management acquisition programs in government, and led the Department of Defense and intelligence community effort to establish a national collaborative environment.

Assistant Chief Constable Duncan McCausland, PSNI

Duncan McCausland joined the Northern Irish Police Service in 1983 and served as a Constable and Sergeant in Belfast and Dungannon. He was promoted to the rank of Inspector in 1991 and to Chief Inspector in 1995. He was transferred on appointment to Superintendent in 1998 and took charge of Dungannon as Sub-Divisional Commander. In 2000, he returned to Headquarters as Head of Command Secretariat. From February 2001 until April 2002 he was Staff Officer to the Chief Constable. In March 2002 he was promoted to Chief Superintendent. On October 6, 2003, he was appointed Assistant Chief Constable Urban Region, including Belfast City, based at Castlereagh. As ACC Urban, he is responsible for the provision of effective professional policing within 12 District Command Units, utilizing some 4,600 police and civilian support staff.

Lieutenant General Gary S. McKissock, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Gary S. McKissock (Ret.) is the former Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics. Since leaving active service, McKissock has served on the board of both the Sapient Corp. of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Acorn Growth Companies of Midwest City, Oklahoma. Additionally, he has served as an executive fellow at the Institute for Defense and Business in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and is founder and principal of CorpsStrategy LLC, a consulting firm specializing in organizational planning.

Sergeant Major Alford McMichael, USMC (Ret.)

Alford L. McMichael is the founder and president of the 4-DREW Foundation, a foundation that supports children at risk. He also provides counseling to young men at two Catholic high schools in Harlem and the Bronx, where he teaches the importance of pursuing excellence in all endeavors in life. He has served on three congressional task forces on sexual assault in the military services, on the military academies, and on domestic violence and sexual harassment. Sergeant Major McMichael served as the 14th Sergeant Major of the United States Marine Corps from 1999 to 2003, and from 2003 to 2006 served as the 1st Sergeant Major in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He retired from the United States Marine Corps in October 2006 after 36 years of service.

Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA (Ret.)

Brigadier General Richard Potter, U.S. Army (Ret.), currently serves as a senior advisor to Sierra Nevada Corporation–Integrated Mission Systems. After a distinguished 35-year career in the military, Brigadier General Potter retired in 1994 from his post as Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command. Since 1995, he has provided independent consulting services specializing in high-tech firms and companies within the defense industry, including Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Jacobs-Sverdrup, ACS Defense, Gray Hawk Systems, Inc., and Areté Associates. Additionally, he has served as a consultant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence (ASDC4I), the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), as well as with the Department of the Army and other government agencies on special projects both domestically and abroad.

Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (Ret.)

Arnold Punaro is a retired Marine Corps Major General who served as Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division (1997–2000) and Director of Reserve Affairs at Marine Corps

Headquarters during the post-9/11 peak reserve mobilization periods. Following active duty service in Vietnam, he was mobilized three times: for Operation Desert Shield in the first Gulf War, to command Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Fwd) in Bosnia and Macedonia, and for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. He worked on Capitol Hill for 24 years for Senator Sam Nunn and served as his Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee for 14 years. He is currently Executive Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation. He is also chairing the Independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves established by Congress in 2005.

Chief Charles H. Ramsey

Charles H. Ramsey served as Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department from April 1998 to December 2006, making him the longest-serving chief of the MPDC since home rule was granted to the District of Columbia in 1973. He has since served as consultant to the U.S. Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Under Chief Ramsey's leadership as Chief, the MPDC regained its reputation as a national leader in urban policing: crime rates declined by approximately 40 percent, community policing and traffic safety programs were expanded, and MPDC recruiting and hiring standards, training, equipment, facilities, and fleet were all dramatically upgraded. His notable initiatives included a September 1998 reorganization of the Department that put more police resources in the community, cut bureaucracy, and enhanced accountability by creating a system of Regional Operations Commands. The Chief also oversaw a multimillion-dollar upgrade to district stations and other Department facilities, as well as new communications and information technology, including mobile data computing and the 3-1-1 non-emergency system. Chief Ramsey redefined the Department's community policing mission to focus on crime prevention. The program he instituted, Policing for Prevention, encompassed law enforcement, neighborhood-based partnerships and problem solving, and systemic prevention efforts. Prior to joining the Metropolitan Police Department, Chief Ramsey served for 29 years in the Chicago Police Department (1968–1998), retiring as a Deputy Superintendent of Police. While serving in this capacity he developed the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) that has been internationally recognized as an innovative community policing model.

Chief John F. Timoney

John Timoney was appointed Chief of Police of the Miami Police Department on January 2, 2003, after serving one year as CEO of an international private investigation and security company in New York City. He has served four years as the Police Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, where he commanded a diverse police force of approximately 7,000 officers and over 900 civilian employees in the fifth-largest metropolitan city in the United States. Prior to that Chief Timoney spent more than 29 years with the New York Police Department, eventually becoming the youngest four-star chief in the department's history.

Lieutenant General John A. Van Alstyne, USA (Ret.)

John A. Van Alstyne is a career infantry officer with 36 years of service. In his last assignment on active duty, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy. He currently serves as Commandant, Corps of Cadets, Texas A&M.

General Charles Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.)

A career infantry officer and a veteran of combat operations in Vietnam, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia, General Wilhelm commanded Marine units at every level, from Rifle Platoon and Company Commander in Vietnam to Commander of the II Marine Expeditionary Force and all Marine forces in the Atlantic, Europe, and South America. In his final military assignment, he served as Commander of the United States Southern Command, where he was responsible for all U.S. military activities with the 32 nations of the Caribbean and Central and South America. General Wilhelm currently serves as Vice President and Director of Battelle's Office of Homeland Security.

APPENDIX B: ENABLING LEGISLATION

SECTION 1314(e)(2) – Page 14

ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPABILITIES OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Defense, $750,000, that the Department, in turn, will commission an independent, private sector entity, which operates as a 501(c)(3), with recognized credentials and expertise in military affairs, to prepare an independent report assessing the following:

(i) The readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, and bringing greater security to Iraq's 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and bringing an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation.

(ii) The training, equipping, command, control and intelligence capabilities, and logistics capacity of the ISF.

(iii) The likelihood that, given the ISF's record of preparedness to date, following years of training and equipping by U.S. forces, the continued support of U.S. troops will contribute to the readiness of the ISF to fulfill the missions outlined in clause (i).

(B) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, the designated private sector entity shall provide an unclassified report, with a classified annex, containing its findings, to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, Foreign Relations/ International Relations, and Intelligence.

APPENDIX C: INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED DURING ASSESSMENT

Current and Former United States Officials

U.S. Civilian Officials

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England

Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns – *Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs*

Ambassador Ryan Crocker – *U.S. Ambassador to Iraq*

Ambassador Charles Snyder – *Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs*

Ambassador Marcie Ries – *Political Military Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad*

Ambassador David Satterfield – *Senior Advisor to Secretary of State Rice and Coordinator of Iraq Policy*

Dr. Meghan O'Sullivan – *National Security Council*

Ms. Betsy Philips – *Head of Joint Strategy, Plans, and Assessments Office, U.S. Embassy Baghdad*

Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Kimmitt – *Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East*

U.S. Military Officials

The White House

Lieutenant General Douglas Lute – *Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan Policy and Implementation*

The Joint Staff

General Peter Pace – *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani – *Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Plans and Policy, J-5

Lieutenant General John Sattler – *Director, Plans and Policy, Joint Staff*

Major General Philip Breedlove, USAF – *Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff*

Colonel Joseph di Salvo – *Iraq Division Chief, J-5*

Colonel Sean MacFarland – *Iraq Division Chief, J-5*

Lieutenant Colonel Larry Reeves – *Iraq Division, J-5*

Lieutenant Colonel Andrea Begel – *Iraq Division, J-5*

Central Command

Admiral William Fallon – *Commander, U.S. Central Command*

Multi-National Force–Iraq

General David Petraeus – *Commanding General, Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Major General John Paxton – *Chief of Staff, Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Major General Mastin M. Robeson – *Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Major General Douglas Stone – *Deputy Commanding General, Detainee Operations, Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Major General Michael Barbaro – *Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Brigadier General Kevin Bergner – *Spokesman, Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Colonel Lawrence Morris – *Law and Order Task Force, Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Colonel Ken Tovo – *Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force*

Colonel M. Fugues -- *Multi-National Force–Iraq, G-5*

Commodore Nicholas Lambert (U.K.) – *Combined Task Force 158, Royal Navy*

Captain Robert Sanguinetti (U.K.) – *Combined Task Group 158, Royal Navy*

Lieutenant Commander Nicholas Wheeler (U.K.) – *Combined Task Force 158 Liaison Officer to Multi-National Division South East*

Command Sergeant Major Marvin Hill – *Command Sergeant Major, Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Michael F. Walther – *Law and Order Task Force, Multi-National Force–Iraq*

Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Lieutenant General James Dubik – *Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and Commander, NATO Training Mission–Iraq*

Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey – *Former Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq*

Major General Berraghan (U.K.) – *Chief Coalition Advisor, Baghdad Operations Center*

Rear Admiral Edward Winters – *Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq*

Colonel Michael Fuller – *Training and Education, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq*

Colonel Juan Arcocha – *J-4, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq*

Colonel David Dornblasser – *FMS, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq*

Mr. John Cochrane – *Coalition Advisor, Ministry of Defense Transition Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq*

Mr. Dan Maguire – *Intelligence Transition Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq*

Command Sergeant Major Tommy Williams – *Command Sergeant Major, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq*

Coalition Police Assistance Training Team, MNSTC-I

Major General Ken Hunzeker – *Former Commanding General, Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Brigadier General Mike Jones – *Commanding General, Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Brigadier General Pettit – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Brigadier General Robert Weighill (U.K.) – *Deputy Commanding General for MOI Capability, Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Brigadier General David Phillips – *Deputy Commanding General for MOI Forces, Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Colonel Alexander – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Colonel Mark French – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Colonel Brown – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Colonel Buechler – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Colonel Galloucis, *Police Training Team Leader, Baghdad*

Lieutenant Colonel Tye – *Coalition Advisor, Ports of Entry Directorate*

Lieutenant Colonel Goodrich – *Coalition Advisor, Border Security*

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Winn – *Former Lead, Border Transition Team, Region 2*

Major Bain – *Ports of Entry Transition Team, Walid*

Major Yi – *Ports of Entry Transition Team, Trebil*

Major Anthony Lamb – *Border Transition Team Leader*

Major Tom Harris – *National Police Transition Team Chief*

Major Phil Stauffacher – *Former Border Transition Team Lead, Trebil Port of Entry*

Captain Padill – *Border Transition Team, Trebil*

First Lieutenant Michael Warren – *Aamel Iraqi Police, Police Transition Team Leader*

Mr. Stephen Mangino – *U.S. DHS, Attaché and DHS Country Coordinator*

Mr. Walter Redman – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Ms. Kimberly Riffe – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Mr. Rick Andy – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Mr. George Murray – *Coalition Police Assistance Training Team*

Mr. James Davis – *Legal Attaché, Major Crimes Task Force*

Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Brigadier General Robin Swan – *Iraqi Army Coordinator, Commander, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team*

Brigadier General Dice Allardice – *Commander, Coalition Air Force Training Team*

Captain Keith Harvey (U.K.) – *Advisor to the Head of the Iraqi Navy*

Captain Tim Stockings (U.K.) – *Commander, Naval Transition Team*

Colonel Andrew Bristow – *10 Iraqi Army, Military Transition Team Chief*

Colonel Pat Matlock – *Commander, Blackjack Military Transition Team, 4-9 Cavalry*

Colonel Pollock – *Military Transition Team Commander, 6th Iraqi Army*

Colonel Diemer – *Director, COIN Academy*

Colonel Mike Smith – *Chief, 3rd Iraqi Division Military Transition Team*

Colonel Steed – *Chief, Military Transition Team with Iraqi Ground Forces Command*

Colonel Chris Mitchell – *Chief, 2nd Iraqi Division Military Transition Team*

Colonel Amato – *Chief, Iraqi Army Division Military Transition Team*

Colonel Hall – *Coalition Military Assistance Training Team*

Colonel Ferral – *Coalition Military Assistance Training Team*

Colonel Johnson – *Coalition Military Assistance Training Team*

Colonel Bryant – *Coalition Military Assistance Training Team*

Lieutenant Colonel Shell – *Deputy Chief, Military Assistance Team, 1st Brigade, 3rd Iraqi Army Division*

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Walsh – *Military Transition Team, 4th Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division*

Lieutenant Dildar -- *Coalition Military Assistance Training Team*

Major W. Caldwell – *Team Leader, Military Transition Team*

Major Kevin Nicholas – *Iraqi Army, Military Transition Team*

Captain Ferguson – *Coalition Military Assistance Training Team*

Captain Shrewsbury – *Coalition Military Assistance Training Team*

Lieutenant Biet – *Department of Border Enforcement Military Transition Team*

Ms. King – *Ministry of Defense Transition Team*

Mr. Chessnoe – *Ministry of Defense Transition Team*

Mr. Horne – *Ministry of Defense Transition Team*

Mr. Prince – *Ministry of Defense Transition Team*

Multi-National Corps–Iraq

Lieutenant General Ray Odierno – *Commander, Multi-National Corps–Iraq*

Lieutenant General Rich Zilmer – *Former Commander, Multi-National Force-West*

Major General Robert Neller – *Former Deputy Commanding General for Operations, Multi-National Force-West*

Major General Walt Gaskin – *Commander, Multi-National Division West, U.S. II Marine Expeditionary Force*

Major General Rick Lynch – *Commander, Multi-National Division Center, U.S. 3rd Infantry Division*

Major General Randy Mixon – *Commander, Multi-National Division North, U.S. 25th Infantry Division*

Major General Graham Binns (UK) – *Multi-National Corps–Iraq*

Brigadier General Jim Huggins – *Deputy Commander, Multi-National Division Center*

Brigadier General James Yarbrough – *Commander, Iraqi Assistance Group*

Brigadier General John Allen – *Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West, II Marine Expeditionary Force*

Brigadier General Vincent Brooks – *Acting Division Commander, Multinational Division Baghdad, U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division*

Brigadier General Charles Gurganus – *Commanding General, Ground Combat Element, Multi-National Force-West*

Colonel Charlie Flynn – *82nd Airborne, Multi-National Corps–Iraq*

Colonel John Charlton – *Commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division*

Colonel Paul Funk – *Commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division*

Colonel Richard Simcock – *Commander, Regimental Combat Team 6, Multi-National Forces-West*

Lieutenant Colonel Swindell – *Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Multi-National Division-Center*

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr – *Commander, Command Operations Post Cleary, 1-15 Infantry*

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Frank – *Battalion Commander, 1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division*

Command Sergeant Major Clifford Dockter – *1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division*

Sergeant Major Rodney Lewis – *1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division*

Captain Sean Lyons – *COP Attack, Multi-National Corps–Iraq*

Chief Warrant Officer 5 Terry Walker – *Multi-National Forces - West*

Command Sergeant Major Citola – *Multi-National Corps Iraq*

Command Sergeant Major Burrows – *Iraqi Assistance Group*

First Sergeant Jeffrey Griffith – *COP Attack, Multi-National Corps–Iraq*

Sergeant Smith – *1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division*

Specialist Benner – *1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division*

Specialist Riahi – *1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division*

Private First Class Graff – *1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division*

NATO Training Command–Iraq

Major General Pompegnani – *Commander, NATO Training Command–Iraq*

Current and Former Iraqi Officials

Iraqi Civilian Officials

President Jalal Talabani – *State President of Iraq*

Deputy Minister Barham Salih – *Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq*

His Excellency Abdul-Qader al-Obeidi – *Minister of Defense*

Deputy Minister Maliki – *Deputy Minister of Defense*

Major General Mahmood – *Director General of Programs and Budgets, Ministry of Defense*

Dr. Mumtaz – *Director General of Personnel, Ministry of Defense*

Mr. Abid Ali Jasim – *Director General of Armaments and Supply, Ministry of Defense*

Mr. Mudhfar – *Director General of Contracts and Purchases, Ministry of Defense*

Major General Kamal – *Director, National Information and Investigation Agency*

His Excellency Samir Shakir M. Sumaida'ie – *Iraqi Ambassador to the United States*

Dr. Bassima Al Jaidri – *Advisor to Prime Minister Maliki*

Iraqi Military Officials

General Faruq – *Office of the Commander in Chief*

General Mohan – *Iraqi Commander, Basra Operations Command*

Lieutenant General Ali – *Commander, Iraqi Ground Forces Command*

Lieutenant General Aboud – *Commander, Baghdad Operations Center*

Lieutenant General Talib Kinani – *Commander, Counter Terrorism Bureau*

Lieutenant General Abdulrazzak – *Joint Headquarters, M-3*

Lieutenant General Aboud – *Commander, Baghdad Operations Center*

Lieutenant-General Kamal al-Barzanji – *Commander, Iraqi Air Force*

Major General Khorsheed – *Commander, 3rd Division Iraqi Army*

Major General Abu Ghani – *Commander, Government of Iraq Counter-Terrorism Command*

Major General Abdul Amir – *Commander, 6th Iraqi Army*

Major General Ala'a – *Deputy Head of Iraqi Air Force*

Major General Jassim – *Joint Headquarters, M-7*

Major General Kamal – *Joint Headquarters, M-2*

Major General Othman – *Joint Headquarters, M-1*

Major General Jawdat – *Joint Headquarters, M-4*

Rear Admiral Muhammad Jawad Kadhim – *Head of the Iraqi Navy*

Brigadier General Kahleel – *Iraqi Air Force*

Brigadier General Qaid – *Iraqi Air Force*

Brigadier General Kareem – *Iraqi Air Force*

Brigadier General Fadhil al Berwari – *Commanding Officer, Iraqi Special Operations Forces*

Brigadier General Alaa – *Comptroller, Joint Headquarters*

Brigadier General Muttah – *Commander, 2nd Iraqi Army Division*

Colonel Abdul Rahim – *Commanding Officer, Iraqi Counterinsurgency School, Iraqi Army*

Commander Ahmed Maarij – *Operational Commander, Iraqi Navy*

Captain Nasir – *Patrol Base Whiskey 1, Iraqi Army 6th Division*

Sergeant Major Kassam – *Iraqi Ground Forces Command*

Iraqi Ministry of the Interior

Ministry of the Interior Officials

His Excellency Jawad al-Bolani – *Minister of the Interior*

Major General Admed al-Khafaji – *Deputy Minister of the Interior for Support Forces*

Deputy Minister Adnan al-Assadi – *Deputy Minister of the Interior for Administration*

Deputy Minister Hala Shakir – *Deputy Minister of the Interior for Financial Affairs*

Major General Jihan – *Director of Training and Qualification, Ministry of the Interior*

Major General Jodah – *Assistant Deputy Minister, Iraqi Police Service Affairs/Security*

Major General Jawad – *Director of Contracts, Ministry of the Interior*

Brigadier General Farhoud – *Ports of Entry Directorate, Ministry of the Interior*

Brigadier General Jasim – *Ports of Entry Directorate, Ministry of the Interior*

Iraqi Police Service and National Police

Major General Mahdi Juma'a Salma al-Salami – *Dean, Baghdad Police College*

Major General Jasim Hassam Attia – *Dean, High Institute, Baghdad Police College*

Major General Ameer – *Director of Logistics, Baghdad Police College*

Brigadier General Khalid Adulani – *Dean of Police Academy*

Major General Khadim Hamid Shi'wa al-Mohammadadawi – *Baghdad, Provincial Director of Police*

Brigadier General Baha – *Commander, 5th Division 2nd Battalion Iraqi National Police*

Deputy Minister Sinjari –*Deputy Minister of Interior, Kurdish Region*

General Jamal Ahmad Muhamad – *Provincial Police Chief, Sulaymaniyah*

Major General Hussein al Awadi – *National Police Commander*

Outside Experts

Dr. Jon Alterman – *Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies*

General John Abizaid (Ret.) – *Former Commander, U.S. Central Command*

Dr. Stephen Biddle – *Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

Dr. Anthony Cordesman – *Center for Strategic and International Studies*

Colonel Paul Hughes (Ret.) – *Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace*

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan – *Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute*

Dr. Phebe Marr – *Leading U.S. Expert on Iraq, Author of The Modern History of Iraq*

Mr. Robert Perito – *Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace*

Ms. Sarah Farnsworth – *Strategic Advisor*

The Honorable Patrick T. Henry – *Strategic Advisor*

Mr. John Raidt – *Strategic Advisor*

Colonel Arthur White, USMC (Ret.) – *Strategic Advisor*

Note: *The Commission has made every attempt to list all individuals consulted during the course of its work. Despite best efforts, the Commission recognizes this list does not include many of the members of the U.S. and Coalition forces and the Iraqi Security Forces who spent time with the Commissioners on the ground in Iraq.*

APPENDIX D: REVIEW OF MAJOR REPORTS & ANALYSES

United States Government Sources

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Department of Defense

Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, (U.S. Department of State & U.S. Department of Defense), July 2005.

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- July 2005
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Government Accountability Office

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Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, (GAO), Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

United States Congress

Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, July 2007

Statement of Admiral William J. Fallon, United States Navy Commander, United States Central Command, House Armed Services Committee, April 2007

Testimony by Gerald F. Burke, House Armed Services Committee, April 2007

Testimony by Robert M. Perito, *Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police and Facilities Protection Service*, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 2007

Testimony by Olga Oliker, *Iraqi Security Forces: Defining Challenges and Assessing Progress*, House Armed Services Committee, March 2007

Testimony by Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, USA, Commander Multinational Security Transitional Command Iraq, Hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, June 2007

Congressional Research Service

Jeremy M. Sharp, *The Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences*, Congressional Research Service, January 2007

Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, Congressional Research Service, April 2007

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The Baker-Hamilton Commission, *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – A New Approach*, December 2006

Lionel Beehner, *Iraq: Militia Groups*, Council on Foreign Relations, June 2005

Stephen Biddle

- *A Gamble at Very Long Odds*, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2007
- *Hard Bargaining: If President Bush is Committed to Fighting on in Iraq, Then He Needs a Fundamentally Different Military Strategy -- One that Offers the Only Realistic Chance of Compelling a Ceasefire Between Iraq's Warring Factions,"* Boston Globe, June 2007

Anthony H. Cordesman

- *Still Losing? Measuring Stability in Iraq*, June 2007
- *Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: The Critical Problems and Failures the US Must Address if Iraqi Forces Are to Do the Job*, March 2007
- *Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida*, July 2007

Mohammed Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom*, USIP, 2007

Frederick W. Kagan, *Iraqi Security Forces: Status and Prospects*, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 2007

Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, *The New Strategy in Iraq: General Petraeus Learns from Past U.S. Mistakes*, July 2007

Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report*, 1993

Colonel Frederick Kienle, *Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch: Lessons for the Future*, American Enterprise Institute, May 2007

Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Rudolfo, *Iraqi Insurgent Media, The War of Images and Ideas*, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Special Report, July 2007

Dr. Phebe Marr

- *Iraq's Reconstruction: Where is it Going?*, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 2003
- *Iraq's New Political Map*, January 2007

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- *Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience*, written by Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, Keith Crane, 2005
- *Rebuilding Security Forces and Institutions in Iraq*, 2005

[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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